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Freeman, Richard B., Ph.D., 1998, Forestry
The U.S. Forest Service and the Political Construction of Ecosystem
Management (272 pp.)

This study is a history of the U.S. Forest Service's adoption and construction
of Ecosystem Management as official policy for managing the national forests.
Secondary sources are used to establish the historical background for this
story, such as documented histories, policy texts, newspaper articles, and
widely-distributed magazine articles. Also, secondary sources are used as
primary evidence w hen their popularity reflects attitudes and political
positions influential during their time. To establish events and
developments during the formative years of ecosystem managem ent (19891993), I provide, as prim ary evidence not available in secondary sources, text
from interviews, memos, letters, and speeches. I conducted interviews with
seven of the people who were prominent in the Forest Service's adoption of
Ecosystem Management. Approved transcriptions of these interviews are on
file at the University of Montana's Mansfield Library.
This history unfolds along the lines of two opposite, yet simultaneous
movements — the invalidation of Forest Service agency and the official
political revision and reassertion of that agency. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the Forest Service, as a political entity in an environment of conflict, suffered
a drastic loss of legitimacy, agency, and identity. During this dilution of the
Forest Service's persona, a power shift was occurring —largely in reaction to
court mandates enjoining the Forest Service from timber harvest on various
western forests. Amidst this power struggle arose a new framework to guide
decision making regarding millions of acres of forest declared to be habitat of
the northern spotted owl (and ultimately, of other threatened species).
During this reconstruction, the political actors used science to aid their cause,
creating a political position of power for the non-timber-focused applied
sciences —particularly conservation biology and landscape ecology. These
scientists, as part of die bureaucratic milieu of the universities and agencies,
were influenced by the several "crises" that attended the political upheaval.
And, those who w ould translate scientific statements into science —
themselves scientists -- would become influential in Forest Service policy.
Congress, the courts, the Forest Service, and other executive agencies
summoned the work of these various scientists in constructing their
response, which emerged ultimately as ecosystem management. It was one
particularly acute crisis, however — the embarrassment of the Bush
administration during the Rio Conference on global warming in Brazil, 1992
—that precipitated the adoption of ecosystem management as a significant
policy event.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CONTENTS

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

Conflict and Negotiation: The Agency's Formative Years

12

Chapter 3

Smoky's Identity Crisis

36

Chapter 4

A dding Insult to Injury:
More Activism, Dissent, and Discord

77

Chapter 5

1

Big Science: The Synthetic Discourses of
Landscape Ecology and Conservation Biology

102

The Power of Science: The Interagency Science Team
and the Scientific Panel

142

Chapter 7

Poly Science: The New Perspectives Program

165

Chapter 8

ForestWorld, a Policy Spectacle

203

Chapter 9

Plugging Up the Hole:
Filling die Signifier of Ecosystem Management

234

Chapter 6

Chapter 10 Conclusion

257

References Cited

262

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 1
Introduction

On June 4,1992, in a memo to regional foresters and station directors,
Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson announced what he called "the
marriage" between the agency and Ecosystem Management.1 He also laid out
the general principles and instructed his audience to report back w ithin 90
days regarding their strategies for implementing the policy.

Why is this event significant? What did the memo signify? Was it the
emergence of a new policy paradigm —a new "ecological approach" to public
forestry? Was his memo a rewording of the same old emphasis on timber?
Perhaps it demonstrates some sort of development or evolution in
environmental policy? Perhaps, more importantly, the memo signifies that,
at heart, public forestry and forest policy are political in origin. This
dissertation is a historical inquiry into the processes and events that
culminated in Robertson's memo of June 4, 1992. The study demonstrates
that forest policy is, indeed, based upon politics.

The paper narrates the history of the Forest Service's "marriage" w ith
Ecosystem Management as a political story, w ith subjects, agendas, and
conflict, itself part of a larger political story. This history, as I have w ritten it,
unfolds along the lines of two opposite, yet simultaneous movements — the
invalidation of Forest Service agency and the official political revision and

1 Robertson to Regional Foresters, June 4> 1992.

1
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reassertion of that agency.2 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Forest Service as
a political entity in an environment of conflict endured a drastic loss of
legitimacy, agency, and identity. During this dilution of the Forest Service's
persona, a power shift was occurring —largely driven by court mandates
enjoining the Forest Service from timber harvest on various forests. Amidst
this power struggle arose a new structure for decision making regarding
millions of acres of forest declared to be in spotted owl habitat (and
ultimately, the habitat of other rare species). D uring this reconstruction, the
political actors called on science to aid their cause, creating a political position
of power that the applied sciences (especially wildlife biology, hydrology, and
ecology) had not previously experienced. Congress, the courts, the Forest
Service, and other executive agencies, summoned the services of a scientific
community and its production of science, which featured its own political
relationships and personalities, as well as its ow n bureaucracy.

Methodology and Method

The historian sets out to arrange "facts" — documentable events, names,
dates, messages, and so forth —in a way that makes sense to him or her.
Crudely speaking, constructing history requires two tasks: the making or
gathering of facts - the researching and documenting of useful pieces of
information — and the making sense of facts — strictly interpretation.
Interpretation involves assigning signifiers (the facts) into meaningful
categories (metaphors). If the reader —the judge -- cannot dispute the fact, can
2 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "agency" as such: "1: the capacity,
condition, or state of acting or of exerting power: OPERATION." The Oxford English
Dictionary uses similar language: "1. The faculty of an agent of acting; active working or
operation; action or activity." (Italidzation of "faculty" is mine.)
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agree with the attribution of category to fact, and can agree that the category is
worth mentioning, then the statement stands as history.

In constructing this history, I combine three methods for making or
appropriating facts, each corresponding with its own type of evidence. First,
to construct historical context, I use previously documented histories or other
secondary texts (texts written by others about the events I, too, am
chronicling). For instance, I employ histories and policy textbooks, such as
David Clary's Timber and the Forest Service, Paul Flirt's Conspiracy of
Optim ism , Michael Kraft's Environmental Policy and Politics, Stephen
Yaffee's Wisdom of the Spotted Owl, and Samual Dana and Sally Fairfax's
standard Forest and Range Policy. I also use newspaper and magazine articles
out of the widely-distributed publications —for instance the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and Time and N ew sw eek magazines. Authorship and
date of these texts vary.

Second, to establish previously undocumented fact —particularly
concerning attitudes and political positions of the actors during those times —
I also use some otherwise secondary texts. For instance, I use histories like
Michael Frome's The Forest Service — to demonstrate the popular historical
perspectives. I use newspaper and magazine articles to demonstrate attitudes
of the press toward policy makers and policy developments. I am assuming
that a study or history of the Forest Service, widely read and cited during in
the 1980s, provides evidence regarding prevailing attitudes about policy.
Texts that provides prim ary evidence in this context w ould serve as a
secondary source in another case.
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Third, to establish additional fact, I provide, as primary evidence not
available in secondary sources, text from memos, letters, speeches, and
interviews. I conducted interviews w ith seven people who w ere involved in
the events leading up to the Forest Service adoption of Ecosystem
Management. The interviewees are (alphabetized by last name):

— Jerry Franklin was a forestry professor at the University of Washington
and a Forest Service Researcher in the Pacific Northwest during this historical
period. He was a key spokesman for the idea of "new forestry," a component
of ecosystem management, as well as serving on two scientific committees
that produced the text that would constitute the new policy framework — the
Scientific Panel on Late-Successional Forests of the Pacific Northwest (1990-91)
and the Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (1993).

He also

promoted and provided ideas for the Forest Service's N ew Perspectives
program —a pilot project for ecosystem management.

— John Gordon was Dean of Yale University's forestry school and also
served on the Scientific Panel.

— George Leonard was Associate Chief of the Forest Service during the
owl crisis and w hen Chief Robertson signed the memo. He retired in spring
1993.

— John Mumma was Regional Forester for the Forest Service's northern
region, based in Missoula, Montana. He played a large part in conflict
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between regional officers and the Forest Service directorate in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.

— Dale Robertson, whose memo announced the "marriage" to ecosystem
management, was Chief of the Forest Service from 1987 to 1993. Robertson
was a careerist in the agency, working his way from assistant ranger from 1964
to 1966 to Chief in 1987. Between he held the positions of Ranger,
Management Analyst (Washington Office), 1968-73, Supervisor (Siuslaw
National Forest, 1974-76, and Mt. Hood National Forest, 1976-80), Associate
Deputy Chief, Programs and Legislation, 1981-82, and Associate Chief, from
1982-87.3 In 1987, Robertson became Chief.

— Hal Salwasser was a Forest Service Washington Office bureaucrat who
was largely responsible for constructing and marketing the agency's New
Perspectives Program and developing some of the language later used in
ecosystem management. During much of his career w ith the Forest Service —
from 1978 to the present — Salwasseris role involved translating natural
resource-related science for planning, management, and marketing
objectives. From November, 1978, until June, 1982, he served as "Regional
Wildlife Ecologist" in the Pacific Southwest Region, where he was
Coordinator of the California Interagency Wildlife Task Group, in addition to
other responsibilities.4 In June, 1982, Salwasser became "National Wildlife
Ecologist," and in November, 1985, he moved to "Deputy Director of Wildlife
and Fisheries."5 In January, 1990, he became the first (and last) director of the

3 Roberston, "Curriculum Vitae."
4 Salwasser, "Curriculum Vitae," 2.
5 Ibid.
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New Perspectives Program, until the program was discontinued in
September, 1992, after which he served as "Boone and Crockett Professor of
Wildlife Conservation," at the University of Montana until June, 1985. At
this time, Salwasser accepted the position of "Regional Forester" for the
Forest Service's Northern Region, based in Missoula, Montana.6 In addition
to his agency work, Salwasser served as "Senior Analyst for N atural
Resources" on the President's Commission on Americans Outdoors," from
January to October, 1996

— Jack Ward Thomas was on all the scientific teams that helped construct
much of the language of ecosystem management: the Interagency Science
Team (1ST), 1989-90; the Scientific Panel, 1990-91; the Scientific Assessment
Team (SAT), 1992-93, and the FEMAT, in 1903. Of these, he led the 1ST, SAT,
and FEMAT. In 1993, President Bill Clinton made Thomas Chief of the Forest
Service, where he served until 1996, when he became Boone and Crocket
Professor for Wildlife Conservation at the University of Montana. Before he
became well-known through his work on the various scientific teams,
Thomas' career charted a fairly conventional path up the Forest Service line
of authority.

After serving as a Research and Management Biologist for the

Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, from 1957 to 1966, Thomas entered the
Forest Service as a Research Wildlife Biologist.7 In 1969, he became a
Principal Research Wildlife Biologist, and in 1969, the Chief Research
Wildlife Biologist at the Pacific Northwest Research Station, in La Grande,
Oregon.8 He occupied this post until becoming Chief in early 1993.

6 Ibid., 1-2.
7 Thomas, "Curriculum Vitae."
8 Ibid.
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In addition to using text from these sources, I borrowed text from
interviews conducted and published by others -- found in otherwise
secondary texts, for instance interviews of Forest Service officers found in
books like Yaffee's Wisdom of the Spotted Owl or in articles of magazines
such as the Journal of Forestry. I also used transcripts of testimony in
congressional hearings, memoranda, and newspaper and magazine articles
written by the historical characters- In this way, I have been able to document
the history in relation to particular people or agencies.

The Dissertation Organization

I will begin in Chapter 1, "Conflict and Negotiation" by narrating the
politically tumultuous formative years of the Forest Service. During these
years, 1897 to 1960, Gifford Pinchot and other politicians maneuvered to gain
agency and resources for the Service through an often hostile Congress and
maintain it from aggression by the expansionist Department of the Interior
and western business interests and politicians. The Forest Service attem pted
to bolster its image and gain popularity, culminating in its golden years
between the early 1940s and the late 1960s. But, I ask, despite the Forest
Service's rising budgets and a high public profile, was the agency not as
unified as some might argue?

In Chapter 2, "Smokey's Identity Crisis," 1964-1992,1 will discuss the major
legislation and case law that dim inished the Forest Service's discretion in
planning and managing the national forests. National politics — particularly
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an active Congress and courts —exerted immense pressure upon the Forest
Service that culminated in an organizational identity crisis and the loss of its
pre-war mythic status of a unified, credible, can-do agency. In March, 1989,
federal judge William Dwyer enjoined the Forest Service from all timber
activities w ithin the territory of the northern spotted owl until it could
assemble a "credible" scientific team to construct an "owl plan" for managing
the national forests in the Pacific Northwest. In a series of decisions, the
courts continued to enjoin the agency until spring 1993.

In Chapter 3, "A dding Insult to Injury: More Activism, Dissent, and
Discord," 1984-1992, I will trace the political activism directed against the
agency by activists and dissenters within the agency as well as the protest
directed at the agency by andent-forest activists and journalists outside the
Forest Service —from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. This public and
internal unraveling of the Forest Service's image contributed to the
organizational identity crisis that occurred in the early 1990s. The persistence
and consequences of these dem ands seemed to signify that the Forest Service
needed to do something (anything!) dramatic enough to resurrect its image —
from the perspectives of its ow n workers as well as its external critics.

In Chapter 4, " Big Srience," I briefly discuss the political construction of
these sdentific discourses -- landscape ecology, conservation biology, and new
forestry —outlining their concepts and rational structure and their bearings
upon the history of the production (reconstruction or "reinvention," in the
agency's words) of the agency's new mission, Ecosystem Management.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In Chapter 5, "The Power of Science," 1989-1991,1 discuss the formation
and work of the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC), 1989-90, and the
"Scientific Panel to Study Late Successional and Old Growth Forests"
(Scientific Panel). In 1989, Congress legislated into existence the ISC, adding
legislative authority to Judge Dwyer's requirement that the Forest Service
produce a "scientifically credible" plan. In April 1990, the team submitted a
plan to Congress, but the administration of president George Bush forbade the
Forest Service to adopt the plan. Political conflict continued, and public
dissatisfaction remained high. In 1990, Congress convened the Scientific
Panel to construct a group of alternatives for legislative zoning and
management of the owl region. In 1991, the panel submitted its report to the
House of Representatives. Congress failed to pass legislation resulting from
the Scientific Panel's work, and the controversy and injunction continued.
Nevertheless, the two reports remained important in the development of
ecosystem management, because they provided the framework for planning
that the Forest Service would adopt for its construction of ecosystem
m anagem ent.

In the same year, the Forest Service chartered the "New Perspectives"
program. Much of the science that the ISC, the Scientific Panel, and the New
Perspectives program appropriated came from the "disciplines" of
Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology and the closely related "New
Forestry" (a synthesis of Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology applied
to forest ecosystems) that were themselves produced in a politically charged
environment. Conservation biology's political agenda is written into its
name, and many of its progenitors are explicit about their position in politics
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as advocates. Landscape Ecology is political as well, if not as explicitly, surely
as thoroughly, its progenitors also emerging and writing in a political
environm ent.

In Chapter 6, "Poly-Science," 1989-1992,1 discuss the Forest Service's "New
Perspectives" program, which the agency began building in 1989 to articulate a
"new" set of management principles based upon new political demands,
knowledge and science. During the period in which the ISC and the Scientific
Panel were convening, a group of Forest Service officers and staff were busy
constructing a policy framework using the language of these scientific and
political discourses. The production of "New Perspectives" involved political
maneuvering and negotiation as well as the production of texts that reflected
this "science." In this manner, science and politics were woven into a
construction w ith an appearance of solidity — in the hope of achieving
political stability.

In Chapter 7, "Forest World," I discuss the events leading up to Dale
Robertson's authorship of the June 4 "marriage" memo, in context w ith the
relationship between the administration of U.S. president George Bush and
the Forest Service. The pressures bearing upon Bush, particularly in relation
to his re-election campaign, as well as his involvement at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, had
a major influence on the timing and shape of the Ecosystem Management
policy.
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Last, in the condusion, "Plugging Up the Hole: Filling the Signifier of
Ecosystem Management," 1992-93, I refocus attention upon the political
function of Ecosystem Management, to ask, "what was (or is) Ecosystem
Management?" In the context of events in the year after the June 4 memo, I
offer an answer: It is a mediating structure —a production —meant to
reconcile the Forest Service ideas with the manifold desires of the political
public Ecosystem management defines what resources are recognized to exist
and in w hat quantities, it outlines the trade-offs between uses (or resources),
and manages the processes for making the derisions. Ecosystem Management
as produced by the Forest Service does not, in and of itself, make political
decisions, but rather, it draws and maps the rules and boundaries of the larger
political struggle over resources on the National Forests. Actual decisions are
made at various levels (internal and external to the agency), and while
drawing and mapping are themselves political processes, the most general
and far reaching questions and decisions are negotiated in a political struggle
involving congressional and executive as well as judicial players.
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Chapter 2
Conflict and Negotiation: The Agency's Formative Years
Nowadays you can scarcely be a lookout without a uniform and
a college degree, but in 1919 not a man in our outfit, least of all
the ranger himself, had been to college. They still picked rangers
for the Forest Service by picking the toughest guy in town. Ours,
Bill Bell, was the toughest in the Bitterroot Valley, and we
thought he was the best ranger in the Forest Service.
As a uniform, our ranger always wore his .45 and most of our
regular crew also packed revolvers, including me. The two old
men in the outfit told the rest of us that "USFS" stood for
"User'er Slow and Fuck'er Fast." Being young and literal, I put
up anargument at first pointing out that the beginning letters in
the motto didn't exactly fit USFS — that their last word "Fast"
didn't begin with S as "Seruice" did. As far as they were
concerned, their motto fitted the United States Forest Service
exactly, and by the end o f the summer I came to share their
opinion.
— Norm an MacLean
"USFS 1919: The Ranger, the Cook,
and a Hole in the Sky," in
A River Runs Through It and Other Stories

In the 1940s, Gifford Pinchot nostalgically wrote that the Forest Service,
which he had been so instrumental in forming, "had a clear understanding of
where it was going, it was determined to get there, and it was never afraid to
fight for w hat was right. Every man and woman in the Service believed in it
and its work, and took great pride in belonging to it."9 The agency, created by
the U.S. Congress to be administered by the executive branch of the
government —but built by Pinchot —was clear about its mission, it was

9 Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, 285.
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militant about its mission (to cut trees and regulate harvest and assure a
steady supply of water) and, apparently, dissent was at a minimum.

But, can we accept Pinchot's claim without skepticism? After all, he wrote
of a life of politicking —negotiating the creation of the Forest Reserves and
the Forest Service, serving as Governor of Pennsylvania, running for a seat in
the Senate, and lobbying and advocating for several controversial political
agendas. During much of his life as a politician, Pinchot —as Chief and exChief —defended the Forest Service from political foes, saving the agency
from funding crises, land transfers, and control (agency) transfers. He had a
stake in promoting virtues for his agency, believing that his political activities
were crucial for American forestry.10

But, these years were rife with conflict and uncertainty, as Pinchot himself
described in his autobiography.11 Such a political environment could not
have offered a great deal of certainty for anyone invested in the Forest Service
during those years. Perhaps, the Forest Service, from the beginning, was not
as clear about its own agency (discretion) much less its direction as Pinchot
claimed. Certainly it developed in a hostile political environment.

In this chapter, I w ill outline Forest Service history up to the 1960s from
the perspective of its struggle to survive in a hostile politics, dividing it into
two eras following the reasoning of historian Paul Hirt. In A Conspiracy of
O ptim ism , H irt divides the history of the Forest Service into two eras. In the
"Custodial Era," from the agency's creation in 1905 to World War
10 Pinchot, Breaking New Ground.
11 Ibid., 391-476.
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agency was mainly concerned with overseeing use of the national forests, and
it contributed less than five percent of the nation's wood supply. Following
the war, during the first two decades of the "Intensive Management" years
(1945 to the early 1990s), the Forest Service doubled, tripled, and ultimately
quadrupled timber harvest from the national forests and in the process
became tightly coupled w ith the timber industry.12 This chapter traces both
the custodial years, marked by political conflict and institutional insecurity,
and the early Intensive Management years, w hen the Forest Service enjoyed
relative prosperity and discretion.

Insecurity in the Formative Years — 1905 to World War II

The Forest Service's first decade depended almost entirely upon the
maneuverings of one charismatic politician, Pinchot, who was soon banished
from federal service under the Taft administration after a political dispute.
The Forest Service, w ith or without Pinchot, has always had to defend itself in
a hostile political environment, especially against powerful sectors in
Congress. Since its inception, Congress has pushed around the Forest Service
—not in the sense that Congress has often been unified, but in the sense that
the agency has usually faced hostility from at least some quarters of Congress
and has had to be responsive to that hostility.

It has often found itself in a

tenuous position; its gains have usually been qualified and at risk from
hostile quarters within Congress and an expanding and competitive
Department of the Interior.13

12 Hirt, Conspircay of Optimism, xxi, 44.
13 Clary, Timber and the Forest Service, Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy; Robbins,
Lumberjacks and Legislators.
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Even its ow n original organic act — 'T h e Organic Act of 1897" —was not
really its own. Congress wrote the Act to grant custodial powers over the
forest reserves to the Department of Interior (giving as much extra pow er to
the President as it did the Secretary of the Interior). Not until seven years
later, with the urging of President Theodore Roosevelt and this confidant,
Pinchot, did Congress transfer these powers to the Department of Agriculture
and the new ly formed Forest Service.14

On the other hand, as an agency, the Forest Service has had agency —the
authority and resources to pursue objectives.15 It is an administrative
bureaucracy w ith a certain amount of discretion —based upon the "organic"
mandate, as well as a hodge-podge of legislation and case law16 —though it has
been constantly subject to overview, revision and threat of revision by a
hostile Congress. In the Creative Act of 1891, Congress gave discretion to the
President to designate forest reserves. It later gave agency to the Secretary of
Interior to adm inister and sell timber off them (Organic Act of 1897) and
finally transferred this agency to the Forest Service in the Transfer Act 1905.17
As usual, contention and debate characterized the political negotiations that
yielded these laws.

14 Transfer Act of 1905.
15 See footnote 2 for a dictionary definition of "agency."
15 I describe the development of this legal structure in the paragraphs below.
17 The "Creative Act" was actually a subsection of General Revision Act of 1891. Listed as
Creative Act in the References Cited. The "Organic Act" was a rider to the 1897 General
Appropriations Act of June 4,1987; listed as Organic Act. See Dana and Fairfax, Forest and
Range Policy, 81, and Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 18.
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The lands, to which the Organic Act made reference in 1897, included 47
m illion acres already designated under the presidential authority written into

the "Creative Act" - a designation that caused considerable congressional
reaction. The 1891 act, which Gifford Pinchot later dubbed "the most
important legislation in the history of forestry in America," passed through a
lackadaisical and inattentive Congress as a last minute rider to "A Bill to
Repeal the Timber Culture Laws," which was widely supported.18 At the
urging of Secretary of Interior, John Noble, Congress hastily attached the rider
in Conference Committee, violating its own rules of procedure and writing
law in language that was vague and sloppy (including an incomplete
sentence).19 Nevertheless, the bill stood. W ithin a month, President
Harrison created the Yellowstone Park Forest Reservation, and over the next
two years, he added a total of 13 million acres. By 1894, Harrison's successor,
Grover Cleveland had added another 4.5 million acres. Shortly before his
departure in February, 1897, Cleveland hastily added 21.3 million acres to the
reservation system, but "with no mention of how they were to be
administered, managed, or used."20

Cleveland's actions inspired various congressional proposals to alter or
eliminate the powers in the Creative Act. Congress attached a rider to its
appropriations bill allowing any President to "modify or abolish" forest
reserves, which the lame duck Cleveland killed w ith a pocket veto in early
1897, deferring the problem to his successor. (Cleveland was concerned that

1® Williams, Americans, 409-411.
Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 55-58; Williams, Americans, 409-411.
20 Williams, Americans, 414.
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McKinley w ould use the act to dismantle the newly formed reserves.21)
McKinley, taking office in February, convened a special session of Congress to
pass an appropriations bill (so the federal government could operate), and
again Congress debated the future of the reserves, settling upon the purposes
of the reserves as the central issue. In this context, on June 4, 1897, Congress
passed the law that was to later become the Forest Service's "organic law." The
language of the Organic Act of 1897 states that the purposes of the reserves are
to assure outputs such as water and tim ber in the long term, giving the
President authority to establish forest reserves only to "improve and protect
the forest w ithin the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber"22

Much of the Organic Act of 1897 specifies the Secretary of Interior's
authorization to dispense timber outputs in a lawful manner, including
timber sales, with an eye towards sustainability of the timber resource: "For
the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and promoting the
younger grow th on forest reservations, the Secretary of the Interior, under
such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, may cause to be designated
and appraised so much of the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found
upon such forest reservations as may be compatible with the utilization of the
forests thereon."23

The law further instructed the Secretary regarding the

designation, appraisal, and marketing of timber sales as well as dispensation of
revenues from such sales.

Thus, he was to appoint some person to the

purpose of marking or designating timber "before being sold," as well as
21 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 61.
22 Creative Act of 1891.
23 Ibid.
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supervising its cutting and removal. The particular language —"such timber,
before being sold, shall be marked and designated" - was to be central to the
Monongahela case, seventy-five years later.

Further, the Secretary had

administrative obligations to provide "protection against destruction by fire
and depredations," the exact meaning of "depredations" not being spelled out
in the Act.24

In 1905, urged by Pinchot and President Roosevelt, Congress transferred
authority concerning the reserves to a newly created Forest Service in the
Department of Agriculture. The Transfer Act of 1905 authorized the agency to
deposit funds from timber sales and grazing permits into an account from
which it could draw for Forest Service administrative reasons. (This financial
discretion was consistent w ith the idea of self-supporting agencies, popular in
a budget conservative Congress.) Probably as important to future national
forest policy as the Act itself was the letter Secretary of Agriculture, James
Wilson, addressed to Pinchot giving him instruction regarding dispensation
of the reserves. In this letter, which Pinchot is said to have crafted himself,
Wilson enunciates the utilitarian vision of the forest service as well as its
commitment to serve industries depending upon forest resources.25 This was
an assertion of agency discretion that was destined to become a polity
statement, and it also reflected the pressures of the w estern congressmen in
whose states the reserves were located. By early 1906, reserves covered an area
of 85.5 million acres, but again, opposition was mounting.

24 Ibid.
25 This letter —particularly text like the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number in
the long run" —has found coinage in forest policy discourse since Pinchot ghost-wrote it for
Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson. Wilson, '"Wilson to Pinchot."
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These transfers of agency were largely the product of the assertive Gifford
Pinchot's political maneuvering, and the survival of the fledgling bureaucracy
depended especially upon this one individual assisted by his Mend, President
Theodore Roosevelt. By 1906, Pinchot was already working the margins of
credibility, making exaggerated claims to Congress regarding the agency's
ability to pay for itself and buying off western opposition with the promise of
local dividends and community stability in order to get funding.26 Almost
immediately, Congress was to reduce and constrain these fiscal powers,
depriving the agency of much of its independence to make and spend
m oney.27

In March, 1907, through the Agricultural Appropriations Act, Congress
reduced the agency's fiscal discretion by assigning ten percent of receipts to
local and state governments for schools and roads.28 While this affirmed
Pinchot's argument to westerners that national forestry was good for
community stability, it was a step away from fiscal impunity.29 In the same
act, Congress abolished the forestry fund and explicitly required the agency to
report receipts and expenditures (tightly curtailing spending discretion).30
Also in the same act, Congress revoked presidential authority to establish new
reserves, restraining the president from transferring authority of public
domain lands from the Department of Interior to the Department of
A griculture.31 The national forest system w ould grow more slowly and by

26 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Polio/, 25-26.
27 See Wolf, "National Forest Timber Sales."
Appropriations Act of 1907.
29 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26.
30 Appropriations Act of 1907.
31 Ibid.
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different means. Also in the appropriations act, Congress renam ed the Forest
Reserves the National Forests.32 In 1908 Congress raised to twenty-five
percent the share of receipts from timber stumpage that the Forest Service had
to pay to local governments for schools and roads.33 Payments to counties
were destined to play a major role in the development of future agency
policy.34 In the Appropriations Act of 1913, Congress again used an
appropriations act to make forest polity by requiring the Forest Service to use
ten percent of receipts for road-building, effectively tying the agency*s funding
to the timber program.35

Shortly before he signed the 1907 Appropriations Act, President Roosevelt,
with advice and assistance from Pinchot, hastily added nearly 65 million acres
to the system, again provoking the westerners, especially ranchers, who
wanted unrestricted access to the forest lands.36 In 1911, after much debate that
was characterized by the use of advocacy science concerning the relationship
between forests and watersheds, Congress passed the Weeks Act, which
authorized and funded the Forest Service to acquire eastern lands.37 This act,
in a sense, marked the close of the Forest Service's formative years; the lines
had been draw n and redraw n in an environment of political struggle and
hostility that w ould continue "to haunt the Forest Service for decades."38

32 Ibid.
33 Appropriations Act of 1908.
34 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26; Hirt, Conspiracy of Optimism, xxxivxxxv.
35 Appropriations Act of 1913.
36 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 25-26
37 The Weeks Act of 1911.
38 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 90-92.
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Also in 1911, the Supreme Court "firmly established the Forest Service's
broad regulatory authority" in a "landmark" ruling in the case of United
States v. Grimaud, particularly the authority to charge fees and require permits
for National Forest use.39 According to Charles Wilkinson, "lower court
decisions since Grimaud have consistently upheld assertions of Forest Service
regulatory power. The agency has withstood challenges to its permitting
procedures, a basic element of the agency's authority by which it regulates
various uses of the national forests," all under the "auspices of the Organic
Act."

The Service's administrative powers benefited in other ways, too.

In the

years between 1911 and World War II, Congress passed laws that further tied
the Forest Service to local and industrial concerns —a direction previously
established by Pinchot's rhetoric and the machinations of the congressional
appropriations process. The Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 created the authority
for fire control and cooperation with state governments in fire control,
reforestation, and conservation programs, as well as expanding the eastern
forests acquisition programs, while the McSweeney-McNary Act of 1928
established the Forest Service research program.40 The Knutson-Vanderberg
Act (1930) further tied the agency to its timber program by authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to require timber buyers to pay for reforestation and
silvicultural activities.41

39 United States v. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource
Planning, 55-57.
40 Clarke-McNary Act of 1924; McSweeney-McNary Act of 1928. Clary, Timber and the
Forest Service, 83.
41 Knutson-Vanderberg Act of 1930.
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Yet, these years were not calm: congressional hostility remained, and the
agency faced aggression from other quarters, particularly an expanding
Department of the Interior (DOI). In 1908, following conflict between Gifford
Pinchot and the newly assigned DOI Secretary, Richard Ballinger, Pinchot was
fired, marking the beginning of three decades of tension between the Forest
Service and the DOI. In the mid-1920s, Harold Ickes, Secretary of the DOI
under Franklin Roosevelt, opposed Forest Service attem pts to obtain
congressional appropriations for recreation and suggested that the DOI take
control of the Forest Service. In the early 1930s, Ickes resurrected this idea of
subsuming the Forest Service and Interior bureaucracies into a Department of
Conservation.

The proposal was not adopted, but continued to reside in the

discourse as an uncomfortable issue for the Forest Service. In 1933, Congress
placed under DOI jurisdiction sixteen monuments w ithin national forest
boundaries. Conflict between the DOI and Forest Service persisted
throughout the 1930s as Ickes, working w ith Congress, attempted to acquire
more national forest lands for the National Park Service or extend Park
Service control of recreation planning over them.42

Forest Service struggle with the Park Service significantly influenced its
recreation policy.

From its early years, the Forest Service attempted to

establish itself as a provider of recreation in order to establish its legitimacy as
manager of all above ground resources on the national forests.

While the

automobile and related recreation remained central to Forest Service
recreation policy in the 1920s and 1930s, the agency also committed resources
to wilderness policy, particularly to the "U-Regulations" of 1939. The U-

42 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 151-152,193-194.
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Regulations were a three-tier roadless area classification that w ere the subject
of internal Forest Service conflict, as was its predecessor policy, the "LRegulations" of 1929. Advocates argued that a vigorous wilderness program
would build public support and institutional protection against an aggressive
Department of the Interior, while opponents argued that focusing upon
wilderness and recreation as a forest use affirmed the DOI position that
recreation was a legitimate primary use of public lands. This rift represented
the beginning of internal conflict that was to arise, mutate, and grow to much
more serious proportions by the 1970s and into the 1980s.43

The FS suffered hostility from the timber industry also, insofar as it
pressed for government regulation over industry logging on private lands.
From as early as 1919, Pinchot had enlisted members of the Forest Service
directorate in ca llin g for federal regulations over land use on privately owned
lands, particularly those belonging to the large corporations.44 Agency
personnel, however, w ere not united in support of such regulation, and in the
1920s, the Forest Service did not adopt an official position in support of such
regulation, advocating state rather than federal control.

Nevertheless, Pinchot and his supporters pressed for legislation, and
though no laws were passed, they did bring influence to a congressional study
of timber harvesting culm inating in the Timber depletion, lumber exports,
and concentration of timber ownership report in 1920.45 Later, the
"Depression Chiefs of the Forest Service ... were increasingly vociferous and

43 Ibid., 155.
44 Ibid., 125.
43 Ibid., and Williams, Americans 325.
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adamant in their espousal of federal forest regulation."46 In 1933, the agency
produced the "Copeland Report," predicting timber famine and advocating
increased federal land acquisitions and control over industry timber
production. Some of these ideas briefly came to realization in the "Lumber
Code" provisions of the National Industrial Relations Act, though, within a
year, the Supreme Court "unanimously invalidated the whole NIRA
program."47 Roosevelt, with encouragement of Chief Earl Clappe, assembled a
'Joint Congressional Committee on Forestry," which, in 1938, issued a report
calling for state control rather than federal planning —a disappointm ent to
advocates of Forest Service control over private tim ber regulation.48 Next,
the agency enlisted forest rangers in a failed attempt to persuade the public
and the industry to adopt regulations on industrial lands.49 By 1940, the
agency found its morale at an all time low, with FS Chief Earl Clappe reporting
that "[o]ne group of problems included the existing morale in the Forest
Service, and baffled feeling of many men because they do not know what
Forest Service objectives are, the feeling of uneasiness or even hopelessness
because of inadequate legislation and funds for badly needed work, the belief
that the Service is continually on the defensive, the dam per on enthusiasm
and creative effort caused by the threat of reorganization."50

On the other hand, in the 1930s, the agency had gained the support of
recreation users and New Deal work project advocates with Forest Service
projects. For example, the Forest Service was able to muster the labor of the
45
47
48
49
50

Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 168.
Ibid., 170.
Ibid., 170-171.
Clary, Timber, 108-09.
Earl Clappe in Clary, Timber, 109.
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Civilian Conservation Corps for tree planting and fire suppression and
development of trails and recreational facilities. The N ew Deal work was a
source of legitimacy and political momentum for the Forest Service, though of
limited potency.

Its next challenge, however —a drastically scaled-up production for World
War II —propelled it to the front lines of industrial production. According to
Hurt, "timber sales on the national forest rose from 1.3 bbf to 3.1 bbf between
1939 and 1945, an increase of 238 percent. More significantly, the proportion of
national forest contributions to the total national timber production economy
in that same period doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent.51 World War II,
with its increased demands, sharply contrasted with the preceding fifteen years
and provided the impetus for the Forest Service to undergo its
metamorphosis into a large-scale timber provider. H irt claimed.
World War Two thus represents a major transition period in the
history of the Forest Service. The move to intensive
management and rapidly expanded production that began w ith
the war and peaked in the 1960s is crucial to understanding the
foundation of current national forest management
controversies.52

Clary also stated that the agency was, "at the close of the war, thoroughly
oriented toward production forestry in a way that it had never been
previously."53

Intensive Management (the construction of Smoky Bear)
51 Hirt, Conspiracy, 45.
52 Ibid., xxi.
53 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 175.
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Intensive Management (the construction of Smoky Bear)

During the late 1940s and the 1950s, governm ent and industry
undertook major investments in transportation, education, mass
communications, manufacturing and agriculture. These investments had
numerous impacts, including demographic changes, introduction of new
manufacturing and agricultural technologies, and the wide spread, everyday
use of mass communication technologies — the telephone, television, and
radio. According to Hirt, "pent-up dem and for housing exploded after 1945,
exacerbated by a postwar 'baby boom /"54 D uring this time, the Forest Service
grew tremendously in terms of its labor force, its budget, its productivity, and
its effects upon the landscape, as it became linked to the timber industry and
its political constituency. Meanwhile, public contact increased as numbers of
visitors to the national forests increased, and people increasingly voiced
political dem ands for non-timber uses. Eventually, the demands became
more acute, culminating in congressional acts constituting the bulk of
environmental legislation relevant to the politics concerning national forests
in the 1980s and 90s.

Accompanying these production increases, an important development in
the early intensive management days was the coupling of the Forest Service
w ith the timber industry. For instance, in 1951, the National Lumber
M anufacturing Association (NLMA), "who had opposed the sale of national
forest timber up until the early 1940s (trying to keep competition down and
prices up), now spoke critically about the national forests not contributing

54 Hirt, Conspiracy, 50.
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their 'fair share' to the lumber supply burden, disingenuously blaming the
Forest Service for the overcutting that had earlier occurred on private
lands."55 The industry began a full-time lobbying effort, which used the
Korean War to link national security to its timber supply from national
forests, conjuring up images of a national emergency and timber famine crisis
to promote "immediate development of plans for the maximum utilization of
publicly owned stumpage. These plans should include consideration of
overmature stands now degenerating in areas now locked up for lack of ready
access in Alaska."56

Congress, particularly through the appropriation committees, responded by
raising timber budgets, particularly for "the agency's proposed accelerated road
construction program," while neglecting reforestation, wildlife, and recreation
budgets.57 In FY 1950, Congress made available to the Forest Service $13.3
million for forest roads; in FY 1951, $16.9 million; in FY 1952, $18.9 million;
and for FY 1953 the figure jum ped to $24.3 million.58 In comparison, the
entire budget for national forest protection and management of all resources —
in FY 1953 amounted to $39.8 million (not including roads). These road funds
and additional tim ber purchaser credits built nearly 6,000 new miles of roads
between FY 1951 and FY 1953.59 In 1959, the Forest Service requested $24
million for road construction, which Congress increased to $28 million, "a 17
percent increase aver the agency's request, equivalent to a fifth of the total
budget allocation approved by Congress, hi contrast, in the final appropriation
55
56
57
58
59

Ibid., 90. Hirt acknowledges Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legislators.
Hirt, Conspiracyr 90.
Ibid.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid.
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the Forest Service got substantially less than it requested for reforestation, soil
and w ater management, wildlife, and recreation."60

Thus encouraged by Congress, the agency adopted an "intensive
management" operating philosophy. To implement the program, the Forest
Service began using large clearcuts coupled w ith intensive tree growing
practices —terracing, tree planting, chemical weeding and protection against
insects and disease, fire suppression, among others and dramatically increased
its cut. According to Flirt:
The key development in national forest management in the
1950s was the full maturing of intensive timber extraction and
the contingent evolution of technical and ideological rationales
for raising allowable cut levels, including the widespread
adoption of clearcutting as an alternative to selective cutting.
During the 1950s, timber production from the national forests
shot up from 3.5 billion board feet to 9.3 billion board feet. At
the same time, the percentage of national forest contributions to
total U.S. timber harvests climbed from 10 percent to 15 percent.
In the Pacific Northwest, national forest contributions to
regional timber production in this decade jumped from 21
percent to 35 percent.61

The Forest Service's "rationales" for raising the allowable cut inevitably
reflected the demands of the timber industry, which reinterpreted the
maximum allowable cut to be the amount of timber to which the industry
should have access.62 What's more, rationales were ambiguous enough to
allow for flexibility and interpretation, marking their construction as projects
of political negotiation. The construction of politically acceptable allowable cut
60 Ibid., 210. (Emphasis in original.)
61 Ibid., 131. "The volume of timber cut oof the national forests as a whole rose horn 3.7 billion
board feet in FY 1949 to 4.6 bbf in 1951, and to 5.1 bbf in 1953." Ibid., 90.
62 Ibid., 132.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
limits —that is, acceptable to industry —required the forestry community to
construct "theories of technological control," to justify "promises that
politicians and constituents then expected them to deliver."63 In addition, the
agency's "definition of multiple use and sustained yield, which had previously
been consistent with the industry view, grew more ambiguous in the late
1950s; that way agency leaders could retain the maximum am ount of
flexibility in applying them."64 In turn, the Forest Service enjoyed ever
expanding budgets, which it then spent upon more "intensive management,"
using the increased production of commodities to justify future budgets:
Since the agency's budget and employee base had significantly
expanded in response to promises to produce more goods and
services, admitting an inability to achieve production targets
would weaken Forest Service clout in budget negotiations and
threaten job security for hundreds, maybe thousands, of
employees. And since intensive management was a means for
increasing forest productivity to meet escalating demands,
abandoning the faith would have meant establishing limits to
production, saying no instead of yes to constituents and
congressmen, and rationing rather than simply stepping up
outputs.65

In the same twenty years, 1945-1965, the Forest Service gained a new degree
of authority in its successful promotion of recreation as a use that was worth
managing, insofar as it increased the agency's management options. In United
States v. Perko, a Federal Court affirmed the agency's authority to manage a
particular roadless area for recreation.66 In 1960, a friendly Congress
broadened this power to all national forests with the Forest Service authored
63 Ibid., xxxiii. For a brief history of this shift in the meaning of sustained yield, see Parry,
etal., "Changing Conceptions of Sustained Yield."
64 Ibid., 171.
® Ibid., xxxiii
66 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 59.
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Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act o f 1960 (MUSY) - a law that in its ambiguity
promises "more of everything for everyone."67 Hirt, who studied the Forest
Service's intensive management program, argued that, by "promoting
multiple use, politicians could befriend all the pressing constituencies, and
with intensive management there was to be more of everything for
everyone."68 The law specified a range of uses — recreation, range, timber,
watershed, wildlife, and fish — that the national forests are to make available
"in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people."69
In Wilkinson's words, the Act "has fortified the agency's defense against legal
challenges to its regulatory authority.70 The Act also directs the Forest Service
to maintain enough flexibility in its management to allow for changes in
demands for outputs. According to Hirt,
MUSY can be considered the last major victory for the Forest
Service in its struggle to retain full discretionary control over
national forest management (discretion w ithin budget
constraints, of course). After 1960, legislation became
increasingly prescriptive. The act further symbolized the
continued hegemony of the expanding pie ideology among
politicians and agency leaders.71

The Forest Service maintained its intensive managem ent posture into the
1960s, increasing its logging levels to pay for other programs, such as
recreation and wildlife. Finally, the agency enjoyed political prestige and a
modicum of security —only 20 years after Chief Earl Clappe lamented the poor
morale of the agency. It was selling more stumpage than ever before, and a
67
68
69
70
71

Hirt, Conspiracy, 84. Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
Hirt, Conspiracy, 84.
Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 62.
Hirt, Conspiracy, 190.
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friendly Congress, influenced by the timber industry, was increasing the
timber program budget. The Forest Service was also promoting itself to the
public, spending millions on public spectacles intended to influence the
populace. For instance, the agency worked w ith the Ad Council, the American
Broadcasting Agency and other television networks, the organizers of Macy's
parade, the Boy Scouts, magazines such as Playboy Magazine, the Disney
Corporation, and thousands of schools, civic organizations, and businesses to
promote its fire suppression program and bought advertisements in J 2 The
agency also propagandized communities about the link between national
forestry and community economic health (as well as national prosperity), and
promoted itself as the nation's premier recreation provider. During this
period, sociologist, Herbert Kaufman authored a book destined for wide
readership, The Forest Ranger, describing a confident, integrated agency that,
after thirty-five years, had established a solid institutional footing, a strong
identity, and a favorable popular image.

The Forest Service and Identity Management

Almost any study on the Forest Service dtes Herbert Kaufman's book, The
Forest Ranger, wherein he explores the assertion that, although the agency's
decentralized adm inistrative structure would encourage fragmentation and
inconsistency, "this fragmentation does not occur" — "rarely does one hear it
said that Rangers behave in a fashion inconsistent with Service policy." An
important question is, Why do they "not succumb to the centrifugal forces
inherent in the adm inistrative situation"?73
72 USDA1973, 6-10.
73 Kaufmann, Forest Ranger, 4-5.
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Kaufman addressed this question and described his research methodology
thus:
Five Ranger districts in different parts of the country were
selected for intensive analysis. They were not chosen as being
"typical," although districts with conspicuously unusual
characteristics were avoided; rather they were picked as samples
because together they show almost the whole range of Forest
Service activities and a wide variety of the conditions under
which its work is carried on. Ideally, the number of "specimens"
would have been larger —at least one district of a national forest
in each of the ten regions ... but there was neither sufficient
money nor manpower for more inclusive coverage.74
Kaufman concluded that the Forest Service uses several "techniques of
integration," using such techniques as "authorization, direction, and
prohibition," "official diaries," "sanctions," "selecting men who fit," and
"building identification with the Forest Service," to name only a few
"procedural devices for preforming decisions," "detecting and discouraging
deviation," and "developing the will and capacity."75

Most policy books concerning Forest Service in the recent decades reference
Kaufman's work, and many expound upon it. Michael Frome wrote of the
"[c]ohesiveness and loyalty" that had prevailed within the Forest Service,
claiming that "esprit and devotion to the agency rose as a binding force
between individuals and institution."76 Clary noted that "criticism from
w ithin was unlikely, because the shared culture of the agency was
pervasive."77 Depending upon Kaufman's account, Paul H irt describes a time
74
75
76
77

Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 92-124.
Frome, Forest Service, 36.
Clary, Timber, 196.
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when "the Forest Service enjoyed a high degree of public accolade and
organizational cohesion. Then, scholars d ted the agency as a model of publicspirited bureaucratic efficiency."78 Policy professor Steven Yaffee took the
study at face value when he concluded that Kaufman's "classic study":
[Identified information, budget and personnel systems that tended
to enhance the compliance of the Forest Service workforce with the
overall direction of the organization. By the 1960s, the Forest
Service was a fairly militaristic, "Can Do" agency that promoted and
rewarded individuals that m irrored the values and objectives of the
agency's leadership, and tended to select against individuals who
disagreed. While the Forest Service's district rangers and forest
supervisors had remarkable am ounts of discretion at the forest
level, they exercised it prim arily w ithin the overall themes defined
by the organization.
The idea that the Forest Service maintained a strong identity has carried
over to claims regarding the agency's public image —its public identity. As
late as 1984, Frome could still claim that the Forest Service "is a well respected
institution," citing a 1981 study ranking the agency "among the ten most
successful organizations in the country," partially because it "produced a wellrespected product, whatever the nature of the product," as well as appearing "a
good place to work," and staying "sound and healthy" over a "sustained
period of time."79 Frome described President Eisenhower's 1954 visit to
Missoula, Montana, to dedicate a smoke jumper facility. There the president
claimed: "I am not surprised that it is such a good outfit," extolling the good
relations between agency workers and m anagem ent80 Others agree w ith
Eisenhower's assessment For instance, Yaffee writes of high times for the
Forest Service during this era:

78 Hirt, Conspiracy, xvi.
79 Frome, Forest Service, 33.
80 Eisenhower in Frome, Forest Service, 33.
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By the 1960s, the combination of organizational styles and behaviors
described above had succeeded remarkably well for the FS. It had an
expanding budget, a set of supporters in the federal budget process,
and an esprit de corps that was the envy of Washington. ... Overall,
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were a great time to be in the Forest
Service. The agency's mission w as growing, clear, and valued by
society, and its methods of land m anagem ent and organizational
control were well tested. While the agency had been challenged
occasionally over site-specific controversies, by and large it had won
those challenges and was in control of its destiny.81
But, is it legitimate to assert w ith confidence that the Forest Service was
strongly integrated based upon one study involving five subjects? Probably
not; though Kaufman's argum ent may (or may not) have described the
situation as it really was, evidence lacks for such a positive statement.

Yaffee,

in an interview, later said that:
In some respects, Kaufman's basic image is consistent w ith other
things about the agency in the times. But the fact that he only
looked at five districts —it was a small number. I think we
pattern these things pretty much to fit our prior notion unless
w e're very careful. I think his image held together really nicely
—all this emphasis on control. I suspect that three quarters of it
or two thirds of it was right on the mark. But I think w hat we
probably lost was a sense of the diversity that was present at the
time in the organization. I doubt that was ever that tightly as
controlled as he would suggest.82
Whether or not Kaufman's study was statistically acceptable, it reflects an
image that was believed at that time, in w hich the Forest Service was a
flagship agency that could do the job.

8! Yaffee, Wisdom, 8.
82 ibid., 15.
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Concluding Remarks

Given the tumultuous years preceding the time period of Kaufman's
writings, and given that the 1950s and early 60s marked periods of significant
social change for the U.S. society, a claim to such integrity and identity is
suspicious. The historian would w ant more evidence -- should want more
evidence. Perhaps, despite Pinchot's rhetoric, the agency spent its infancy
with a challenged identity, which remained challenged. Being responsive to
the politics of the day, the agency could never have been expected to have a
"clear understanding" of where it was going, unless its mission was in fact "to
be responsive to the politics of the day."

Nevertheless, by the time of the Multiple-Use/Sustained Yield Act of 1960,
the Forest Service seemed to be politically positioned well, with expanding
budgets and the prestige signified by Smoky Bear. The agency had linked itself
to both the timber industry and recreationists — almost the entire spectrum of
political claims upon the national forests. For the time, though, the Forest
Service had support in political quarters and a strong sense of direction and
identity. But, this support and organizational confidence was soon to be tested
by a changing and increasingly adverse political struggle over control of the
public wildlands. Ultimately it would give way to turmoil, as the range of
public dem ands expanded while the available resource rapidly diminished.
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Chapter 3
Smokey's Identity Crisis
The "purpose of la w /' however, is absolutely the last thing to
employ in the history o f the origin o f law: on the contrary, there is
for historiography o f any kind no more important proposition than
the one it took such effort to establish but which really ought to be
established now: the cause of the origin o f a thing and its eventual
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie
worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is
again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed,
and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the
organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing
and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation
through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are
necessarily obscured or even obliterated.
— Friedrich Nietzsche
Geneaology o f Morals

Whether or not the Forest Service's fifteen years of prosperity, 1945-1960,
constituted the basis for a strong identity —the commonly accepted mythology
—it surely was not able to protect one during the following three decades.
From the early 1960s, the agency suffered a steady erosion of political
acceptance (internal as well as external), culminating in fierce opposition and
challenge to its policies. Congress repeatedly intervened in national forest
policy, passing and threatening to pass legislation the Forest Service
considered hostile and constraining to the agency. The Endangered Species
Act, for instance, gave the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service —a Department of
the Interior agency —jurisdiction over management of endangered or
threatened species on all national lands, including national forests.83
Administrative appeals and lawsuits delayed and impeded logging,

Endangered Species Act of 1973.
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culminating in the Pacific Northwest logging moratoria on behalf of the
northern spotted owl. Citizens groups opposed agency activities on site, step
by step, all over the country. By the early 1990s, the bureaucracy was struggling
with a crisis of agency -- losing control over management of the national
forests, as well as an internal crisis of identity. Its entire modus operandi had
become delegitimated, the agency had little if any sense of direction, and its
fate was ambiguous.84 Its image of integrity and ability, long cultivated within
ranks as well as sold to the public, had deteriorated, and, to the public as well
as industry, the fundamentally political nature of Forest Service policy had
become clear.85 In this chapter, I will outline this deterioration of Forest
Service authority. I will begin with the years 1964 to 1976, w hen Congress
passed major environmental legislation, discuss the political negotiation of
roadless areas, old-growth, and wilderness, during 1975-1984, and finally,
outline the political struggle that focused around the northern spotted owl

When it all began to unravel: Law in the Post-War Reformative Years. 19641976

An early sign of the coming unrest for the Forest Service was opposition to
the multiple use plans in the Pacific Northwest by conservation groups,
seeking permanent w ildlands designation of some of the areas in some of the
plans.86 Some of the groups, for instance, "the Sierra Club, the Federation of
Western Outdoor Clubs (a newly formed coalition of organizations), and the
Mazamas (a hiking club turned politically active)" had gained support in
8^ Webster's defines an "identity crisis" as "a state of confusion in an institution or
organization regarding its nature or direction." Webster's N ew Collegiate Dictionary, 597.
88 Hirt, Conspiracy', Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian.
88 Hirt, Conspiracy, 225.
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Congress, as well as "the influential support of United States Supreme Court
Justice William O. Douglas - also from W ashington."87 Responding to this
formidable opposition, the Secretary of Agriculture, in 1961, requested that the
Chief "put the plans on hold temporarily while it developed a new
comprehensive policy statem ent for forest managem ent in the region."88 The
agency, in a report called "Long-range management policy and objectives for
the high mountain areas of the region," vowed to be more careful in regards
to esthetics, but continued to log the areas in question.

The first major legislative action hostile to the Forest Service was passage
of the 1964 Wilderness Act, which Clary noted, "reflected an absence of faith in
multiple use or in the intentions of the Forest Service, whose feelings
accordingly were bruised."89 The act constituted a "zoning type law," which
provided the machinery for stipulating specific land uses over large areas. A
compromise patched from a stronger bill that the Forest Service opposed, the
Act instituted some previously designated lands in the U-Regulation system
as National Wilderness areas, limiting the agency's discretion regarding those
lands as well as hinting at future removals (Congress retained the right to
designate Wilderness). According to Frank Gregg, a "public administration
scholar" and BLM director under President Carter, "the era of Forest Service
discretion over major land use allocations ended with the Wilderness Act of
1964, which established the Congress as a direct decision maker on the uses to
be perm itted on millions of acres of national forests."90 In one sense,

87
88
89
90

Ibid., 225.
Ibid., 226.
Clary, Timber, 172.
Gregg in. Hirt,Conspiracy, 232.
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however, the Act represented a small victory for the agency, because the extent
of the designated lands was small and of marginal timber value.

In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, which
mandated the Forest Service (and other agencies whose actions affect the
environment) to draft environmental impact statements of proposed actions,
with alternatives considering a range of environmental consequences.

The

law also required federal agencies to open the planning process to public
scrutiny and participation, particularly through a public hearings process. The
Forest Service mistakenly considered this act to be insignificant in the sense
that the agency believed itself already to be in compliance, m aking agency
changes unnecessary.91 However, the act turned out to be very effective in
altering Forest Service policy, particularly in terms of timber policy. As case
law developed in relation to NEPA, it became apparent that the law required
documentation of agency activities beyond what the Forest Service was able to
produce. In addition, the law instituted demographic change within the
agency. Its requirements for interdisciplinary, scientific planning, forced the
Forest Service, whose workforce had been made up of foresters, to hire
workers with diverse educations and backgrounds.92 These new specialists,
particularly biologists, began to work themselves into positions of authority,
eventually bringing internal opposition to the Forest Service tim ber program.

In 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act, destined to rock the
public lands politics of the 1980s (U.S. Congress 1973). If a species with habitat
on national forests were to become listed as threatened or endangered —or, as
91 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 242.
92 Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian, 145-146
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it turns out, proposed to be listed — the agency would be forced to respond,
particularly in the face of litigation. This act threatened and ultimately
proved to constrain Forest Service discretion and made necessary further
specialization of labor within the agency to address the effects of logging on
plant and animal wildlife.

The absolute nature of the language in the ESA —its mandate that the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) listing of any species could deter any
program or project, government or private, that endangered the species or its
habitat — drew intense resistance, for instance, from natural resource
managers.

According to Dana and Fairfax, "From the point of view of forest

and range managers, the Endangered Species Act seemed to constitute an
uncompromising piece of legislation which threatens management activities,
invites court action, and fails to allow for a balancing of other considerations
which w arrant weighing against the necessity of protecting a species."93
Eventually, owing to the Tellico decision barring the further development of a
Tennessee Valley Authority dam, industry and several agencies pressured
Congress into passing legislation that qualified the ESA.94 The ESA update in
1978 created the possibility of convening a cabinet level committee (soon
dubbed the "God Squad") to weigh the political and economic advantages of a
project against the risks posed to the species in question.

Meanwhile, conflict between the Forest Service and tbe recreationists and
environmentalists arose concerning the Forest Service's widespread use of
clearcutting as a management tool. The Forest Service, it seems, had taken the
93 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 261.
94 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill et. al.
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Organic Act's language pertaining to marking every tree to mean m arking
only those trees on boundaries of what would become large dearcuts.
Clearcutting became the technology of the day, espetially in large tracts, and its
widespread effects became increasingly apparent. By the 1970s —only a decade
after the Kaufman report —conflict had become apparent, w ithin and without
the agency. In 1970, Neil Rahm Regional Forester of the N orthern Region
wrote a memo to the Forest Service Chief, despairing the regional Forest
Service workforce's low morale:
Some of our own people are feeling and expressing doubts. The
doubts are whether we can perform as well as we tell people w e can.
Do we have the expertise on the ground to perform an acceptable
job? I think the answer is no.95
Chief Cliff responded in a memo of his own, alluding to the agency's
uncertainty regarding its mission in a time of changing politics:
Many employees have recently expressed concern on the direction in
which the Forest Service seems to be heading. I share this concern.
O ur programs are out of balance to meet public needs for the
environmental 1970s and we are receiving mounting criticism from
all sides.96
In response, Congress, at the request of Senator Lee Metcalf (D —Montana),
commissioned a panel of professors from the University of Montana to study
the effects of FS management on national forests in Montana. N am ed for its
leader, Forestry Dean Arnold Bolle, the Bolle report harshly criticized the
agency for its clearcutting and for terracing to promote regeneration in the
Bitterroot Valley (Bitterroot NF), writing, "Such cutting practices abuse the
multiple use principle. And they make a mockery of the sustained yield

95 Neil Rahm, "Memo to the Chief." Frome, Forest Service, 5.
96 Frome, Forest Service, 5.
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concept which decrees that all resources — but particularly the key ones, soil
and water —m ust be sustained. Above that, many consider it foolish
economics. The short-term gains are offset by longterm losses in both
economics and environmental quality."97

Three years later, a group of turkey hunters, soon joined by the Izaak
Walton League, filed suit against the FS over its clearcutting practices in the
Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia. The lawsuit successfully
argued that, in its indiscriminate cutting of trees of all ages, the Forest Service
had exceeded its authority."98 In summ ary, the "plaintiffs contended that in
embarking upon a clearcut, the Service violated the letter and the clear intent
of the Organic Act of 1897."99 Further, they argued that the entire timber
program relied upon this one law, writing, "the act was the only real charter
the timber program had."100 Arguing that a bureaucracy had no authority to
alter the content of congressional law, the judge enjoined all clearcutting
operations on the entire Monongahela National Forest, and the 1975 decision
in the Fourth Circuit Appeals Court proscribed clearcutting across all national
forests within its domain.101 "The court's reasoning in the Monongahela case
was promptly adopted in Zieske v. Butz,"102 and it was clear that similar
findings would be forthcoming in other judicial districts. The Forest Service
timber program was stymied.

97 Bolle Report, in Frome, Forest Service, 5.
9® Clary, Timber, 191; West Virginia Div.of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz.
99 Clary, Timber, 191.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 42, fin.197; Zieske v. Butz.
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As a way out of this impasse, and after N ixon's administration, the Senate,
the Forest Service, and even Ralph N ader's public interest group had all
studied the situation and published reports, Congress passed the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), am ending the 1974 Renewable
Resources Planning Act (RPA).103 The NFMA is an updated "Organic Act" in
the sense that it establishes the Forest Service's basic authority and mandate to
manage the National Forest, although it is different than the original Organic
Act in several respects, reflecting changes in public opinion since the turn of
the century. In some ways the act affirms the Forest Service's instituted
operating procedures, insofar as it does establish the agency's discretion to use
clearcut logging, and it does structure resource planning in the context of
multiple-use and sustained yield as m andated in the MUSY of 1960. Further,
to translate NFMA into administrative rules, Congress provided for a
"Committee of Scientists" to be appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Through consultation, the Forest Service w ould be able to exert influence
upon the political production of the NFMA regulations.104

On the other hand, NFMA and RPA were more prescriptive than earlier
land management laws, defining management objectives ("considerations" in
the NFMA language) in relatively specific language, including time-tables for
regeneration and explicit limitations on clearcut logging.105 According to
Charles Wilkinson and H. Michael Anderson, the NFMA "is the most
adventurous congressional incursion into the on-the-ground activities of the

National Forest Management Act of 1976; Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.
104 National Forest Management Act of 1976, sec. 6 (g),(h).
105 Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Three Decades," 9; Hirt, Conspiracy, 245.
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Forest Service."106 The law references some of the specific political demands
of the time, such as requiring consideration of "biological diversity," aesthetic
impacts, and so on, as well as mandating a planning process that includes
provisions for "public participation."107 In addition, the law —particularly
the original RPA language —links congressional funding to the agency's
production of national assessments of forest resources as well as national
program plans and budgets regarding their use.

During the House floor

debate on RPA, Congressman Don H. Clausen of California summarized, "the
intent of the legislation is to establish more congressional control over the
management activities and appropriation process of the national forest system
lands," which it did.108

The NFMA was the last piece of legislation forming the institutional
milieu in which the Forest Service was operating when the politics of
Ecosystem Management emerged in the late 1980s. Though the Forest
Service's direction and modus operandi were affirmed, as was its longstanding
practice of using planning to assert agency, the agency was now saddled with
forest level planning and reporting responsibilities that would increase its
workload by a large magnitude and force further diversification of its ranks
while also increasing Congressional oversight. The NFMA signified change
for the agency in the sense that its practices would now be even more in the
public eye, it would have to account for increased public pressure and diverse
demands, and, as it turned out, intense criticism and conflict. Together with
NEPA, the congressional action forced the agency (and other agencies) into
106 Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning, 7.
107 The National Forest Management Act of 1976.
108 Hirt, Conspiracy, 245.
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timely planning processes open to oversight and litigation, as well as making
substantive forest management demands. The Forest Service was now to
operate in an environment open to onlookers, criticism (or applause), and
ultimately, litigation, while also diversifying its workforce in terms of
specialization.

The environmental legislation of these years, particularly the Wilderness
Act, the ESA, the NEPA, the RPA and ultimately the NFMA, "clinched a trend
toward greater congressional intervention in federal land management and
decreasing agency autonomy and discretion."109 What is more, the Forest
Service, which once considered itself insulated from public conflict by virtue
of its position as a technocracy,110 now found itself chronically embroiled in
the political theater, attacked in the media, in Congress, in the courts, on the
streets and in the forests.

Roadless Lands, Wilderness, and Old-growth (Oh My) 1975-1984

The conflict that has assailed the Forest Service from the mid-1970s to the
present mostly concerned unroaded or otherwise primitive lands —
characterized by old-growth forest These lands were rich in timber, yet also
valued for recreation, ecological preservation, watershed roles, aesthetic and
spiritual reasons, and as habitat for rare and endangered species —all concerns
that translated into a wide array of different political demands. Most of the
remaining roadless areas were in the national forests of Pacific Northwest and
N orthern Region and corresponding BLM and NPS lands. Of these
109 Hirt,Conspiracy, 232.
HO A consistent theme in Clary, Timber.
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forestlands, the most profitable for timber w ere in western Washington,
Oregon, and California. As a consequence, these regions became the primary
focus of Forest Service policy, and national issues were framed in terms of
these regional environm ental issues.

Much of the actual political negotiation and debate focused on lands —
predominantly in the western states —that the agency had classified in its
highly politicized Roadless Area and Review and Evaluation (RARE) studies
during 1971-1972. The Forest Service conducted this classification in an
attempt to regain control over management of undeveloped forestlands.
During 1971, the Forest Service contended that it was unable to conduct
multiple use planning as required by administrative law, due to uncertainty
over the status of its unroaded lands arising from court cases and proposed
wilderness designation. Reflecting upon these times, Forest Chief Edward
Cliff lamented:
Every time we made a move into a roadless area we ran into
opposition which generally materialized in the form of a lawsuit or
a wilderness proposal by a congressman. The principle of sovereign
immunity had been breached in the court cases in the 1960s. As a
result, environmentalists started filing lawsuits and conservation
law became a fast growing branch of the law. If a bill was pending,
that effectively stopped any activity because we d id n 't want to
aggravate Congress. We had no idea where we could plan or where
we could be stymied. We needed to d raw some parameters around
areas which we could develop and which we could preserve.111
Arguing that RARE studies w ould clarify the status of these lands as well as
constituting a national environmental impact statem ent for logging on them,
the agency gained support for the project from officials in the Department of

H 1 Interview with Edward Cliff, in Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980, 36.
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Agriculture.112 By 1972, the Forest Service had designated 1,449 roadless areas
over 55.9 million acres and selected 274 areas over 12.3 million acres to be
protected while it further studied them for wilderness designation.113 Soon
afterwards the Sierra Club sued, and settling out of court, the agency agreed to
prepare an environmental impact statement and land use plan before
developing any potential wilderness area.114 The agency7s attempts to gain
impunity over development of roadless areas had only yielded the additional
responsibilities linked to producing environmental impact statements for
offering stumpage in these areas.

In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed an act (with no title) designating
fourteen national forest wildernesses and 17 wilderness study areas, and in
1978, Congress passed the Endangered American Wilderness Act.115 But,
many popular areas had been excluded from both pieces of legislation, and
political dissatisfaction persisted. In 1978, Rupert Cutler, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture for Conservation (and earlier in his career, assistant executive
director of The Wilderness Society), responded to dissatisfaction with the
incompleteness of the RARE I process and w ith the Endangered Wilderness
Act by initiating the RARE II process. At first. Cutler preferred an approach
that w ould "release" all lands not recommended for wilderness, but he soon
announced a third category named "further planning."116 In 1979, Cutler
announced the RARE II allocations: 15 million for wilderness consideration
(one-third of this on the Alaskan Tongass National Forest), 36 million for
112
113
114
113
116

Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980,
Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980,
Ibid., 37; Dana and Fairfax,
Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980,
Roth, Wilderness 1964-1980,

37; Dana and Fairfax p. 300.
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Forest and Range Policy, 300.
46,51. Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1975.
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nonwildemess, and 11 millions for further planning.117 Definition of the
release language posed the next political question. Timber industry officials
favored a national wilderness bill including a "hard" or "long-term"
interpretation of release -- an interpretation that appeared in the "Hayakawa"
bill. In 1981 and 1982, environmentalists defeated this bill as well as a
Wyoming wilderness bill that would have instituted hard release, signaling
the defeat of the hard-release interpretation of RARE II non-wilderness
lands.118 In the years 1980 to 1983, Congress passed several wilderness bills,
mostly for eastern states.119

During 1984, Congress passed wilderness bills for six western states (as well
as twelve eastern states), including 950,000 acres of wilderness in Oregon and
1.8 million acres in California.120 Passage of these bills marked the end of
wilderness designation as the primary focus of the conflict over developing
roadless areas, aside from Montana and Idaho roadless lands, for which acts
were never passed.121 Nevertheless, the remaining, undesignated but defacto
wilderness areas in these states were to persist as an object of political struggle.

117 Ibid.
118 ibjd Hendkee, Stankey, and Lucas, Wilderness Management, 141.
119 Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980; Colorado Wilderness Act of 1980; Charles Deam
Wilderness Act of 1982 (Indiana); Cheah Wilderness Act of 1983; Florida Wilderness Act of
1983; Lee Metcalf Wilderness and Manageament Act of 1983 (Montana —not a comprehenisve
act); Paddy Creek Wilderness Act of 1983 (Missouri); West Virginia Wilderness Act of 1983;
Roth, Wilderness 1980-1984, Chapter One.
120 ArizonaWildemess Act of 1984; Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984; California Wilderness
Act of 1984; Georgia Wilderness Act of 1984; Mississippi National Forest Wilderness Act of
1984; New Flampshire Wilderness Act of 1984; North Carolina Wilderness Act of 1984;
Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984; Pennsylvania Wilderness Act of 1984; San Juan Basin
Wilderness Act of 1984; Texas Wilderness Act of 1984; Utah Wilderness Act of 1984; Vermont
Wilderness Act of 1984; Virginia Wilderness Act of 1984; Washington Wilderness Act of 1984;
Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984.
121 Actually, Nebraska did not pass a wilderness act until 1985, (Nebraska Wilderness Act of
1985) and Tennessee did not pass one until 1986 (Tennessee Wilderness Act of 1986).
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Owl I: Yet Another Annoyance

After 1984, the focus of the roadless area conflict became a struggle between
"old-growth" forest advocates and the timber industry. At the core of the
battle were old-growth dependent wildlife, particularly those species fit to be
listed under the ESA, of which the northern spotted owl was most
consequential. During the preceding decade, researchers and activists
increasingly had been focusing attention upon the spotted owl, which seemed
to be diminishing in numbers and losing habitat as private, state, and federal
forestry interests logged remaining old-growth forests —forests that were
always slated for demise under the traditional precepts of intensive
management and high level sustained yields of timber. After passage of the
wilderness bills, several national and local organizations began to pressure
federal agencies, particularly the Forest Service and the BLM, into managing
remaining lands for the preservation of the owl. Among the national groups
entering the political fracas were the Sierra Club Legal Defense Foundation,
the National Wildlife Federation, and the Audubon Society. These groups
were often in disagreement w ith the local or regionally based groups, the most
powerful being the Oregon N atural Resources Council, headed by Oregon
native, Andy Kerr. Ultimately, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service w ould list
the northern spotted owl as threatened under the Endangered Species Act.
What began as an annoyance grew into the major issue that was to give rise to
the adoption of Ecosystem M anagement as Forest Service Policy in June 1992.
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After Congress had passed the Endangered Species Act in 1973, federal and
state agencies had formed an interagency group called the Oregon Endangered
Species Task Force (OESTF) to "begin inventory, research, and management
work on endangered Oregon wildlife."122 The task force — which included
representatives from the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the
Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as the Oregon State Game Commission and
the Oregon State University (OSU) — was already aware that the northern
spotted owl could pose legal problems. Publicity around the research work of
Eric Foreman, an OSU master's student in wildlife biology, had raised the issue
of declining owl habitat. Foreman recalls that he and professor Charles
Meslow, of OSU, w ith whom he was working, were active in bringing public
attention to his research results, ultimately culminating in creation of the
conflict around the spotted owl.123 In the same year, responding to an
accumulation of research around the northern spotted owl, the U.S. FWS had
included the species among a list of "candidate species," for listing under the
newly passed ESA.124 By 1976, the OESTF had devised an interim plan for the
spotted owl, which included a network of land set-asides for owl habitat (a
zoning strategy that w ould designate zones to a particular use) which the team
intended to be w orked into regional guides and forest plans. Three years later,
the NFMA Committee of Scientists published its 1979 administrative
regulations naming the spotted owl as an indicator species of old growth
ecosystems.125 Nevertheless, the Forest Service continued to sell stumpage in
122 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 20.
123 Forsman in Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 20. Accordin to Yaffee, Jack Ward Thomas, then a
research scientist for the Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station, was project funder
and director for Foreman's ow l research. Ibid., 19-23.
124 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 47.
125 (36 CFR 219.19). A lso, see Watson and Muraoka, "The Northern Spotted Owl," 88; Yaffee,
Widsom, 384, fn.8.
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owl territory and neglected to adopt a strategy for dealing w ith declining
habitat. Not until 1984 did the Forest Service address the issue of owl
management in context of an official planning document.

In June, 1984, the FS published its "Regional Guide" for Region 6
(including Oregon and Washington) — a document outlining the general
direction and objectives of the Forest Service, but deferring specific resource
decisions (and liability) to individual forest plans.

Environmental groups

promptly appealed the Guide, asserting that its lack of cumulative effects
analysis concerning the relationship between logging and owl habitat violated
NEPA and that its lack of viability analysis regarding effects on owl
populations violated the biological diversity requirements of NFMA.126 In
1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Douglas MacCleery
(previously a lobbyist for the forest products industry) succumbed to political
pressures and ordered the Forest Service, particularly Region 6 (whose
Forester was Jeff Sirmon), to w rite a supplemental environmental impact
statement to the regional guide regarding management for the spotted owl.
Meanwhile, MacCleery authorized logging on the controversial lands.

The

SEIS appeared in April 1988, and in December, the Chief of the Forest Service,
Dale Robertson, signed a Record of Decision. Several groups —including oldgrowth advocates and timber industry groups — then filed administrative
appeals which the FS promptly rejected. Subsequently, in February, 1989, the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF), acting on behalf of twenty-nine
groups, filed federal suits in Seattle and Portland. Seattle District Court Judge
William Dwyer, basing his decision on the ESA, in March, 1989, granted a

126 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 75-81.
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preliminary injunction on 140 planned FS timber sales and set a court date for
June, w hen he extended the injunction indefinitely.127

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Land Management was facing similar legal and
political problems in relation to its timber program and the northern spotted
owl. In 1987, the SCLDF filed suit in U.S. District Court (in Portland, Oregon)
against the BLM "over the inadequacy of their owl protection plan."128 "In
1988, U.S. District Judge Helen Frye... granted a preliminary injunction
blocking BLM timber sales in stands of trees more than 200 years old."129 In
response, spurred by industry and troubled by rapidly changing scientific
pronouncements on owl ecology, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon) and
Representative Les AuCoin (D-Oregon) "attached language to a spending bill
for the BLM that said its management plans could not be challenged solely on
the basis of new scientific information," w hereupon Judge Frye lifted the
in ju n ctio n .130 The legitimacy of the BLM had been strongly challenged and
nearly usurped by a federal court, exposing its vulnerability to legal challenge.
But through overt political maneuvering in Congress by its allies, AuCoin and
Hatfield, the agency had, at least temporarily, been directed to perpetuate its
current timber program.

During the same time frame, in January 1987, a small group out of
Massachusetts nam ed Green World petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as an endangered species.

127 Seattle Audubon Society o. Robertson. Also, see Sher, 'Travels with Strix."
128 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 91.
129 Ibid., 91.
130 Ibid., 91.
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According to Andy Stahl, who had recently become director of the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund, the larger environmental organizations had wanted to
delay filing a petition until they had better "developed" public opinion.131
But, the petition by the "out-of-the-blue" group, GreenWorld, forced their
hands, and in March, thirty-five other groups filed a separate petition.132 In
December, the FWS' regional director for the northwest, Rolf Wallenstrom,
acting under orders of the FWS national director, Frank Dunkle, rejected the
petitions. The following May, 1988, SCLDF sued the FWS, and in November,
U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly found the FWS decision to have been
"arbitrary and capricious," and ordered the Service to review its decision using
available scientific evidence that the agency had ignored.133 In April, 1989, the
FWS proposed listing the owl as threatened under the ESA and published the
listing in the Federal Register in June. Final listing was published in the
Register a year later, but the FWS had failed to designate critical habitat. The
Sierra Legal Defense Fund, the Portland Audubon Society, and the Northwest
Resources Defense Council sued, and in February, 1991, Judge Zilly
determined that the FWS failure to designate owl habitat violated the ESA
and ordered the Service to submit a plan for reviewing critical habitat.134 The
court had effectively required the Fish and Wildlife Service — w ithin the
Department of Interior, which had often attempted to gain control over Forest
Service Lands —to zone the Pacific Northwest for the objective of managing
the owl. Since most owl lands were on national forests, the Fish and Wildlife
Service w ould exert great control over Forest Service decision-making.
1^1 Stahl in Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 108.

132 Ibid.
133 Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F.Supp. 479 (W.D.Wash. 1988); Yaffee Spotted Owl,
111; Durbin,Tree Huggers, 92.
134 Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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While the Forest Service was being assailed by environmental groups, the
court, and factions within Congress (see discussion below, in this chapter), the
Congressional appropriations committees were busy ordering the Forest
Service to raise cuts in the Pacific Northwest. For instance, in 1987, during the
agency's NFMA planning process, Congress directed the agency to harvest
tim ber from owl national forests in Oregon an Washington at quantities
eighteen percent higher th an written into its draft plans.135 October, 1989, the
Senate passed an appropriations bill dubbed the Hatfield/ Adams bill with a
rider —dubbed "Section 318" —that guaranteed a total timber cut of 9.6 billion
board feet from federal lands in the Pacific Northwest (7.7 bbf from the FS; 1.9
from the BLM) during the 1989 and 1990 fiscal years.136 The bill gave
environmental groups the discretion to choose which 1.1 billion board feet
w ould be harvested (the total volume held in litigation), protecting the
remaining lands from logging until the end of fiscal year, 1990, and prohibited
all logging on lands w ith known habitat. Section 318 reduced the debate
between preservationists and the tim ber industry to a conflict over mutually
exclusive landuses —a conflict over zoning. While it conceded a great am ount
of timber to industry, the bill clearly signified restraints upon the Forest
Service's decision-making power, as well as acknowledging "fragmentation"
as an unwanted effect of logging practices. In its accompanying conference
report, Committee members chastised the agency directors regarding the
"adequacy of their planned actions" concerning the spotted owl and habitat.
But, the Forest Service gained on other fronts: the bill also proclaimed the
final SEIS to be immune from further judicial review, "prohibited the courts
I*® Caufield, "A Reporter at Large," 56.
136 Section 318 of 1990 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.
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from issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction on fiscal
year 1990 timber sales/' prescribed deadlines for judicial review, and
streamlined the litigation process. 137 The agency was clearly caught between
the courts and congress, although it was a far from passive participant.

Administrative Appeals and Litigation: Smokev's Star Chamber

In crafting the Hatfield/Adams bill, Congress was at least temporarily
responding to the Forest Service directorate's complaints regarding increasing
dem ands upon planners and disruption of management activities resulting
from litigation and administrative appeals. These complaints were part of a
campaign to limit public control of the agency (a campaign that the Forest
Service kept active at least until the mid-1990s). In the mid-1980s, the Forest
Service contended with an increasing num ber of administrative appeals to
timber sales as well as lawsuits, largely based upon allegedly inadequate
environmental impact statements. The agency was not prepared for the
increasing number of appeals, and a backlog developed, increasing the
processing period for each appeal. In addition, by 1985, as national forests
completed their NFMA mandated forest plans, environmental groups began
appealing the plans, further increasing the agency's burden.

According to the

General Accounting Office report:
Nationwide, the number of Forest Service appeals filed annually
more than doubled between fiscal years 1983 and 1988, from 584
to 1,298. Average processing time for appeals increased from 201
days in fiscal year 1986 to 363 days by March 31,1988, which is
more than 2-1/2 times as long as generally provided for appeals
processing. The nationwide backlog of unresolved appeals grew
137 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 121.
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from 64 at the end of fiscal year 1983 to 830 by the end of fiscal
year 1988.138

Appeals and litigation were largely stop-gap measures, but the issue of oldgrowth and old-growth dependent species was beginning to emerge
nationally, providing the main focus for the political conflict that w ould
culminate in the Forest Service's adoption of "Ecosystem Management."
One of the Forest Service's responses was to work behind the scenes to limit
access to public involvement in management through administrative appeal
and litigation.

In March 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on Conservation and Forestry
convened a "Hearing on Appeals Process Used by the Forest Service" to
review the consequences of the new appeals process crafted by the Forest
Service the previous month.139 Montana Senator Baucus played a large part
in organizing the hearings, and during the proceedings, he aggressively
questioned Forest Service officials. Though the hearings ostensibly concerned
appeals, Leonard began his oral testimony by referring to timber supply
problems, which he linked to timber sales that were not taking place due to
the appeals process. In his written testimony, he stated the case more softly:
During the past year, the Forest Service appeals process has been
cited as one of the causes of timber shortages in several areas of
Montana and other parts of the country. Over the last 2 years, a
total of 48 timber sales were appealed in the Northern Region.
Of those 48, 19 were affirmed. The remainder were either
remanded, settled through negotiation, or withdrawn. In 1988,
138 u_s. General Accounting Office, Forest Service, 1-2.
139 U 5. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Subcommittee on
Conservation and Forestry, Hearing on Appeals Process.
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over 52 million board feet were tied up due to appeals. That
represented about 65 percent of the Region's tim ber sale
program .140
Associate Forest Service Chief Leonard persistently attem pted to link appeals
and litigation to reductions in the timber supply. He particularly emphasized
Region One —com prising mostly Montana and northern Idaho —where
Baucus' constituency was situated. In November of the same year, speaking
before a House of Representatives hearing, Leonard also testified that forest
plans were facing the obstacle of appeal: "Of the 97 plans which have been
issued in final form, we have had 825 appeals. Of that 825, 515 of those
appeals have been resolved, either through local discussions or decisions We
also have 10 major lawsuits." A t the time, Leonard testified, 48 plans were
still tied up, though Leonard looked at the positive side: "But we now have
49 plans free and clear of appeals and lawsuits" (which was one plan over the
half way mark).

Leonard's reference to litigation was revealing. It reflected an ongoing
controversy w ithin the agency and in the political dialogue in general. In the
March, senatorial hearings, Montana Senator Max Baucus, who played a
large part in the proceedings (and commissioned the GAO study mentioned
above), addressed Leonard about the agency's legal record in the Northern
Region (Region One, Missoula, Montana): "As you know, in the last 15 cases
that have gone before the N inth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Forest Service
has lo st So the Forest Service is now batting 0 for 15."141 Leonard defended
the record somewhat obtusely, telling Baucus, " We have a better batting

140 Ibid., 60.
141 Baucus, "Senator from Montana," 26.
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average in some of the other circuits." Linking the problems to the NEPA
process, which Congress itself had instituted, Leonard added:
We have tried to utilize environmental assessments tiered back
to forest plan environmental impact statements, and we simply
have not been successful in convincing the ninth circuit that
provides adequate consideration of the environmental impacts
and that in fact in order to comply with the NEPA those kinds of
decisions m ust be docum ented in a full-blown environmental
impact statement. Some of it we can say has been the result of
evolving standards. Some of those decisions that we have lost
in recent years, if we had presented the same decisions to the
court 5 years ago might very well been accepted. The NEPA law
has been evolving.142
Leonard continued to construct the link between timber shortages and
environmental appeals and litigation, while also continuing to develop the
link been these procedural obstacles and federal law, particularly NEPA. In
this context, Leonard told Congress that "appeals and litigation have resulted
in delays and withdrawals of timber sales, and they have also identified the
need for us to go back and rew ork previously prepared sales to bring the
NEPA documentation to standard."143 Furthermore, Leonard argued, "NEPA
rework has substantially slowed the completion of timber sale preparation. It
has also meant that decisions to make sales are delayed to the point that an
appeal cannot be resolved w ithout delaying the planned sale date."144 From
the agency's perspective, the m ain problems it faced resulted from
inadequacies in procedural law, not misconduct on the part of the agency. On
issues of substance —the technical content of plans and sales —the Forest
Service retained its hegemony. Leonard added:

142 Ibid.
143 Leonard, 'Testimony," 23-24.
144 Ibid., 25.
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I would like to point out that while appeals and lawsuits have
revealed procedural deficiencies in complying w ith the National
Environmental Policy Act, there have been no decisions in
either appeals or litigation identifying substantive violations of
other environmental laws or of the standards and guidelines in
forest plans.145
In making the link to NEPA and other procedural considerations, Leonard
tried to soften his critique upon citizen involvement through appeals and
litigation, stating (enigmatically) that appeals were actually a symptom of
tim ber shortages and that —presumably under further refined conditions —
they were a practical aid to forest management. He added:
Although administrative appeals have delayed and in some
cases stopped timber sales, we believe appeals are more a
symptom than the cause of the timber shortage problems. The
appeal process costs the Forest Service time and money.
However, the appeal process is a beneficial tool the public and
our land managers can use in making responsible natural
resource decisions and detecting emerging issues.146

Leonard went even further, touching upon the democratic and practical
functions of administrative appeals, which he more fully acknowledged
elsewhere while lamenting its role in political conflict. He noted:
Appeals play an important role in the management of the
national forests. The Forest Service makes every effort to
delegate decisionmaking to the lowest possible level. We want
the decision to be made by people who are most familiar with
the conditions on the ground.
But, in making these delegations, we create opportunities for
different interpretations of regulations and procedures. The
appeals process gives people who may be adversely affected by a
decision an opportunity to have it reviewed by a higher level.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 60.
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And it is an important part of ensuring that we remain
responsive to the public.147
Thus framed, Congress and the Forest Service had presented the issue of
appeals as being a tension between two conflicting ideas: the democratic
process and its consequent slowdowns versus the efficiency and timeliness of
goods and services delivered (notably, timber) by an unconstrained
management agency. In the words of Wyche Fowler, a Georgia Senator and
member of the subcommittee: "While we want to avoid unnecessary
impediments to Forest Service management activities, the solution to such
problems cannot come at the expense of public participation and interest in
good forest planning and management."148

With this tension so expressed, Leonard informed Congress, in February,
1989, the directorate "made changes in our appeal regulations to standardize
or to streamline the process and to try to encourage resolution of disputes
outside the appeals process."149 In written testimony, in the last sentence of
the paragraph attesting to the rightness of having an appeals process, Leonard
wrote that "We believe our new appeal regulations will go a long way toward
reducing the cost and delays we experienced in the past."150 Leonard claimed
that the new appeals process would result in cooperation between the Forest
Service and local activists —presumably environmentalists — and an increase
of informal agreements that would allow controversial stumpage sales to
continue. Leonard stated:

147
148
149
150

Ibid., 25.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 60.
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There is no doubt that the new appeal procedures are changing
the way we approach planning and decisionmaking. Although
it is still early for any definite conclusions, we are greatly
encouraged by w hat we see as a change for the better under the
new rules. We already have examples of controversial timber
sales and other decisions going forward because of an
understanding being reached between the public and the Forest
Service at a local level. This was one of the goals we hoped to
achieve under the new rules. One underlying objective in
developing the new rule was to get people to w ork out their
differences in an informal setting during project development
rather than w aiting until after the environmental docum ents
were complete. By informally working out differences early in
the process, w e expect to implement projects more quickly.151
Presumably, environmentalists would have to bargain informally with
the Forest Service as a result of decreased access to the alternatives of appeals.
If the agency's reasoning were correct, then the appeals process would speed
up, and the backlog of delayed timber sales would diminish. The agency
would opt for efficiency over public participation.

Bob Wolf —retired congressional staffer (who, as a chief staffer for Senator
Hubert Humphrey, had drafted the RPA and NFMA) and past Forest Service
forester and economist —opposed this trade-off and testified that the changes
were anti-democratic. Wolf further testified that the tim ber industry, which
would directly benefit from the dispatch of the appealed tim ber sales, unduly
influenced the decision to institute further restrictions on appeals. Wolf
wrote:
N ow the Forest Products Industry and the Forest Service w ant to
make it more difficult for conservation groups to secure an
adm inistrative review of their concerns. They w ould tilt the
jury box.

151 Ibid.
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Wolf believed that the high number of appeals resulted from pubic
dissatisfaction with the Forest Service's plans, not because the process was too
easy to use, and that the correct solution would be to manage in line with
public opinion. Wolf stated:
I view the volume of appeals as an indicator of general
dissatisfaction with the proposed National Forest Plans. I think
that commodity or noncommodity groups file appeals for
reasons they believe are just. The solution will not be found in
changing the appeals process. It will come w hen the Forest
Service addresses the reasons for the several publics registering
their votes of low confidence.152
Leonard did not acknowledge a public "vote of low confidence," however,
and continued to focus upon the need for an uninterrupted supply of timber.
From Leonard's perspective, the timber program would remain the highest
priority, despite earlier rhetoric pertaining to the virtues of public
participation. Leonard summarized his testimony with the claim: "We hope
the combination of these actions and the emphasis we have placed on
prededsional public involvement in our new appeal regulations will create a
situation conducive to refilling the 'tim ber pipeline.'"153

Pipeline or not, the agency remained entangled in court. In October, Chief
Robertson appeared before a senatorial joint hearing, in which Senator Mark
Hatfield from Oregon readdressed the question of the Forest Service's recent
legal history:

"Over the last 5 years, how many lawsuits and appeals have

been filed in Region 6 [Pacific Northwest] on the activities of the Forest
Service?" Robertson replied that "there have been 21 appeals and 1 lawsuit
challenging an old timber management plan to date. There have been
152 Wolf, "Prepared Statement," 365.
153 Leonard,'Testimony," 61.
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hundreds of appeals and lawsuits for project-level activities." Presently,
Robertson added, "I can tell you right now the Forest Service has about 3,300
lawsuits pending nationwide, 3,300," of which "between 10 to 20 percent"
concerned activities in the Region 6.154

Owl II: Listing and Post-Listing (1990-1992)

Meanwhile, politics largely out of control of the Forest Service were
producing results w ith great bearing upon the agency's discretion over the
national forests. In June, 1990, when the FWS had listed as threatened the
spotted owl, it had failed to designate critical habitat, though the ESA
mandates that the agency must simultaneously list a species and designate
habitat. Subsequently, in a federal district court ruling in February 1991, judge
Thomas Zilly had ordered the FWS to propose critical habitat by April 30.155

By March, Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan, announced that he had
assembled an endangered species recovery team —consisting largely of
political appointees w ith nominal representation by biologists —which
published its proposed critical habitat on May 6. The designation included 11.6
million acres, 6.5 million of them on national forests. In response, BLM
Director, Cy Jamison requested that Secretary Lujan convene an Endangered
Species Committee to evaluate the exception of forty-four timber sales on BLM
lands within the proposed critical habitat, which Lujan accepted in late
September. Political pressure came to bear upon the FWS, which dropped its

154 Robertson, 'Testimony," June 22.1989,31.
155 Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan.
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habitat designation to a total of 6.9 million acres, issuing its final
recommendations in early January, 1992.156

The subsequent February, "a federal judge issued a preliminary
injunction... blocking all logging in old-growth forests on U.S. Bureau of Land
Management property because of danger to the northern spotted owl's
habitat."157 On May 14,1992, the ESC —known as the "God Squad" —after
hearings surrounded by public fanfare and spectacle, voted to exempt fourteen
of the forty-four sales —an ambiguous result. The Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund prom ptly filed suit to stop the sales. Meanwhile, during the same
month, the FWS published its draft owl recovery plan in Portland, while BLM
director, Jamison, continued to w ork on his own plan, featuring more timber
than the FWS draft plan offered.158

The Bush administration opposed implementation of the draft recovery
plan, which was a modification of the ISC strategy, arguing that it would result
in the loss of 32,000 jobs.159 In early 1991, the Forest Service succumbed to
pressure from the Bush administration and rejected the ISC owl conservation
strategy, and several groups responded by filing suits against the agency for
scheduling timber sales under no explicit plan.160 In early 1991, the court
again enjoined the agency from timber sales in lands suitable to owl habitat
and ordered the FS to deliver a timetable for completing an owl management

156 "Logging Limits Sought Over 7 Million Acres," New York Times, January 10,1992, A12.
157 "Judge blocks logging in owl habitat," Washington Post, February 20,1992 A10. Injunctive
Relief was granted in Portland Audobon Soc. v. Luhan.
158 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 136-40.
159 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 137-38.
160 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 136-40.
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plan by June 15 and a plan by March, 1992. In late May, 1991, two weeks after
the FWS published its proposed habitat designations, Judge Dwyer, in Seattle
Audobon v. Evans (771 F. Supp. 1081), permanently enjoined FS timber sales
in designated owl habitat "until the FS completed a new spotted owl
managem ent plan and environmental analysis."161 Ruling that the agency
"had violated the EIS requirements of NEPA,"162 he wrote in strong language:
"The problem here has not been any shortcomings in the laws, but simply a
refusal of adm inistrative agencies to comply with them. This involves a
public interest of the highest order: the interest in having government
officials act in accordance with the law."163

Meanwhile, the issues concerning roadless areas and old-growth forest
began to expand —conceptually and geographically —threatening further
action and curtailment of Forest Service discretion. The list of politically
important (ESA listed or proposed) old-growth dependent species was
growing, and various congressional members were crafting their own
solutions to the old-growth controversy. In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy
(Vermont, D) criticized foresters for not accounting for changing political
demands and indirectly warned the Forest Service and other agencies that
Congress was preparing legislation to remedy this neglect. Leahy suggested:
Despite the dram atic change in public view, it seems that the
forestry profession has been slow to respond. For that reason,
Congress has become increasingly active in environmental and
forestry issues. ... This increased congressional activism has been
renewed in the last two years and will continue on several
fronts. Key areas include: old growth forests; global warming;
161 Ibid., 133.
162 Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Making Ecosystem Policy," 10.
163 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
ad d rain; wilderness preservation; and forest planning. Last
week the Senate passed my Forest Stewardship Act as a separate
title in the 1990 Farm bill. This is the first time a forestry title
has ever been incorporated into a farm bill and bears witness to
the importance Congress now places on forestry.164
On April 19,1990, the same day that the ISC was presenting its findings to a
Congressional hearing, Congressman Jim Jontz (D, Indiana) introduced a bill
with 24 co-sponsors to establish an andent forest reserve system on Forest
Service and BLM lands. The proposed A ndent Forests Protection Act did not
pass, but the idea persisted through 1992, representing the sentiment w ithin
some sedors of Congress that the FS discretion regarding forest management
should be further censured.

In April, 1991, the House Agriculture Committee

and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee convened a
"Sdentific Panel on Late-Successional Forest Ecosystems" (dubbed Gang of
Four by the timber industry and hereafter Sdentific Panel165) in an attem pt "to
get things going by providing members of Congress with a menu of options
from which they could build forest protection legislation."166 John Gordon, a
panel member and Dean of the Yale forestry school, recalls that the formation
of the team "was symptomatic of the Forest Service losing control," and the
Forest Service Chief was unhappy about i t 167 According to Gordon:
The fa d that the Forest Service was not very happy about what
we were doing m ust have been that they felt they lost something
that way—control, I suppose. We were called in by Dale
Robertson, and sort of bawled out for running off and getting
Forest Service sdentists involved.168

I 64 Leahy, "Forestry and Foresters," 31-3Z
1®* Timber industry presumably chose this name to cast the panel in the light of the Chinese
communist leadership, a bizarre instance of red-baiting.
166 Durbin,Tree Huggers, 168.
16? Gordon, "Interview," 9.
168 Ibid., 10.
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Responding to a growing body of research and political claims concerning
the reduction of salmon populations, as well as owl populations and habitat,
the Scientific Panel concluded that protecting the salmon w ould require
controversial decreases in old-growth logging, particularly roadbuilding.
"[L]ike it or not, the Forest Service would have to start taking fish protection
seriously in the owl forests west of the Cascade."169 Meanwhile, the FWS was
preparing to announce its proposed threatened species listing of the marbled
marrulet, which it published in September, 1992. By Spring, 1992, two House
committees were considering bills to control management of the owl forests.
According to the New York Times:
At issue are unlogged forests in Northern California, Oregon, and
Washington. Even as a Cabinet-level committee votes this week on
how much forest should be cut, two committees of the House are
set to deal with proposals that would protect endangered species by
identifying and preserving ranges covering millions of acres.170
According to the New York Times, the two "bills now in the House would
slow the harvest of ancient timber and make available millions of dollars for
retraining workers and restoring lands ruined by clear cutting."171 A bill
approved in the House Interior Committee (co-written by Representatives
Bruce Vento, Dem., Minnesota and George Miller, Dem., Cal) would have "set
aside roughly eight million acres of land to remain uncut and put one million
acres out of reach of loggers temporarily for researchers." Another bill, out of
the House Agriculture Committee, would have "establishfed] a 6.8 millionacre owl preserve in the Northwest."172
169 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 170.
170 Schneider, Keith, Bush and Congress facing a showdown on forests. New York Times. May
12,1992: A14.

171 Ibid.
172 Tom Kenworthy, "Logging Approved at Owl Site," Washington Post May 15,1992 A ,l.
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Meanwhile, the Forest Service continued to face difficulties in the federal
courts. In January, 1992, the Forest Service had produced a supplemental Final
Environmental Impact Statement on Management for the Northern spotted
Owl. (The EIS supplemented the Regional Guide, which the Forest Service
published in 1984.) The agency's preferred alternative and proposed action
was to adopt the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) plan as the framework
for management of owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest.173
Environmentalists appealed the plan arguing that it neglected "information
produced subsequent to the 1990 ISC report and that the EIS failed to take into
account the impact that an owl plan would have on 32 other old-growthdependent spedes."174 Judge Dwyer rejected the plan in May, ruling that the
agency had failed to address three issues: whether or not "the Fish and
Wildlife Service's jeopardy call on the 13 Bureau of Land Management sales
released for harvest by spedal review process under the ESA (the "God
Squad") necessitated a revision of the viability assessments used in the EIS";
whether or not "new information about declining owl populations require
changing the probabilities of maintaining viable owl populations"; and,
whether or not the agency's plan w ould "lead to extirpation of the 32 spedes
dosely assodated with old-growth, which had been part of the Gang of Four
report."175

Judge Dwyer subsequently imposed a new temporary restraining order
through the summer and fall of 1992, shutting down logging on old-growth in
173 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 398, fn.66.
174 Ibid., 398,61.66.
175 Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Mosely; See Caldwell, Wilkinson, and Shannon, "Making
Ecosystem Polity," 10.
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the Pacific northwest. The Region 6 harvest level declined from 4.9 billion
board feet in 1990 to just 0.77 million in 1992.176 The Forest Service, having
lost much of its discretion in the management of its lands in its only "paying"
region, faced the task of providing a planning framework that would suit the
federal court. Meanwhile, the ruling p ut pressure on Congress to form a
legislative solution to the political conflict between tim ber jobs and the
northern spotted owl, threatening a farther reaching restraint upon the
agency, at a time when the conflict was m oving east tow ard the interior
Columbia basin and the northern Rockies and expanding to include more
spedes.177

The Conflict Expands

To complicate matters further for the Forest Service, environmentalists
and the media began to expand the discourse to the "eastside forests" (east of
the Cascades) and the northern Rockies, as well as other regions, while
expanding the list of politically important spedes. In December 1991, Time
magazine prodaim ed in its by-line that "the fight is not just about spotted
owls anymore. Conservationists step up an all-fronts campaign to save
America's an d en t forests."178 The artide, entitled "Whose woods are these?"
(in bold letters), began with an apocalyptic tone: "Deep inside the dwindling
woods, a rare spedes of bird is threatened w ith extinction. Before loggers came
to the forest, the birds could easily find the trees they needed for nesting —
176 Warren, Production, Prices, Employment, 1990; 1991; 1992.
177 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?"; Barry Meier, "Spotted owl dispute jolts another
timber region," New York Times, February 1, L,7; Tom Kensworthy, "'Unraveling' of Ecosystem
Looms in Oregon Forests,"Washington Post. May 15,1992, A,14; Tom Kensworthy, "Study of
Northwest's forests sought," Washington Post June4> 1992, A27.
178 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70.
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trees at least 80 to 100 years old. But the relentless advance of chain saws has
leveled much of the old woodland." The story, referring to national forests,
went on to link the Pacific Northwest controversy to other regions and species
beyond the owl, conveying a voice of alarm and criticism to a large,
mainstream readership:
This story may sound familiar, but these forests are not in the
Pacific Northwest, and the bird in question is not the northern
spotted owl. It is the red-cockaded woodpecker, a striking redblack-and-white bird that lives in loblolly and longleaf pines
from Virginia to Texas. Like the owl, it is being used by
biologists as an indicator species, a sensitive probe of the vitality
of forests across a broad swath of the U.S. Just as dying canaries
once let coal miners know that oxygen levels were perilously
low, the decline of the red-cockaded woodpecker, the northern
spotted owl, and many other species is a warning of a far greater
threat: America's few remaining stands of old-growth forests —
woods whose ancient trees have never been logged —are in
danger of disappearing as distinct and valuable ecosystems.179
In November, 1991, the Fish and Wildlife Service "determ ined that logging
in the Southwest was rapidly destroying the dense forests in which the
Mexican spotted owl lives" and proposed that owl also be listed as a threatened
spedes.180 By January, the Forest Service had "temporarily dosed thousands
of acres of federal land in the Southwest to logging," dropping timber
production in the Gila National Forest by 50 percent from the previous year's
levels, "under a plan to protect the owl while it is studied."181 hi early May
1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the Snake River chinook
salmon as a threatened spedes. According to the Washington Post, "East-side
forests provide spawning ground for some Chinook, and logging could be

179 Ibid., 70.
180 Meier, "Spotted owl dispute" New York Times, February 1, L,7.
181 Ibid., L, 7.
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halted to prevent further degradation of salmon habitat hit hard by clearcutting and cattle grazing that raise water temperatures and cloud streams
with sediment."182

A Washington Post front-page headline ominously declared that an
"'unraveling' of ecosystems looms in Oregon forests," further reporting that
"scientists say recovery could take [a] century."183 At the time, the House
Interior and Agriculture Committees were debating inclusion of provisions
for "the east-side" in ancient forest legislation under consideration. In an
attempt to "reduce pressure to include provisions on east-side forests in
legislation now being written by the House Interior and Agriculture
committees," House Speaker, Tom Foley (D-Washington) and Oregon Senator
Mark Hatfield wrote a letter to Agriculture Secretary Ed Madigan, requesting
him to "undertake a scientific study of the insect- and disease-ravaged national
forests in eastern Oregon and Washington."184 This was seen by
environmental groups as portending an effect in order to increase the east-side
cut to partially offset the loss of northwest timber production.

The Forest Service was facing similar activism in its N orthern Region,
where environmentalists were winning suits regarding sensitive species on
national forests as well as crafting regional legislation.185 In Montana, for
which Congress had not passed a wilderness bill, environmentalists had
182 Tom Kensworthy, "'Unraveling' of Ecosystem Looms in Oregon Forests/'Washington Post.
May 15,1992, A,14.
183 Ibid., A ,l.
184 Tom Kensworthy, "Study of Northwest's Forests Sought," Washington Post June4,1992,
A27.
185 for instance, see the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act, which the Alliance for
the Wild Rockies drafted. Congress introduced the bill, which did not pass, in 1993.
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formed, in 1988, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies. In 1990, the popular
Outdoor Magazine announced that the group was "one of eight 'homegrown'
or 'low -budgef environmental groups nationwide" to meet its "'honor roll' of
small environmental groups," which, according to the editors, "may be the
future of the environm ental movement."186

At this time the alliance, directed by Mike Bader in Missoula, Montana,
was drafting its N orthern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act, which would
cover over 16.3 million acres in Montana and Idaho (both states w ithout
Congressional wilderness bills), Wyoming, eastern Oregon, and eastern
W ashington.187 (Ultimately, the Alliance was unable to gam er the support of
the Montana delegation, but by 1993, with the help of legislators from other
states, the group was able to see its bill introduced.)188

Below Cost Timber Sales

In 1991, the House Agriculture Committee decided to visit the issue of
below-cost timber sales, which had persistently been an object of criticism since
the beginning of the conflict over PNW ancient forests. Paul H irt writes that,
although below-costs sales "have been common since World War Two, the
losses have accelerated over the years as forest managers increasingly turned
to the lower valued and more inaccessible timber in the remote high country
to fulfill their logging quotas."189 As early as 1980, the Natural Resources
186 Sherry Devlin, "Alliance Named by Magazine/' Missoulian , September 1,1990, B-l.
I ®7 Sherry Devlin, "New York Lawmaker Sponsors Rockies Bill," Missoulian , July 16,1993, B1.
1®® Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act.
I ®9 Hirt, Conspircacy, xxxix.
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Defense Council directed attention to below cost sales when it issued a report
entitled "Giving away the National Forests." In 1984, the U.S. General
Accounting Office conducted its own study, discovering that "in 1981 and 1982,
96 percent of timber sales in the Forest Service's Rocky Mountain Region... lost
money; while 93 percent in the Intermountain Region lost money; and 60
percent in the Northern Region lost money."190

In July, 1990, retired Congressional Research Service staffer, Robert Wolf,
wrote that "the most serious failure in implementing NFMA concerns the
cost tracking provisions. In sum, the Forest Service claims profits from its
timber sales that are unrealistic if not egregious."191 Wolf contended that
roads built by loggers ("purchaser credit roads") should not be counted by the
Forest Service as a revenue, and that payments made to counties (in lieu of
taxes) should be counted as a cost. This accounting would tu rn profits claimed
by the agency into losses.192

A year later, in October 1991, the House Agriculture Committee held
hearings on the issue of the timber program's revenues and losses, where
Wolf presented his figures. A scathing article in the Atlantic M onthly
entitled "The mismanagement of the National Forests," criticized the political
manipulation of agency budget reporting, arguing "that the U.S. Forest
Service, protected from congressional scrutiny by pork-barrel politics and
imaginative bookkeeping, is devastating America's national forests through

190 Ibid., 279.
191 Wolf, "Promises to Keep," 14.

192 Ibid.
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needless and unprofitable tim ber sales."193 The author, a one-time "voluntary
wilderness guard" for the agency, began with a litany of graphically described
ecological abuses resulting from logging, then proceeded to an analysis of the
agency's "timber mythology," finally focusing upon the tim ber program's
effect on "the federal purse." Knize proclaimed:
The Forest Service has long claimed that the government makes
money on timber sales, b u t an analysis performed at the request
of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on the
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources shows that the
Forest Service timber program has lost $5.6 billion over the past
decade."194
T im e magazine, also commented upon the proceedings with a critical
voice. The magazine argued that agency "logging operations are questionable
on economic grounds."195 The magazine reported that, "while the agency
claims it made $628 million in profit last year, critics dismiss that figure as
absurd. During the hearings Wolf pointed to the agency's use of 'inflated
revenues and discounted costs,' telling the House Agriculture Committee in
October that 'these mythical profits are achieved by accounting alchemy.'"196

At issue were several reported timber program costs and revenues, for
instance whether or not costs should include the 25 percent payment to
counties required from tim ber receipts, road maintenance, and "land-line
location." Other concerns included depreciation rates for a $575 million
timber fund and amortization rates for roads. According to the Atlantic
M onthly, The Forest Service has used a number of creative accounting
193 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests," 98.

194 Ibid., 100.
*95 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70.

196 ibid.
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gimmicks, including amortizing roads over 240 years," or, in the Chugach
National Forest in Alaska, over 1,800 years.197 In an article from 1990, Wolf
wrote:
On the receipts side of the ledger, the service counts tim ber that
it gives to lumber companies in lieu of payments for road
building as if the trees were money received that could be used
to defray other costs —implying an expense is a revenue. On the
expense side, it uses several methods to obscure or understate
costs. The most famous examples also concern timber access
roads. For roads with a typical life of 20-30 years, the service uses
amortization periods that range from 63 years for the lowest
forest region to 969 for the highest, significantly reducing the
apparent annual cost. Major expenses for road maintenance are
omitted entirely. In addition, the service is working on a few
new cost-hiding schemes. One would make roadbed costs
disappear entirely. These are but a few examples of how the
service systematically overstates receipts and understates costs,
turning actual financial losses for the national forests into
supposed profits.198
Wolf went on to criticize the agency for overrating its "present net value,"
saying that aside from not even being "money in the bank," it was "not even a
proven concept," depending, for instance, upon attributing "monetary value
to such nonquantifiable factors as wildlife and camping."199 Wolf, in pointing
to the economic irrationality of the Forest Service Timber Program was also
alluding to the political character of is accounting.

Concluding Remarks

By early summer, 1992, the Forest Service was struggling to maintain its
agency regarding management of the Pacific Northwest, the "Eastside,"
197 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests," 103.
198 Wolf, "Promises to Keep," 14.
199 Ibid., 14.
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northern Rocky Mountains and beyond. Attempting to rewrite procedural
regulations an d fending off charges of lying to the public regarding public costs
and benefits and the results of logging were among the challenges the agency
faced. The Forest Service faced injunctions from timber harvest —a
devastating loss of authority.200 The agency had severely challenged the
warm and fuzzy Smoky Bear image it had attempted to construct in the 1950s
and early 1960s. This tarnishing showed not only in the formal politics of the
courts and capitols, but on the streets and in the national forests themselves.
If external politics were not enough to challenge the agency's identity, the
agency was also being forced to confront dissent from within, marking the
unambiguous end to the relative internal solidarity boasted in earlier decades.

200 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 139-40.
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Chapter 4
A dding Insult to Injury: More Activism, Dissent, and Discord

Out o f controlllll
— Jefferson Starship
Modern Lave (record album)

While the Forest Service was losing agency before the activism of Congress
and the mandates of the federal courts, it was also facing hostility and protest
from other quarters.

Environmental activists exerted direct pressure at all

levels —at the agency doors as well as in the National Forests, and soon a
variety of popular media —ranging from mainstream newspapers and
magazines, to television producers, writers and filmmakers —began to add
their critiques to the discourse. Ultimately, dissatisfaction affected the Forest
Service itself, and the agency suffered a crisis of dissent and discord am ong its
own ranks, foreshadowing an organizational shift that would follow w ith
Robertson's memo in June, 1992. This chapter chronicles the activism facing
the Forest Service from within its ow n ranks, as well as the political
demonstrations, civil disobedience, and media criticism that the agency could
not ignore.

Internal Discord (1984-1992)

In 1940, when Forest Service Chief Q ap p e lamented on the poor morale in the
U.S. Forest Service, and thirty years later when Chief Cliff em pathized with
his subordinates' sense of misdirection, they were not proclaiming an
organizational breakdown, but certainly they demonstrated that diversity of
77
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mind existed within the agency. This diversity was, however, mainly
diversity among foresters. Environmental legislation of the 1960s and 1970s
significantly changed this situation. After Congress had passed the National
Environmental Policy and National Forest Management Acts, each of which
required the Forest Service to consider the effects of management practices
upon a wide range of social, cultural, and ecological variables, the agency
began diversifying its workforce, hiring more wildlife biologists, soil scientists,
hydrologists, ecologists and economists — even historians and archeologists.

Within a decade, when the Forest Service was losing control of
management decisions in the face of Congressional activism and adverse
court decisions, it was also undergoing internal change, as newly hired
specialists began rising through the ranks. From the mid-1980s on, Forest
Service workers began criticizing agency policy —from the inside —and by the
late 1980s, even regional officers were openly critical of the Chief Forester, as
well as of agency policies. The conflict revealed that, in addition to losing
control from outside forces, the old-guard agency personnel were losing
control over its internal affairs as well.

During the 1980s, this diversity of mind manifested in outright schism
within the Forest Service, fracturing any possible sense of unity the Forest
Service m ight have wished to claim. By the early 1990s, this schism had
become apparent between the agency's Washington, D.G-based central
directorate and the regionally-based Forest Supervisors and Regional
Foresters.201 Timber sales were the first internal battle ground. Based upon
201 Alan McQuillan, "Inside Mumma-Gate," Missoula Independent. October 31,1991, 18-19;
Sherry Devlin, "Region Falls Short on Timber Again," Missoulian, September 15,1991 and
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on-the-ground assessment, regional agency officers were estimating one set of
Allowable Sale Quantities, while the directorate, responding to pressures from
the timber industry, a powerful bloc of westerners in Congress, and the Bush
administration, exploited the RPA data base to manipulate the forest planning
process and revise those numbers upward. Ultimately, the regional officers
broke rank. Meanwhile, a schism had also developed between on-the-ground
staff and the Forest Service administration regarding the effects of logging.
Regional Foresters were caught in the middle, themselves subject to pressures
from the Washington Office as well as the proddings of Congress and the
executive branch, while also being respondent to their own workforce's voices.

An early and poignant statement of this unrest came in 1984 from the
Forest Service's Northern Region, based in Missoula, Montana. An
anonymous disgruntled agency worker from the Beaverhead National Forest
in Idaho whom the Washington Post dubbed "Deep Root" revealed the depth
of the internal division.202 (Deep Root later revealed his identity.) Deep
Root's tactics including making collect phone calls to the bureaus of several
major newspapers and television networks reporting Forest Service road
practices in "roadless areas where timber values may be marginal or where
they may be outweighed by fisheries, wildlife or recreations values," some
with timber receipts below the cost of preparation, and some in violation of
federal environmental law.203 According to the Denver bureau of the
Washington Post:
"Forest Service Making Promises It Can't Keep?" Missoulian, October 11,1991, Al; Timothy
Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much," New York Times
September 16,1991, A l.
202 T.R. Reid, "Deep Root's Telephone Crusade," Missoulian November 25,1984, A -l.
203 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher, Deep Root Discuss Issues," Missoulian, Dec. 15,1985,13.
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For weeks now his calls have been coining in to the W ashington
Post bureau here and to the Denver offices of the New York
Tim es, N ewsw eek, NBC, and other national media. Invariably,
they are collect calls from —as the operator puts it —"an
experienced forest manager in Montana."204
The anonymous whistle blower gave one example "of an illegal road" —
the Howell Creek Road —claiming it was "built inside RARE II (wilderness
study) areas prematurely before any Montana wilderness bill passed and before
any cumulative impact study was performed for all projected roads in the
area," and, in the words of the reporter, "contended that similar examples exist
on the Kootenai, Flathead, Lolo, Bitterroot, Deerlodge, and Gallatin
forests." 205 According to several sources, Deep Root was an experienced forest
manager —a "professional forester" belonging to any of several professional
groups including the Society of American Foresters and the American Forestry
Association.206 Other professionals adopted the tactics, eventually gaining a
defensive response from Forest Service Chief Max Peterson and the attention
of Montana Senator John Melcher (D), who met in private w ith Deep Root.
Melcher, claimed that he shared many of the concerns with Deep Root and
would investigate whether or not the National Forest Management Act was
meeting Congressional intent. He told the press, "He tapped the root with
m e."207

While the Deep Root spectacle was seemingly a regional event, unrest took
a national course four years later w hen disgruntled Forest Service workers
formed the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics,
204 Tim Reid, ''Deep Root's Telephone Crusade," Missoulian, Nov. 25,1984. A -l.
205 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher to Whistleblower: Have Boots, Will Travel," Missoulian,
Dec. 13,1984> 14.
206 John Kuglin, "Forest Service Nemesis Spreads its 'Roots,'" Missoulian Dec. 2,1984,17.
207 Don Schwennesen, "Melcher, Deep Root Discuss Issues," Missoulian December 15,1984,13.
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or AFSEE. In 1989, Jeff Debonis, a timber sale planner on the Willamette
Forest, wrote an e-mail memo to Chief Dale Robertson criticizing the Forest
Service timber program. Debonis, in his memo, w hich became public, wrote:
We, as an agency, are perceived by the conservation community
as being an advocate of the timber industry's agenda. Based on
my 10 years with the Forest Service, I believe this charge is true.
I also believe, along with any others, that this agency needs to re
take the moral "high ground."208
Subsequently, Debonis formed the Association of Forest Service Employees
for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE) and began publishing a monthly
newspaper-style magazine, the Inner Voice, starting w ith an open letter to
Dale Robertson criticizing the close relationship betw een the agency and the
timber industry:
O ur basic problem right now is that we (the Forest Service) are
much too biased towards the resource-extraction industries,
particularly the timber industry. We support their narrowly
focused, short sighted agenda to the point that we are perceived
by much of the public as being dupes of, and mere spokespeople
for the resource extraction industries.209
Debonis went on to criticize the agency for overlooking the effects of its
own management, particularly overcutting, w riting that:
This stubborn, get-the-cut-out mindset we tend to embrace as an
agency blinds us to the actual destructive results of our actions.
We see only w hat we want to see. As the negative impacts of our
actions become more and more obvious, we try to pretend it's
not happening And yet at some subconscious level we kn o w
that we are overcutting.210

208 Debonis, in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 102.
209 Debonis, "Speaking Out," 4.
210 Ibid., 4
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Early the next year, Robertson replied to Debonis, via the Inner Voice,
commending him for bringing up "several good ideas," but disagreeing with
Debonis7 assessment of the "attitude of the Forest Service": "It does not
represent my attitude nor that of the people I work with and know best."211
Robertson, again, appealed to "balance," a signifier the Forest Service would
employ throughout the conflict.212 Robertson wrote:
It seems to me that your letter was one-sided and did not
appropriately take into account the interest and needs of the
American people in the Forest. We in the Forest Service have to
keep a more balanced view of the world under our multiple use
mandate. I think one of the things we have to guard against is
getting caught up in the rhetoric of either the timber industry or
the environmental groups and start believing it without putting
some balance into it.213
However, Chief Robertson did approve of "participatory management77 and
encouraged employees to "speak up and let their views be known" so the
agency could benefit from "advantages of a diverse workforce."214 Robertson
went on to appeal personally to Debonis to promote constructive, balanced
and sensitive reform in the agency, writing, "Jeff, I hope I can count on you to
bring about constructive change in the Forest Service —change that is
sensitive to both the environment and the people who are affected by our
decisions."215 Robertson wanted benefit from the advantages of diversity

211 Robertson, "Chief Robertson Responds," 3.
212 The use of the term "balance," and the Forest Service's claim to promote a balanced policy,
is an example of a political appropriation of a popular term. Balance is a vague reference to
the themes of civility and reason, primary organizing ideas in the historical development of
modem bureaucracies. For a good discussion of this relationship between civility and policy as
it developed in Europe, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, and his Madness and
C ivilization.
213 Robertson, 3.
214 ibid.
215 Ibid.
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within the agency w ithout suffering the disadvantages of the conflict that
might result from such diversity.

The Inner Voice soon attracted writers from National Forests and BLM
lands all over the United States, writing on issues as diverse as abuse of
archeological sites to the silencing of whistle blowers. It became popular and
well distributed and attracted contributions from government workers and
citizens alike, eventually "showing up on the desks and counters of Forest
Service and BLM offices throughout the West."216

The Forest Service directorate also faced internal opposition from a
significant number of the Regional Foresters and Forest Supervisors.
Following a November, 1989, meeting of Forest Supervisors at the "Sunbird
Conference," in Tucson, Arizona, "supervisors from 63 national forests" from
Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4 signed a memo recommending agency reform.217 The
supervisors charged that agency prioritizing and budgeting —particularly its
emphasis on timber production — was out of proportion with the demands of
society. The memo stated:
The emphasis of National Forest programs does not reflect the
land stewardship values embodied in forest plans, nor does it
reflect the values of many Forest Service employees and the
public.218
Our timber program has been 35 percent of the National Forest
System Budget for the last 20 years while recreation, fish and
wildlife, and soil and water have been 2 to 3 percent each.219
216
217
218
219

Durbin, Tree Huggers, 102.
Ibid.,105; Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 300-301.
Region 1 ,2 ,3 , and 4 Forest Supervisors to the Chief, 10.
Ibid., 10-11.
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The memo went on to recommend studies of the agency's "operational
efficiency/' budget allocation reform, reorganization of "functional middle
management positions," and accounting reform, as well as suggesting changes
in "leadership and communications" and "workforce diversity."220

During the same month, November, 1989, all of the Northern Region
supervisors wrote an "open letter to the Chief' (later appearing in the Inner
Voice, AFSEEE's bi-monthly publication), similar to the Sunbird memo,
lamenting that the agency was not meeting the standards expected by the
public as well as agency workers. Appealing to the mythic legacy of Gifford
Pinchot, the supervisors warned that without a policy change, the agency
mission statement would be reduced to mere political rhetoric. The
supervisors wrote::
We are not meeting the quality land management expectations
of our public and our employees. We are not being viewed as
the "conservation leaders" Gifford Pinchot would have had us
become, despite strong support of the rhetoric in our Mission
Statement. We are worried that if we d o n 't make some major
changes as an agency, our Mission Statement will never move
from rhetoric to reality.221

Referring to increased and unsustainable "stress" within the agency, due to
budget cuts, personnel cuts, and an overly aggressive timber program, the
Supervisors sounded an apocalyptic tone, warning the Chief that old agency
responses would not suffice to meet the current threats. Change was
necessary:
220 Ibid., 11.
221 Region 1 Supervisors, "Letter to the Chief," 10.
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The Ranger District plate is overflowing and the stress on our
workforce to continue to crank out more targets, w ork on more
initiatives, work harder on more customer service projects, and
work harder to resolve conflicting values at the field level, is
becoming too m uch to ask them to bear. The stress in the
organization is serious. A "can do" attitude will not save us this
time. We are spread too thin. It is time that we start dealing w ith
our internal problems, before we crack apart at the seams.222
The language of this letter spelled out what any agency would fear —the
possibility of losing control - a possibility to which the Supervisors directly
alluded. Writing that, despite the diligence of the Regional level officials (to
whom the supervisors referred as "your people") in meeting program targets
set at the Washington Office, "there is a growing concern that we have become
'an organization out of control'."223

An important issue involved the levels of allowable sale quantities (ASQs)
handed dow n from Washington Office at behest of the Bush administration;
supervisors argued that ASQs were "unrealistically high even with full
funding."224 In 1991, forest supervisors in Region One complained to
regional forester, John Mumma, that they could not meet the Bush
adm inistration's dem ands for tim ber and the requirements of environmental
laws also. Ultimately, Mumma ordered the supervisors to meet the legal
requirements, despite directives from the administration.225 In response,
several of the supervisors from Region One w rote to the Chief with the same
message. According to Mumma, "they essentially said that we can't meet our
timber targets in the northern region and w e're asking you to exercise some
222 Ibid., 10.
2 ^ Ibid., 10.
224 Region 1 Forest Supervisors, "Feedback to the Chief."
225 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
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leadership on and on. When [Chief Robertson] got that letter, he was highly
offended."226 John Mumma and the supervisors invited Chief Robertson to
meet w ith them in Big Sky, M ontana, and "he was still sensitive about that
letter, but we had, I think a reasonably good discussion. It d id n 't really resolve
anything."227 According to M umma, "many FS people felt that since [forest
plans] had to go through the Secretary of Agriculture's office for approval that
the numbers were higher than w hat the people on the ground felt were
sustainable over time."228 This difference between the supervisors' estimates
and those approved by the W ashington Office found confirmation in the
September 10 memo.229 Robertson was as unresponsive to the Regional
Foresters as he was to the Forest Supervisors.

D uring the same year, 1991, M umm a and the eight other regional foresters
met in Florida to discuss the lack of communication, eventually drafting a
letter to Robertson offering to help him do his job "and help, essentially, save
the Forest Service."230 According to Mumma, the Forest Service was feeling
the threat that Congress could "actually dismember it and break it down like
Senator Craig has proposed."231 This was not a recent trend. In the 1950s, the
Forest Industries Council had proposed such a change, recommending
Congress to broach the proposition of transferring federal lands to corporate
ownership. In 1953 the political association distributed a report outlining its
policy position in craftily selected language, which included recommendations
226 Mumma, "Interview," 1.
222 Ibid.
22* ibid.
229 Sherry Devlin, "Forest Service Making Promises It Can't Keep?" Missoulian October 11,
1991, A l.
280 Mumma, "Interview," 11.
231 Ibid.
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that Congress study "whether our entire economy w ould be strengthened by
restoring [to private ownership] some federal forest lands."232 According to
Mumma, as late as 1991, the political environment still insinuated change that
could drastically affect who controlled public land management. "In fact, you
would think about whether there would be a Forest Service as we knew it
then, twenty years from then, because certainly there was strong motivation to
make significant changes."233 Nevertheless, George Leonard, an Associate
Chief, rather than Robertson, replied to the letter, implying that the issue was
not necessarily a top priority concern to Robertson.

In September of the same year, 1991, Mumma accepted retirement rather
than reassignment to "an unspecified job in Washington D .C "234 According
to The New York Times, Mumma "was forced into retirement at the age of 51
this month after western Republican senators and timber industry executives
complained that he was not allowing trees to be logged fast enough from the
Rocky M ountains."235 Conversely, the agency claimed Mumma was
transferred because of "poor performance ratings."236 According to Susan
Hess, "director of public affairs for the Forest Service," Mumma's "inability...
to meet the timber cut was only part of the reason for his ouster. She said his
removal as regional forester was not an attem pt to stifle dissident voices... but
rather 'was due to the general job perform ance.../"237 The same m onth that

232 Forest Industries Council in Hirt, Conspiracy, 110. Italics added.
233 Mumma, "Interview," 11.
234 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
235 Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much,"
New York Times, September 16,1991, A1,A12.
236 Hirt, Conspiracy, 286.
237 Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much,"
New York Times, September 16,1991, A l.
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Mumma left the Forest Service, he testified before the House Post Office and
Civil Service subcommittee regarding "allegations that the Forest Service
logged national forests illegally and retaliated against agency whistle
blowers."238 This issue of retaliation against whistle-blowers was soon to
become a serious political issue.

The following January, 1992, John McCormick, "the former special agent
who handled whistle-blower complaints at the Forest Service," affirmed
Mumma's testimony in front of the same committee, saying that "the agency
violated environmental laws, m anipulated scientific evidence to benefit the
timber industry and punished workers who raised objections."239 That same
month, McCormick published an Opinion-Editorial piece in the New York
Times, entitled, "Can't See the Forest for the Sleaze," where he listed
environmental violations and pork barrel resource give aways, as well as
describing an agency policy of assigning investigations to regional offices and,
in the process, identifying whistleblowers to their superiors.240 According to
McCormick, the "quantity of whistle-blower allegations has increased
sevenfold since 1987," most of them going unheeded.241 In response to
McCormick's testimony, Representative Gerry Sikorski, chairman of the
House subcommittee, asked the Justice Department to investigate the charges.
Two months later, "a group of former and current employees" held a press
conference, "charging that America's ancient forests are being devastated by

2^8 "Panel Chairman to Seek Probe of Forest Service, "Washington Post, Jan 30,1992, A, 8; US.
House Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Hearing..
239 "Panel Chairman to Seek Probe of Forest Service," Washington Post, Jan 30,1992, A8.
24° John McCormick, "Can't See the Forest for the Sleaze," New York Times, Jan. 29,1992, A21.
241 Ibid.
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overlogging," and calling for "radical changes in agency management."242
According to the New York Times, "Biologists and timber planners also told a
news conference they had been harassed by superiors when they tried to
expose Forest Service abuses, including proposed logging in areas where rare
bald eagles and spotted owls were nesting." According to Francis Mangels, a
Shasta-Trinity National Forest biologist, "reprisals were vicious and
im m ediate."243

By 1992, the Forest Service was being assailed by its own officers;
organizational integrity and rank had broken down. In part, this involved the
courts assigning decision-making pow er to the science team members.

An, in

part, this disintegration reflected dem ographic changes within the agency.
According to Hirt:
One particularly comprehensive study by researchers at the
University of California, Davis, interviewed over 1,000 Forest
Service employees in 1989-92 and compared their findings with
those of several previous studies dating back to the 1950s. They
concluded that there had been significant change in attitudes
among Forest Service personnel, accelerated during the 1980s.
In particular, they found a marked decline in support for
increased timber harvesting, from 62 percent of respondents in
a 1981 study to 7 percent of respondents in the 1992 survey. The
causes for the change in attitude included personnel turnover,
an increase in the hiring of professionals trained in
noncommodity disciplines, broader exposure of employees to
other professions because of NFMA's requirement for
interdisciplinary planning an d actual changes in individual
attitudes of long-term employees.244

242 "Forest Policy Assailed," Washington Post, March 27,1992, A19.

243 Ibid., A19.
244 Hirt, Conspiracy, 282-83.
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In 1992, University of Michigan researchers who also surveyed agency
workers found that, while "70 percent of respondents chose wildlife and fish
or water or recreation as the most important use," the majority also believed
the Forest Service prioritized timber.245 The survey showed a strong schism
between agency values and employee values, a split reflected in the agency's
multifold internal dissent.

On the Streets and in the Woods: Activism and the Negation of Authority

O ld-grow th supporters, like other environmental advocates, adopted a
variety of tactics —mass mailings, television spots, and other mass marketing
techniques, lobbying and so forth —but none brought as much media attention
and sense of urgency as the direct actions like on-site protests and obstruction
of logging, the occupation of politicians' offices, the picketing, and other forms
of protests.

In 1983, "EarthFirst! made its Northwest debut on Bald Mountain Road,"
in the Siskiyou National Forest246 Tipped off by a call from a Forest Service
soil scientist that the agency was roading into an area of old-growth forest long
in dispute, several activists, in an act of civil disobedience, entered the site and
blocked the bulldozer —leading to several arrests. This event, as well as any,
marks an escalation in direct activism against the Forest Service that was to
change the face of environmental activism in the U.S.

245 fcid.
246 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 58.
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EarthFirst! tactics varied widely, as did the personalities of "EarthFirstlers,"
with loosely affiliated groups scattered across the country. Several groups
published local newsletters (for instance, The Wild Rockies Review in
Missoula, Mont.), and volunteers published the monthly national EarthFirst!
journal. Most EarthFirstlers engaged in at least some form of "direct action" for instance occupying politicians' offices (some locking themselves to
furniture), having themselves buried to the neck in the middle of a logging
road, occupying old-growth trees in platforms 100 feet above the ground,
disrupting Forest Service meetings, and so forth. In rare cases, people engaged
in tree-spiking and industrial sabotage, though these practices were subject to
significant controversy w ithin the group.

Direct action demonstrations persisted for months, delaying the Forest
Service, "drawing national news coverage" and attracting the funds necessary
to take the case to court.247 Soon afterward, EarthFirst! held a "Round River
Rendezvous" on the Rogue River. In the central Cascades, the Breitenbush
Community, a land-owning cooperative near the Willamette National Forest,
"became a base of operations for forest activists who blocked logging roads and
sat in trees to slow the rate of logging in the North Santiam Canyon, a timber
stronghold long accustomed to getting its way with the Forest Service."248

Outreach and education activities included Lou Gold's lecture and slide
show, which he presented across the country more than 500 times.

And, in

1989, two former EarthFirst* activists bought a log from a 780-year old Douglas
fir, and toured the country with it to demonstrate the "magnificence of the
247 Ibid., 59
248 Ibid., 76.
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ancient forests" in the Pacific Northwest to people who, because they lived so
far away from the region, would never have much if any direct experience of
the forests. In 1989, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies began promoting
legislation for the northern Rockies by organizing a traveling slide-show
presentation that traveled nationally, including a tour of the east coast.

Activists organized by the preservation groups also attempted (somewhat
successfully) to contribute to (and influence) the legal and scientific discourses
focusing on old growth forests, particularly those studying old growth forests.
In 1988, The Wilderness Society published a report, "End of Ancient Forests:
A Report on National Forest Management Plans in the Pacific Northwest."249
In addition to analyzing draft management plans for twelve national forests in
the Pacific Northwest, the report publicized the group's own old growth
inventory numbers, generated in a then on-going study. The author, Peter
Morrison, an ecologist w ith a master's degree from the University of
Washington, "using existing Forest Service data and updating it through the
use of current aerial-photos," assembled the inventory according to an
"ecologically-based definition [for old growth] developed by Forest Service
researchers."250 In June, 1989, Wilderness Society President, George Frampton
(later to be named as Assistant Secretary of Interior under the Clinton
administration) presented these findings before a Congressional hearing,
testifying that "we estimate there is probably about 2.4 million acres of old
growth left. Of that, 800,000 acres is in parks and wilderness areas; the

249 Morrison, Old Growth in the Pacific Northwest.
250 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 144
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remaining 1.6 million acres not protected in any system to date."251 These
figures contradicted the Forest Service's estimations, which w ere roughly
double that of the Wilderness Society numbers.

Meanwhile, the National

Audubon Society had organized its "Adopt a Forest" campaign, in which
"volunteers used Forest Service data, aerial photos, and on-the-ground
observation to map all groves at least 300 acres in size that had trees at least 100
years old." Local Audubon groups were then able to use these numbers in
litigation and appeals against the Forest Service and the BLM.252

Other groups similarly had used monitoring of logging activities in efforts
to halt old-growth logging. In 1985, while the Headwaters group "was
monitoring logging on the Medford BLM district," the Siskiyou Citizens' Task
Force was studying "computer models of timber sales" on the forest.253
Related to this strain of action was a "know your watershed approach," where
communities worked together to m ap local forests using the watershed as an
organizing principle; the residents of Matole Valley used this approach in the
mid-1980s to restore salmon runs and bring attention to the effects of logging
in the watershed.254 Bonnie Phillips of Everett, Washington, published the
Forest Voice, which featured photographs of clearcuts around the northwest.
She began by printing 25,000 copies and sending them to activists nationally,
who eventually gave her enough money to print 1 million copies of the first
issue.255
251 Frampton in LLS. House, Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the
Committee on Agriculture and the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Joint Hearing, 20-21.
252 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 145.
253 Ibid., 74.
254 Ibid., 74.
255 ibid., 74
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Meanwhile, the industry and labor groups were organizing direct actions of
their own.

Local communities hosted "rallies" where loggers and their family

members testified regarding the hardships of unemployment, the virtues of
the timber worker lifestyle, and other claims in opposition to logging
decreases. In May 1989, "1,500 loggers, millworkers, and their families staged a
90-minute parade through Hood River, Oregon, featuring an imposing
convoy of 178 log trucks and 33 wood chip and lumber trucks." Mills in the
area closed so workers could participate in the event, which included
displaying and cheering to signs like the one on a log truck saying ""Eat an
owl, save the economy!"256

With both sides mobilized, the ancient forest conflict increased in intensity
by the late 1980s, taking on a more intimidating edge. In one instance captured
on film by the makers of Rage Over Trees (a film the Audubon Society was
producing at the time), timber workers attacked activists engaged in direct
action.257 In the summer of 1990, the group EarthFirst! organized a summer
long campaign against logging of the red woods in northern California, using
direct action techniques like tree sitting, picketing and road barricading.
Loggers beat several protesters and their supporters, and one of the organizers,
Judy Bari, who had been attempting to unite timber workers with
environmental groups, nearly died when a pipe bomb exploded under her seat
in an old panel truck she was driving in Berkeley, California.258 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concluded that she had blown herself up by
256 ibid., 97.
257 National Audobon Society, Rage Over Trees.
258 Helvarg, The War Against the Greens, 330-35.
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driving around w ith an especially volatile pipe bomb under her seat, allegedly
to bomb a target, but other accounts shed considerable doubt on this
hypothesis.259

Conflict afflicted the Northern Region as well, w here in Missoula, during
the fall of 1989, Montana, FBI and Forest Service investigated tree spikings that
had taken place the previous spring in the Clearwater National Forest.260
Special agents from the two agencies intimidated several graduate students in
the Environmental Studies program at the University of Montana, believing
them to be linked to EarthFirst!. The FBI investigated several people at home
and at their work places and eventually served seven subpoenas by a federal
grand jury in Boise, Idaho, to submit testimony and hair and shoe print
samples.261 Agents also attempted to link the tree-spikings to professor Ron
Erickson, who had opened an academic discussion in a graduate seminar to
philosophical consideration of the idea of tree spiking.262

The Media (is the Message)

Various forms of "mass media" played a strong role in pressuring the
Forest Service as well, among them television and video. In 1989, Turner
Broadcasting Corporation and the National Audubon Society released Rage
Over Trees, a politically motivated film documenting the political conflict
over old growth in the Pacific Northwest. Narrated by the mature-looking
259 Ibid.
260 Sherri Devlin, 'Tree Spiking Investigation Outrages Missoula Woman," Missoulian Oct.15,
1989, A l.

261 Ibid; Sherri Devlin, "Grand Jury Supeonas Leave Little Choice," Missoulian Oct. 15,1989, A l.
262 Sherri Devlin, "Subpeona Stuns UM Professor," Missoulian Oct. 6,1989, A l.
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Hollywood movie star Paul Newman, the film defined the conflict in terms of
a choice between cutting or not cutting oid-growth: "Will the remaining
ancient forests continue to be cut? O r should they be protected? This is the
question."263

Within seconds after the film began with footage of violence against direct
activists in the Willamette National Forest, the film show ed Newman
declaring that the issue, presented as a choice between cutting "the forests" and
saving them "for future generations" was related to "the heart of our society's
values." The film featured aerial footage of thousands of denuded, densely
roaded corporate lands as well as thousands of acres of roaded, partially
denuded and fragmented national forests. Emphasizing the effects of
roadbuilding, Newman's voice told the viewer that "the US Forest Service
sells national forest timber in swatches of 10 to 60 acres. To access the timber,
the Forest Service has already built or permitted enough logging roads to reach
the moon — and plans for 100,000 miles more."264

In contrast with the movie star image evoked by Paul Newman, the film
also featured prominent activist, John Montieth, director of the Oregon
Resource Council, an influential preservation group based in Oregon, George
Atilla, an airplane pilot and activist, Bob Ferris, a mill worker, and Forest
Service scientist and University of Washington professor, Jerry Franklin,
among others. Franklin, reasoning in terms of the practicality and functional
benefits of preserving old-growth, solemnly concluded: "The need for some
change is extreme —it's extremely urgent that w e make our decision as a
263 National Audobon Society, Rage Over Trees.
264 Ibid.
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society... Soon. Very Soon. This Year." Franklin was soon to accept a position
on the Interagency Science Team formed to formulate an owl management
plan dem anded by the ninth circuit court.265

While m edia responses to the conflict over the national forests were
diverse, environmentalism claimed a strong voice, and by the 1990s, various
newspapers and newsweeklies were posting articles, features, and opinions
critical of the Forest Service. For instance, recall some of the headlines
mentioned earlier: in bold black letters, a T im e headline inquired, "Whose
Woods are these?" referencing "an all-fronts campaign to save America's
ancient forests" from the Forest Service;266 also, the New York Times posted
the John McCormick opinion piece, called "C an't See the Forest for the
Sleaze."267 The New Yorker, as early as 1990, published an essay in which the
author, Catherine Caufield, lambasted the Forest Service for miles of
clearcutting and roading, unsustainable tim ber harvests, below-cost-timber
sales, and generally, poor agency scruples. Regarding the agency's legacy of
roadbuilding, the author wrote:
If an area is to be clear-cut, there must, of course be a road into it,
and the United Sates Forest Service has become the biggest roadbuilding agency in the world. Into the fragile landscape of the
national forests it has carved hundreds of thousands of miles of
roads. ... That is eight times the mileage of the entire interstate
highway system. Over the next fifty years, the Forest Service
plans to build about a hundred thousand miles of new roads,
and to rebuild over three hundred thousand miles.268

265 see chapter 6.
266 Lemonick, "Whose Woods are These?" 70
267 John McCormick, "Forest for the Sleaze," New York Times, Jan. 29,1992, A21.
268 Caufield, "A Reporter at Large," 61.
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Summarizing the environmental critique and linking the federal agency's
timber programs to the world economy, the author wrote "In the United
States, less than ten per cent [of old growth] survives. Almost all that
remains... is on public lands, and it is scheduled to be cut for lumber, plywood,
and pulp, much of it for export to Japan."269

More criticism followed in the mainstream media. The Atlantic Monthly
posted an article entitled "The Mismanagement of the National Forests."270
In an article entitled "A Wing and a Prayer for the Forests," the W ashington
Post praised the work of Lighthawk, an organization that was using light
aircraft to fly policy-makers and others over Northwest ancient forests and
cutover agency lands. According to the Post, "A few weeks ago, Sky [a
Lighthawk pilot, took House Interior Committee Chairman, George Miller, on
a tour of coastal forests. Both came back impressed, Miller w ith the extent of
the deforestation, and Sky w ith Miller's fondness for a certain four-letter
epithet uttered repeatedly as he looked at the clear cuts."271 In addition to
articles on whistle-blowers and agency reprisals, the papers published evidence
of over-cutting and environmental abuse, as well as a covering a w ider sphere
of environmental degradation, creating a general ambiance of environmental
crisis.

In addition, several books came out criticizing the agency. Tennessee
Senator Al Gore, running for Vice President on the Democratic ticket,
published his provocative book, Earth in the Balance, lamenting "how
269 ibid., 46.
220 Knize, "The Mismanagement of the National Forests." .
221 Kenworthy, "A Wing and a Prayer for the Forests," New York Times June 16,1992, A19..
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dangerously we are threatening to push the earth out of balance."272 Bringing
attention to "the developed nations" for their role in "massive deforestation,"
Gore criticized the Forest Service for its subsidized roading and logging
practices, as well its forestry practices, in general, linking it to "ecological
tragedy"273:
And in the United States, particularly in heavily logged regions
like the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, there is a renewed assault
on the great stretches of temperate forest that are so important to
us. The statistics about forests can be deceptive too: although
the United States, like several other developed nations, actually
has more forested land now than it did a hundred years ago,
many of the huge tracts that have been "harvested" and
replanted have been converted from diverse hardwoods to a
monoculture of softwood conifer forest that no longer support
the species that once thrived in the woods. In national forests
throughout the country, logging roads are being built in order to
facilitate the more rapid logging, even clear-cutting, of public
lands under contracts that require the sale of the trees at rates far
below market prices. This enormous taxpayer subsidy for the
deforestation of public land contributes to both the budget deficit
and an ecological tragedy.274
Richard Manning, in Last Stand, wrote about the logging industry in the
northern Rocky Mountains, which in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
liquidating timber on private lands in order to reduce tax liability, circumvent
future environmental regulation (for example, potential ESA listings), and
exchange slow-growing assets for high-yielding investments elsewhere.275
After consuming their own timber, the corporations, particularly Champion
International and Plum Creek, planned to tap timber supplies in the national
forests in the northern region.

In a critical tone, Manning wrote:

272 Gore, Earth in Balance. 2.
273 Ibid., 120.
274 Ibid., 121.
275 McQuillan, "Accelerated cutting."
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Over the years, about ten million acres of trees in Montana
remained in the public domain, and that is hard enough on
the trees. H ard enough, because the U.S. Forest Service,
charged with looking after them, really exists to cut trees. It is
run by the timber beasts. In recent years, the Forest Service
has made noises about reform, has been forced to reform by a
string of national laws inspired by the environmental
movement and by the dem and for more recreational use of
the forests. 276
Manning w ent on to ridicule the agency's woodsy public image by focusing
upon the issue of production, arguing that "People think of the Forest Service
as a sort of collection of overgrown Boy Scouts, rangers sheltering trees,
flowers, and Bambi from errant campfires and carelessly flicked butts, the
prototypical Smoky Bears. In the West, though, where most of its domain lies,
it is difficult to consider the Forest Service as anything but a branch of the
timber industry." Explicating upon the Forest Service's successful political
efforts to institute clear cuts (in NFMA), Manning portrayed a geography of
destruction as seen from the air:
From the Cessna as we flew that day, we could see all of this
history written on the hills of Fish Creek, giant clearcuts, some
twenty years old, some with no new trees, splotched across the
hills. Even more striking than the clearcuts, however, was a
landscape sewn together by roads.... The hills stood terraced with
roads like the decks of a pyramid, roads that wind around the
hills like a peel spiraling round an apple, cut and cored. Cut and
fill operations these roads are called, cats and graders biting
gouges straight out of the side of a hill and laying the gravel in
swaths across draws. Then the log trucks roll on this new bed of
grit, sand and d u s t277
This book received a considerable popularity, bringing further attention to the
conflict east of the Cascades. The voices of criticism were many —including

276 Manning, Last Stand, 46.
277 Ibid., 67.
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those who would soon control the executive branch ~ and by 1992, the Forest
Service w as not only severely constrained by the courts, but potentially faced
further erosion of its agency by the legislative and executive branches as well.

Concluding Remarks

Interviewed in the 1980s, John McGuire, who had been Forest Service
Chief in the 1970s, said that all organizations pursue the objectives of survival,
growth, and autonomy.278 By the late 1980s, from the perspective of the Forest
Service, all three of these objectives were imperiled, yet it seemed unable to
change direction in the face of political pressure.

Politics to the Forest Service m eant pleasing everyone — everyone with
compelling political demands — or, at the very least, raising no unmanageable
political ire.279 (Ironically, in attem pting to raise no ire, it did just that, and
from all sides.) That approach was not to change, but a shift in decisionmaking was in process, encouraged especially by the court m andated owl plan.
The plan, itself a political document, w ould signify a shift of land allocation
authority to the authors of the science being employed. This science, itself,
would be a political product.

278 Hirt, Conspiracy, 44.
279 This political interpretation poses an interesting question. Having evolved to an overt, bythe-whim political calculus, Utilitarianism, as manifested by the Forest Service, mutated yet
another step when political utility maximization came to be expressed in negative terms. The
favored policy became "that which displeases the least," particularly in the Appropriations
Committee.
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C hapters
Big Science: The Synthetic Discourses of Landscape Ecology and
Conservation Biology
Big Science, Hallelujah!
— Laurie A nderson
Big Science (record album)

By the late 1980s, the Forest Service had lost credibility as a "can do"
agency, able to manage the national forests competently and coherently. To
get its credibility back, it would have to demonstrate a straightforward,
rationale, which it sought in a science-based framework for decision-making.
The Forest Service would have to find a new way to w ork the credibility of
science into policy —specific enough to meet the requirements of the
environmental laws, and general enough to regain lost political acceptability.
The agency was able to turn to recently formed disciplines synthesized exactly
for the purposes of managing large areas of land —particularly conservation
biology and landscape ecology.

Landscape ecology and conservation biology played a central role in the
construction of forest policy on all federal (and many state) lands, particularly
in the Pacific Northwest; in the late 1980s, when court injunctions began to
shut down logging on national forests over the spotted owl, land agency
researchers used the language of landscape ecology and conservation biology
in attempts to meet the scientific requirements of the law .280 In this chapter, I
will trace the evolution of landscape ecology and conservation biology, the
28^ The Interagency Science Team's Conservation Strategy and the Forest Ecosystem
Management Assessment Team's Forest Ecosystem Management provide good examples of this
synthesis.
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language of which came to shape the political conflict during the demise of
the Forest Service, and which the agency would eventually use to craft its
Ecosystem Management. I also will discuss the creation of "New Forestry"
management principles —a synthesis of landscape ecology and conservation
biology applied to forestry —which Forest Service researchers created and
built into ecosystem management.

In tracing these "discourses," I will

describe some of the language and concepts that came to be politically
important in the old growth conflict.

Scienceism

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, while politicians were creating
highly politicized science programs, the Forest Service promoted its own
sdentific-imbued "intensive management."281 But intensive management's
acceptability had deteriorated significantly by the late 1960s and clearcut
logging had become a political problem. Science would become part of the
solution (as it had been part of the intensive management solution to
predicted timber famine). In the environmental legislation of the 1960s and
70s that forced forest reform management —science would play a leading role.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) all imposed

281 Since the late 1950s, when television first became a major force in politics, science, as a
general and vague signifier, has held an esteemed position in American politics. After the
Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik in 1957, politicians began to speak of a "missile-gap,"
preparing the political environment for the expensive and well-published space program,
culminating in NASA's "space spectaculars." Heath, Decade of Disillusionment, 97. John
Kennedy, recently elected to president, would waste no time "getting a man to the moon,"
telling the world: "No single project in this period will be more impressive to mankind."
Kennedy in Heath, Decade of Disillusionment, 97. Scientists and technicians would find the
way.
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planning structures that required scientific analysis from diverse fields
(especially fields related to biology and economics): the ESA with its species
consideration language, the NFMA, w ith its multiple-use consideration
language, the NEPA with its call for interdisciplinary scientific teams, all call
upon scientists to get together and make decisions regarding land
m anagem ent.282

Through these laws, Congress forced the Forest Service to expand its
scientific vision from logging and its effects upon watersheds, charismatic
wildlife, and future trees to consideration of a wider array of values —
especially a wider range of wildlife (plants and animals). To gain the
information necessary to write forest plans and environmental impact
statements, the agency would have to allocate resources to researching new
questions — new hypotheses —often working through universities in
cooperative grant agreements.283

At the same time, university and government researchers (often one and
the same) were expanding their capabilities with the aid of advancing
instrumentation and computer technologies, allowing for progressively more
powerful measurement and modeling methods, making questions
approachable that were previously unanswerable (or unknown). Using
satellite technology (for instance, through the LANDSAT program), scientists
could assess huge areas, while using electron microscopes, they could see
entities once too small for the hum an eye. Ecologists and biologists took

282 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; Endangered. Species Act of 1972 (and amended
in 1978); and the National Forest Management Act of 1976.

283 U.S.D.A, Forest Service, Forests for America's Future, 5.
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advantage of this technology to develop various models, and ecology as a
field flourished.

As research progressed, several scientists became aware of the effects of
ongoing environmental degradation, particularly extinction, and many began
to engage in politics or research pertaining to political questions.284 In the
early 1980s, an overtly political scientific community began to conglomerate
and eventually formed the "disciplines" of landscape ecology and
conservation biology to influence land-use policy.285

Landscape Ecology

Landscape ecology is a "branch of m odem ecology that deals w ith the
interrelationship between man and his open and built-up landscapes."286 It is
a young discourse, and since its inception in the 1970s in Europe to its
adoption by researchers and land-use planners in the United States in the
mid-1980s, it has undergone sig n ific a n t change. It is a practice-oriented
discourse including an interdisciplinary mixture of geography, regional
science and planning, and ecology, w ith an eclectic theoretical background.287
According to Naveh, by the 1980s, this discipline was "viewed in Europe as
the scientific basis for land and landscape planning, management,
conservation, development, and reclamation. As such it has overstepped the
purely natural realm of classical know ledge —the sodopsychological,
284 Erlich, "Extinctions." Regarding "became aware of the effects of ongoing environmental
degradation": duh.
2® Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
286 Nevah, Landscape Ecology, 3.
287 ibid., 3.
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economic, geographic, and cultural sciences connected with m odem land
uses."288 Most of the earlier, theoretical work came out of Europe, where "as
early as 1939, while studying problems of land use and development in East
Africa, [German biogeographer Ed Kroll] coined the term 'landscape ecology/
realizing its great potential in the aerial photographic interpretation of
landscapes. He hoped for a closer collaboration between geographers and
ecologists, from which a unified earth and life research might develop —a
new 'ecosdence'."289

Since its inception, the discourse was interdisdplinary, w ith wide
aspirations of attaining a unified super theory of development. According to
Naveh, "landscape ecology had its roots in Central and Eastern Europe, where
biogeographers viewed the landscape not just as an aesthetic asset (as done by
most landscape architects) or as part of the physical environment (as by most
geographers), but as the total spatial and visual entity of hum an living space,
integrating the geosphere with the biosphere and the noospheric man-made
artifacts."290

During this stage, the "conceptual and epistemological framework" of
landscape ecology derived from three "dosely connected sdentific theories":
"general systems theory," dealing with the concept of "reality as an integrated
hierarchy of organization of matter and energy"; "biocybemetics," the
"sdence of interaction systems," which explained the "regulation" of flows of
matter and energy w ithin and between biological systems through positive
288 Ibid., 21.
289 Ibid., 4
290 Ibid., 21.
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("deviation amplifying") and negative ("deviation-counteracting") feedback;
and, "ecosystemology," a theory focusing on the idea of a 'Total Hum an
Ecosystem (THE)," an ecosystem that includes humans and our landscape
altering practices as well as our artifacts, as "the highest level of ecological
integration with the ecosphere as its concrete space-time-defined global
landscape entity."291

Several of the concepts im bedded within this "framework" endured
through the development of landscape ecology, for instance, the idea of
"holism," which the field appropriated from the work of German General
Smuts (1920s).292 Holism, from the perspective of the new landscape
ecologists, was the idea that, on a metaphysical level, "the whole is more than
the sum of its parts,"293 and on a practical level, researchers and planners
must consider ecological problems in a context larger (spatially and
temporally) than the organismic and niche level. Central to this emphasis is
the idea of hierarchy, not merely a "order of rank on a linear scale or ladder,"
but, rather, like "a living tree" — a multilevel, stratified, outbranching pattern
of an organizational system, branching into subsystems that branch into
subsystems of lower order, and so on: a structure encapsulating substructures,
291 Ibid., 26.
292 Smuts' development of the idea of holism was a metaphysical project, concerned with
reconciling the general with the specific in a non-mechanistic explanation: "This character of
'wholeness' meets us everywhere and points to something fundamental in the universe. Holism
is the term here coined for this fundamental factor operative towards the creation of wholes in
the universe. This character is both general and specific or concrete...." Smuts, Holism and
Evolution, 86. "This is a universe of whole-making. The explanation of Nature can therefore
not be purely mechanical." Ibid., 87. Holism according to Smuts, is itself, creative: "As holism
is a process of creative synthesis, the resulting wholes are not static but dynamic, evolutionary,
creative." Ibid., 87.
292 Naveh, Landscape Ecology, 50. This varies from the concept of Smuts, who wrote that "in
fact the whole is not something additional to the parts, but is just the parts in their synthesis."
Holism and Evolution,, 87.
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and so on; a process activating subprocesses, and so on.294 Naveh elaborated
upon the idea of holism with in-depth references to the idea of the holon — "a
stable, integrated structure equipped w ith self-regulatory devices and
enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy or self-government," yet part of a
larger system known as a "holarchy."295

Other ideas discussed during this time virtually disappeared soon after,
though sometimes they appeared in other guises.

For instance, Naveh

attempted to link "complexity theory" to landscape ecology, writing on the
"self-organizing" characteristics of systems far from equilibrium, as found in
the works of Iliya Prigogine (Nobel Prize winner for chemistry and his work
on thermodynamic systems).296 As landscape ecology matured, it de
emphasized these ideas, but, in m utated form, some of them would later
emerge as the idea of "disturbance." Likewise, Naveh emphasized the
concept that landscapes include hum an processes, which increasingly are
ecologically dominant, and, in the "Total Hum an Ecosystem" concept, should
be treated as the culmination of evolution — a combination of biological
processes and processes emerging from the hum an mind.297 While some of
the theoretical terminology dropped from the discourse, the idea that
humans were part of the ecosystem persisted.

Research methods consisted prim arily of variations of "remote sensing,"
and related classification and cartographic systems (including overlay

294 Ibid.,
29^ Ibid.,
296 Ibid.,
297 Ibid.,

51.
51. Naveh refers to the work of Arthur Koestler, among others.
62-66.
84.
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m apping and eventually geographical information systems, which built upon
Ian MacHarg's Design with Nature, 1968298), as well as "simulation" and
"interpretation models" (models for interpreting the effects of simulation
models) and "capability analysis."

Until the 1980s, "the term 'landscape ecology' [was] virtually absent from
N orth America,"299 but by the mid-1980s, discussions under the landscape
ecology rubric proliferated in the U.S., where, by the early-1990s, the most
conspicuous adherents of landscape ecology had abandoned its modesty
concerning uncertainty, as well as heartily embracing the power of humanity
to direct and control its ecosystems. In the preface of the edited Land Mosaics,
E. O. Wilson, the well-known population ecologist and prolific writer on
biodiversity wrote: "In Land Mosaics, [Richard] Forman joyously embraces
the human-altered environment and proposes that its living p art can be
improved by use of the best principles of environmental biology."300

By the time of New Perspectives' inception, the discourse was in
transition. Until the later 1980s, landscape ecology had explored and
articulated a diverse body of theoretical work, as well as constructing a new
methodology and method, b u t by the early 1990s it had approximated its
present status as an integrated research framework, de-emphasizing
theoretical debate in favor of an integrated methodological structure —a
"spatial language" for researchers, land planners and managers.301 According
McHarg, Design with Nature.
299 Naveh, Landscape Ecology, 4.
300 Wilson, "Preface," xiii.
301 Forman and Godron, "Landscape Ecology," 1986.
301 Forman, Landscape Ecology, 442-43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
to Richard Forman, the most prolific w riter and editor of landscape ecology
textbooks in the United States, "the language of landscape ecology" would
"make the [planning] process gel." Forman reduced the landscape to a system
of "patches, corridors, and a background matrix," each with "simple familiar
characteristics." These "characteristics" were simply a matter of geometry:
"Patches are large and small, rounded or elongated, and smooth or lobed.
Corridors are wide or narrow, straight or curvy, and connected or with gaps.
The matrix is continuous or subdivided, extensive or limited, and contracting
or expanding." The language of this descriptive framework implied that
"patches" were privileged or special in an analytical sense —connected by
corridors —against a "background" matrix.302 Necessarily, the cartographer
w ould define the patch in terms of some measurable, spatial trait, for
instance, the existence of some tree species or some age or stand structure.303
The background matrix would represent those lands where the trait did not
exist. Yet, the background matrix was neither inconsequential nor trivial;
historically, it constituted the "original forest matrix," which was carved into
patches and corridors by logging and other forms of human disturbance.304 In
the present, it constituted the conceptual, non-special base in which patches
were situated, and, in theory, its structure and composition affected wildlife
(flora and fauna) that resided in patches and moved between them. By 1994,
after the Forest Service and other agencies had appropriated landscape ecology
into major planning projects (particularly, through the Interagency Science
Committee, the Scientific Panel, the Scientific Assessment Team, and Federal
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team), Forman stated, "The matrix has
3°2. Franklin and Forman. "Creating Landscape Patterns," 15.
303 This "designation" would necessarily be a "political construction"; matrices, patches, and
corridors were zones.
304 By the time of the model building, matrix lands had become background.
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the greatest control over landscape and regional dynamics/"305 Thus,
defining the matrix —and the patches and corridors situated within —was a
matter of great concern because the definition had implications for managing
the corresponding land areas.

By the early 1990s, Forman had distilled the diverse theoretical works of
the early landscape ecology into the "Patch-Corridor-Matrix Model,'"
emphasizing "spatial structures," particularly "mosaics." According to
Forman, "mosaic pattern is the central feature of land, and ecological
structure, function, and change of the mosaic is the central paradigm of the
book. Spatial arrangement matters. It is the structure of a landscape or
region. It determines the movements and flows between local ecosystems,
and across the m osaic It changes in form over time."306 Forman was rather
comprehensive w ith his spatial description system, claiming that "mosaic
patterns are found at all spatial scales, from submicroscopic to the planet and
universe. Land mosaics, however, were at the "hum an scale," measured in
kilometers to hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers," including
"landscapes, regions, and continents."307 A landscape, in turn, was "a mosaic
where the mix of local ecosystems or land uses is repeated in similar form
over a kilometers-wide area."308

According to Forman, this language shaped the perspectives of all those
involved in the processes of planning and management — the political

Forman, Land Mosaics
306 Ibid., xvi.
307 Ibid., 5.
308 ibid., 13.
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processes of allocation: "Ecologists, hydrologists, attorneys, conservationists,
elected officials, transportation engineers, foresters, geographers, and others
understand and share this spatial language."309 But, Forman did not discuss
the process of attributing significance or meaning to each of these geometrical
spaces, presumably leaving to politics the question of what landscape entity or
entities the landscape ecologists w ould use —presence of owl habitat, presence
of certain types of timber stands, riparian attributes, and so forth. Still,
landscape ecology provided a language, establishing general organizing
principles for designating patches and corridors. The concept of mosaics
requires heterogeneity, "where objects are aggregated , forming distinct
boundaries," resulting from "thermo-dynamically open conditions, w ith
solar energy creating and maintaining structure."310 Mechanisms that create
this pattern include "substrate heterogeneity," "natural disturbance," and
human activity. Linking the concepts of spatial structure and function (or
processes) is the idea that "form or structure, i.e., what we see today, was
produced by flows yesterday."311 The effects of forces are determined by scale,
as described in the "space time principle," which simply states that "most
short duration changes affect a small area, and most long-term changes affect
a large area."312

Another of landscape ecology's linkages between spatial structure and
ecological function is the "size effect on biodiversity," a relationship that
researchers have attempted to elucidate w ith "island biogeography theory."

Ibid., 442-43.
310 Ibid., 5.
311 Ibid., 5.
312 Ibid., 8.
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Island biogeography theory, which has focused cn bird populations on
islands, relies on two major principles: the principle of "spedes-area curves,"
suggests that spedes num ber is positively correlated with habitat size,
qualified by a " m in im u m area point," where the rate of increase in spedes
diminishes — a sort of saturation point —as area continues to increase
(linearly); the "equilibrium theory" (developed by E.O. Wilson) simply states
that islands and island-like mainland areas will exhibit an equilibrium point
between extinctions and colonization, m ediated by landscape features like the
"spedes source" —the mainland — and "stepping stones," intermediary
islands between the young, colonizing island and the mainland.313
Researchers such as Richard Harris have applied island biogeography theory
to m ainland conditions where habitat such as a forested mountain
surrounded by desert is isolated and thereby displays island-like features. In
relationship to the patch-corridor-matrix theory, small patches are analogous
to islands w ith large patches being analogous to mainland, with corridors
providing passage through matrix lands —large, relatively inhospitable areas.
Within patches, species differentiate according to their preference for
"interior" or "edge" conditions. Forman writes that "larger patches have
more species than smaller patches, and area is more important than isolation,
patch age, and many other variables in predicting species number. Exceptions
often result from the presence of another variable covering w ith area, or
where no specialist interior species are present. The prevalence of edge
species in small patches, and interior species in the patch interior or core, is
commonly em phasized."314

313 Ibid.,55-58.
314 Ibid., 62.
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In this context, Forman and his contemporaries shaped landscape ecology
to emphasize methodology and methods, which had been developed and
enhanced in the 1980s alongside recent advances in computer technology. In
terms of "experiments and observations," landscape ecology concerned itself
with: "measurements of natural patterns," which overlap with
"measurements of anthropogenic patterns"; "landscape-scale experiments,"
wherein "studies evaluating the ecological effects of forest patch size, using
both pretreatment and untreated controls, are the best known and most
ambitious to date"; and, "micro-scale experiments," wherein "experiments at
a fine spatial scale are especially useful, because replicates are better
controlled, and time, energy, and money budgets are more feasible," and
"experimental results are then carefully extrapolated to the landscape or
regional scale, where some results apply but others do n o t" 315 Other
methodologies and methods included "modeling, analytic, and statistical
approaches," such as "spatial modeling," the use of geographical information
systems, "parametric studies," and "spatial statistics." Finally, landscape
ecologists have further developed remote sensing techniques, as "images
from satellites have revolutionized our perception and approaches to
understanding landscapes and regions," and thus, "a whole region can be
examined in a single image, " and "images showing clear patterns of
interdigitating landscapes, as well as ecosystems and land uses within
landscapes are widely available."316 As well, infrared technologies, other
spectral wavelength techniques, computer technologies, and radiotracking

315 Ibid., 31-33.
316 Ibid., 35.
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techniques have increased the methodological toolbox of landscape
ecology.317

Conservation Biology.

In August, 1988, Jack Ward Thomas and Hal Salwasser, both of whom
were soon to play major roles in the construction of Forest Service owl policy
(Thomas as leader of the Interagency Science Team and Salwasser as head of
the N ew Perspectives Program), co-presented a paper before the Annual
Meeting of the Society for Conservation Biology. In their paper, entitled
"Bringing Conservation Biology into a Position of Influence in Natural
Resource Management," these two bureaucrats claimed to be "conservation
biologists when conservation biology w asn't cool." N ow they offered advice
on "how conservation biologists can become more effective in influencing
land and wildlife management."318 According to the team:
Maintaining diversity is a philosophy and a management goal
whose time may be at hand in the field of land management —at
least in the United States. This discussion is aimed at helping
conservation biologists be more effective in bringing their
expertise to bear on natural resource management in the United
States.
The stage is set. Capable players are at hand. The script outline
has been prepared. Laws governing federal land management
and other activities have gradually evolved, albeit through
circuitous routes, to the point where conservation of
biodiversity is recognized as a management goal.319

317 Ibid., 35.
318 Thomas and Salwasser, "Bringing Conservation Biology," 124.
319 Ibid., 124.
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Thomas and Salwasser, in language speaking to impending crisis
(biological as well as bureaucratic), urged the society members to "hurry";
"management agencies need help, and the time is running out," and
"conservation biologists must help managers, and themselves, focus on high
priority issues."320 Conservation biologists, the two bureaucrats argued,
must learn to m aneuver within the political realm of federal wildlife
management: "they m ust learn and practice effective biopolitical techniques
in addition to good science and management — to gain influence, change
minds, marshal resources of people and money, and make things happen."
Both Thomas and Salwasser offered a "welcome" to conservation biologists as
"new players w ith a new mission in the natural resource management
game," encouraging them to join in the political struggle around wildlife
preservation on federal lands.321

Conservation biologists, though virtually unheard of to the general public,
believed themselves to be in a crucial role, because they were bringing their
knowledge to the problem of conserving species and retarding the effects of
untim ely extinction.322 To save species, conservation biology would apply
itself to providing "principles and tools for preserving biological diversity."323
It would be a prescriptive discourse, and because of its focus upon the urgent
problem of extinction, it would be a "crisis discipline."324 In this way, Soule
argued, conservation biology "differs from most other biological sciences."325
320 Ibid., 124.
321 Ibid., 124.
322 Lovejoy, "Foreward," ix. "Untimely" is a loaded and loadable term, so to speak; in much of
the conservation biology writing it directly referenced humans.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
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Because time was critical, conservation biologists w ould have to take
exception to the normal standards for applying science to public policy.
Uncertainty would be unavoidable. Soul6 stated:
In crisis disciplines, one m ust act before knowing all the facts;
crisis disciplines are thus a mixture of science and art, and their
p ursuit requires intuition as well as information. A
conservation biologist may have to make decisions or
recommendations about design and management before he or
she is completely comfortable w ith the theoretical and empirical
bases of the analysis. Tolerating uncertainty is often
necessary.326
Like landscape ecology, conservation biology w ould employ a mixture of
theory, experimentation, modeling, and practice.327 According to Michael
Soul6, its most visible proponent, conservation biology is "a new stage in the
application of science to conservation problems, [that] addresses the biology of
species, communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed either directly or
indirectly, by human activities or other agents."328

According to its own texts, it was a young, interdisciplinary discourse
synthesizing various scientific branches. Among the ranks of conservation
biology were population biologists, "ecologists, physiologists, behaviorists,
and all other biologists concerned w ith the functioning of organisms in
natural and artificial environments," as well as "taxonomists and
sy stematists." 329

326 ibid.
327 Soul6, "What is Conservation Biology?" 727.

328 ibid.
329 Ibid.; Ehrenfeld, "Editorial," 6.
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In May, 1985, the Society for Conservation Biology "originated... at the
conclusion of the Second Conference on Conservation Biology." Two years
later, the Society published the first edition of its journal, Conservation
Biology.330 According to Michael Soul6, Conservation Biology relies upon
four "functional" and four "normative postulates." While all of the
functional maxims concern the processes and functions of ecology, two of
them refer directly to spatial phenomenon and demonstrate similarities with
principles enunciated in the landscape ecology literature, while the other two
demonstrate the differences as well as similarities between conservation
biology and landscape ecology.

The first of these postulates, "the evolutionary postulate" states that
"many of the species that constitute natural communities are the products of
re v o lu tio n a ry processes"331 This postulate makes apparent one of the more
significant differences as well as one of the similarities between conservation
biology and landscape ecology. Restated, this postulate means that "the
structure, function, and stability of coevolved, natural communities differ
significantly from those of unnatural or synthetic communities." Non
human systems are different than human systems. According to Soul§,
"Corollaries" of this postulate include: "species are interdependent"; "many
species are highly specialized"; "extinctions of keystone species can have
long-range consequences"; and "introductions of generalists may reduce
diversity."332

330 soul#, "History," 4.
331 Soul#, "What is Conservation Biology?" 729.
332 Ibid., 729-730.
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Apparent in these corollaries, particularly the first, is the "organicist"
outlook, which according to Bryan Norton, was a diagnostic view point.333
According to Norton: "Conservation biologists must reject the role of
biological mechanics and embrace oganitism. They must insist that whole
systems of nature can be judged 'healthy' or 'ill'." Soule stated that the first
postulate "does not necessarily rely on deterministic factors," since
population systems m ust be holistically studied.334 This emphasis on
"holism" permeates the conservation biology, demonstrating another
likeness to landscape ecology. According to Soul&
Conservation biology tends to be holistic, in two senses of the
word. First, many conservation biologists, induding many
wildlife spedalists, assume that ecological and evolutionary
processes must be studied at their own macroscopic levels and
that reductionism alone cannot lead to explanations of
community and ecosystem processes... [second] is the
assumption that m uitidisdplinary approaches will ultimately be
most fruitful.335
The second functional postulate "concerns the scale of ecological
processes," reflecting commonalties between conservation biology and
landscape ecology.336 According to Soule: "Many, if not all, ecological
processes have thresholds below and above which they become
discontinuous, chaotic, or suspended," and therefore are "interrupted or fail
altogether where the system is too small."337 Two "major assumptions...
underlie this postulate: The temporal continuity of habitats, and successional
stages depend on size ... [and] outbursts reduce diversity."338 This postulate is
333
334
335
336
337
338

Ibid., 728.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 729.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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almost identical to the language of landscape ecology that deals with the "size
effect on biodiversity," and indeed, "island biogeography" is an important
part of conservation biology.339 In an earlier discussion of "community
ecology," Soul6 and Wilcox make reference to patches and patchiness —
terminology familiar to the landscape ecology literature: "The world is patchy
and patches come and go."340

A postulate w ith directly political connotations is that nature reserves are
inherently disequilibrial for large, rare organisms. This postulate reflects,
again, island biogeographic theory, as w ell as highlighting one of the main
fod for conservation biology, which is the design, maintenance, and
assessment of "nature reserves." According to Soule and Wilcox:
When considering the preservation of a particular biota, a
system of nature reserves can be described by reference to three
features: num ber of reserves, size of reserves, and density (or
proximity) or reserves. With regard to number and size, some
biogeographers have argued that reserves should be large and
not necessarily numerous; others have argued for many,
smaller reserves. Nevertheless, all agree that the best solution
from the biogeographical standpoint is many, large reserves.341
This issue was central in the spotted owl debate and was discussed in-depth in
both the ISC Strategy and the Gang of Four report, which in part, helped
define the particulars of reserve needs for the owl, generally considered to be
mutually exclusive to timber harvesting.

339 SouI£, "History," 4; Shaffer, "Minimum Population Sizes," 131-134.
340 Soul£ and Wilcox, Conservation Biology, 5.
341 Ibid., 4.
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The last of conservation biology's functional postulates (the third in
Soule's writings) "concerns the scale of population phenom ena."342
According to Soul6: "Genetic and demographic processes have thresholds
below which nonadaptive, random forces begin to prevail over adaptive,
deterministic forces w ithin populations."343

The main point here "is that

the probability of survival of a local population is a positive function of its
size."344 Thus, the corollaries include the maxim that [bjelow a certain
population size... the probability of extinction from random demographic
events increases steeply."345 This statement reflects the literature from
landscape ecology concerning perturbations and fluctuations.346 Other
corollaries include the statement that, "populations of outbreeding organisms
will suffer a chronic loss of fitness from inbreeding depression as effective
population sizes of less than 50 to 100."347 Also, "genetic drift in small
populations... will cause a progressive loss of genetic variation," reducing
"immediate fitness."348 Finally, "natural selection will be less effective in
small populations because of genetic drift and the loss of potentially adaptive
genetic variation."349

The study of population was a major part of conservation biology. Central
to this project was the concept of "minimum viable populations," which
concerns itself with "criteria for successful preservation at the population

342 Soul£, "What is Conservation Biology?" 730.

343 ibid.
344 ibid.
345
346
347
348
349
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level [and] various methods... for determining the population sizes and their
area requirements to meet these criteria."350 Soule phrased the question the
question: "What are the m inimum conditions for the long-term persistence
and adaptation of a species or population in a given place?"351

The '"viable population problem' is very young/' emerging in the 1970s
and 80s am idst political turmoil concerning endangered and threatened
species, in the context of law, and species extinction in general, and
"confusion" and ambiguity characterize the debate. Yet, the questions
conservation biologists were posing concerning population viability of the
northern spotted owl and other old-growth associated species would soon be
important in the political dialogue concerning the northern spotted owl.352

Because the idea of extinction is so central to the political debate regarding
preservation and land-use policy, "viability is now a cause celebre."353
Researchers, attem pting to define "minimum conditions" for viability, focus
upon habitat, which in turn, depends upon land base. "If the likelihood of
survival depends on both population size and time, then what degree of
persistence constitutes preservation and how much habitat is necessary to
achieve such preservation? This is the essence of the minimum viable
population problem and the central question facing conservationists

350 Shaffer, "Minimum Population Sizes," 131. Central to the concept of minimum viable
populations is the problem of extinction. Conservation biologist Mark Shaffer studied sources
of extinction, including "demographic stochastidtjr," "environmental stochastidty," "natural
catastrophes" (summoning the ideas of perturbations and fluctuations) and "genetic
stochastidty."
351 Soul£, ed., "Viable Populations for C o n s e r v a tio n 1.
352 Interagency Sdentific Committee, Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl.
353 Soul6, ed., "Viable Populations for Conservation." 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123
today."354 Deteraiming such conditions has direct political ramifications and
involves political negotiation.

Furthermore, scientists as stakeholders m ust define viability in terms of
probability ~ due to uncertainties resulting not only from stochastic events,
but from methodological structure (for instance, the difference between
modeled and empirical realities) —and deciding acceptable levels of
confidence is a matter of subjective choice to be decided through political
process.355 Another topic of debate regards the propriety of designating
"minimal" conditions. "Some conservationists argue that the term is
tactically self-defeating and ethically offensive. Their reasoning is that the job
of conservation biologists should be to recommend or provide for more that
just the minimum number or distribution of a species. ... They should
prescribe to managers and policy makers the conditions for robust and
bountiful populations."356

Shaffer sums up the difficult, political nature of the maintaining species:
There are no easy answers to the problem of defining successful
preservation or what really constitutes endangerment. The one
certainty is that the issue is not strictly a biological or scientific
matter. Of all the issues facing the conservation of biological
diversity, the definition of preservation itself, in quantitative
terms subject to objective evaluation is both the most crucial and
least addressed.357
S54 Shaffer, "Minimum Viable Populations," 70.
355 An interesting question arises concerning whether or not policy makers, who are often
unfamiliar with the reasoning involved with scientific process, understand the difference
between a straightforward assurance of viability and a less-tangible, if acceptable "risk."
Soule writes that "whatever jargon we choose to adopt, the point is that there is no single
value or 'magic number' that has universal validity." Soul#, "History," 5.
S56 Ibid., 4.
357 Shaffer, "Minimum Viable Populations," 81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124
Underlying the "functional" substance of conservation biology —as a text
and a practice —are its "normative" postulates, which reflect conservation
biology's bias towards natural systems (versus human constructed or altered
systems), or in SoulS's words, a "preference for nature over artifice, for
wilderness over gardens."358 First is the proposition that "diversity of
organisms is good," w ith the corollary that "the untimely extinction of
populations and species is bad."359 Second is the argument that "ecological
complexity is good," extending value to "habitat diversity and complex
ecological processes."360 Third is the argum ent that "evolution is good," as is
its "continuity, and finally, "biotic diversity has intrinsic value."361 Taken as
a whole, the postulates more or less enunciate Conservation Biology's
primary goal: to preserve "biodiversity," a concept central to the rhetoric
around land policy.

People have used the term "biodiversity" (sometimes referred to as
"biological diversity") in various ways. From the microbial scale to the
"landscape," biodiversity can refer to "functional diversity7' (the diversity of
ecological processes), which determines and is determined by "structural
diversity" (diversity of spatial configurations), all of which support the
diversity of species composition — the primary focus of the ESA. As a
principle in political discourse, players m ust pay attention to the idea, and

358 Soule, "What is Conservation Biology," 731.
359 ibid, 730.
360 Ibid., 730.
361 Ibid., 731. This postulate is significantly different than the others insofar as it asserts an
"intrinsic" value, or in other words, a prior good. This assertion implies a certainty or
knowledge of such prior value, which would logically be "a priori knowledge," claims to which
are necessary to religion. See Norton, Toward Unity, 234-5 for a brief discussion on this
distinction.
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many find it profitable to shape its meaning in political discourse. Thus,
biologists, the most "credible" and technically agile subjects, are obvious
recipients of political power. David Takacs interviewed Soule, Ehrenfeld, and
other prom inent conservation biologists for his doctoral dissertation on the
"meaning of biodiversity." According to Takacs:
While they whip up public concern over the dim inution of
biodiversity, biologists simultaneously gam er the resources that
go hand in hand with increased concern. Biodiversity is a
formidable constituency to represent: she who represents it gains
quite a bit of power in a society that cares to preserve it.
Biologists, who have been called upon to provide "facts" about
the natural world, now clear space to speak of nature's
"values."362
The relationship between these biologists of power and national forest
politics would become clear when the courts and Congress began ordering
and commissioning teams to produce decision-making frameworks — as well
as sets of management options — that politicians could use to allocate the
national forests and other public lands as they existed in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.

lust Gettin' Through: the Ambiguous Adaptive Management

Scientists, like other political players, often disagree about most issues
having bearing upon their work —from the working o u t of methodologies
and methods, to the interpretation of data and constructing of conclusions.363
This type of conflict is especially apparent in the "applied sciences," where
groups of scientists (or groups including scientists) are producing scientific
S62 Takacs, Finding Meaning, 6.
363 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions; Walters, Adaptive Management.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126
statements for use in management situations. In the politics regarding oldgrowth forests and associated species, players from industry, the Forest
Service, and environmental groups frequently portrayed these management
situations as crisis situations.364

The political appropriation of science (in a general sense —as a set of
discourses) requires a refining step. The policy maker m ust link the various
individuals and individual teams (using specific research frameworks and
facilities to do their own work) —the "scientists" —w ith statements that will
justify management decisions. This linkage involves synthesizing the
positions of several individuals who may or may not agree on issues
concerning methodology, formulation of questions and hypotheses,
interpretation of data, and so forth. Out of group of particular comes a
collective declarative statement, usually written as if by one author. The
linking process m ust somehow respond (adeptly or miserably) to the various
levels of conflict between official knowledge producers, while responding to
the stress resulting from the perceived crisis situation. The process must also
endure various forms of critique and insult, because, when management
decisions depend upon the resulting scientific statements, political players try
in various ways to influence the science. In the case of the politicized
scientific discourse around the spotted owl issue, most of the science —
particularly that under the rubrics of landscape ecology and conservation
biology —consisted of new methodologies and methods, particularly

364 Walters, Adaptive Management. The portrayal, per se, especially in the context of public
agencies dealing with "problems" (of which crises are a significant subset) is by definition
political. See Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle. Also, see Gramsci, "Prison
Notebooks," in The Modem Prince, for a theoretical discussion of why social production is
political.
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modeling, and confronted new problems, themselves emerging from an
unpredictable political discourse-365 Knowledge on the owl w as new and data
sparse and difficult to acquire, yet research objectives required long-term
projections on issues like "genetic viability." Uncertainty (acknowledged or
not) would determine any decision made regarding owl management (and,
ultimately, management of several other "old-growth species"), and agency
scientists would produce them in an environment of internal and external
conflict and negotiation.

In 1986, as the owl issue was becoming well known in the already national
debate on old-growth forests, Carl Walters outlined a process to deal with
these research issues. For several years, Walters had been working with a
group called the 'International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,"
which had been formed in 1972, at a time when systems analysis scholars and
practitioners were appropriating newly available computer capabilities to
their modeling.

In the mid-70s, C. S. Hollings, long-time colleague of

Walters and director of the Institute, responding to failures of previous
resource management approaches, had coined the phrase "adaptive
management," an idea that Walters proceeded to develop.366

The idea was timely, because by the mid-1980s, many researchers and
managers had become disillusioned by the unsatisfactory results of their
modeling —upon which public agencies had come to depend —and were
becoming aware of sources of uncertainty they had not earlier perceived.
According to Walters, "The model building has not been particularly
365 Walters, Adaptive Management, Ch. 11.
3^6 Lee, Compass and Gyroscope, 54.
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successful, and it keeps draw ing attention to key uncertainties that are not
being resolved through normal techniques of scientific investigation."367

Much of the uncertainties arose as researchers began to perceive new
levels of complexity in the natural systems they were studying. According to
Walters, these uncertainties arose on three levels. First, "certain inputs or
disturbances that occur rather regularly or frequently over time will generate
unpredictable and uncontrollable change" —which he referred to as
"background noise."368 Second, was "statistical or parametric uncertainty" —
mainly regarding the conceptual instruments researchers were using —and
third was "basic structural uncertainty about even what variables to
consider."369

To deal w ith these uncertainties yet move ahead w ith m anagem ent —
which agencies would inevitably continue to do —Walters recommended
"experimental" management, whereby managers w ould learn from
experience. According to Walters:
We keep running up against questions that only hard experience
can answer, and a basic issue becomes whether to pursue
management policies that will deliberately enhance that
experience. Such policies w ould represent a radical departure
from traditional prescriptions about how to deal with
uncertainly, namely to proceed w ith great caution or to act as
though there were no uncertainty in hopes that mistakes and
opportunities will automatically reveal themselves.

367 Walters, Adaptive Management, vii.
368 Ibid., 162.
369 ibid., 162.
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My major conclusion is that actively adaptive, probing
deliberately experimental polices should indeed be a basic part of
renewable resource management.370
Walters and his team devised a structure for this experimental, adaptive
management, which was highly dependent upon modeling as a heuristic
strategy, and statistical analysis, optimization, and game playing as modeling
strategies. Thus, the "design of such policies" w ould include "mathematical
modeling to pinpoint uncertainties and generate alternative hypotheses,
statistical analysis to determine how uncertainties are likely to propagate over
time in relation to policy choices, and formal optimization combined with
game playing to seek better probing choices."371

But, these technical matters only provided a forum for investigation and
idea generation; they did not, in and of themselves provide solutions or
scientific management statements. To provide statements, participants
would have to come forward and reach some sort of agreement —a political
process —upon what should be said and done. According to Walters, "such
technical developments will be of little value unless they are accompanied by
progress in dealing also with the very human problems of reaching
consensus by embracing uncertainty, and of reaching some balance when
there is, in fact, no identifiable decision maker and policies proceed from the
competitive or cooperative activities."372 Decision-makers w ould have to
contend w ith conflict, internal as well as external.

370 Ibid., vii.
37^ Ibid., viii.
372 Ibid., 333.
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In this process of "moving from analysis to synthesis" — or perhaps, from
analyses to synthesis — Walters recommended some sub-processes (not
necessarily sequential). The first was the "modeling to pinpoint
uncertainties." The second had more room for contention, insofar as it
required generating predictions of future policy options (conclusions with
immense political implications). This process would involve developing "a
range of predictions about key policy indicators, using the alternative models
and basic policy options identified during the initial modeling w ork."373 This
exercise was designed to "gain consensus about how large is the range of
future outcomes and how deep are the conflicts about which outcomes would
be best." It would be a testing of the political waters, as well as putting the
participants under the stress of responsibility, in an effort to promote creative
tendencies — "to engender a healthy frustration about the state of affairs.
"This frustration will help later in the search for imaginative policy options,
but at this stage it has the more immediate value of m otivating those
involved in the analysis to 'get dow n to essentials'."374 The third process is
the most significant object of focus for adaptive managem ent — to reiterate
and negotiate and "seek the best option," involving a m utually inclusive
process called "imaginative synthesis."375 This process involves gracefully
recognizing and correcting for past mistakes, discovered through the process
of monitoring.

Thus, Walters and his group had devised a structure for managers —and
manager-scientists, to do what they had to do anyway — act under uncertainty
373 Ibid., 335.
374 Ibid., 335.
375 Ibid., 336.
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and negotiate decisions among themselves in an environment pervaded by
conflict. He had also provided a justification and structure for managers —
and manager scientists —to try out new ideas for management, which is
exactly what Forest Service researchers could use at the time. Adaptive
management could bridge the gap between management and research
divisions that existed in many agencies.

New Forestry

In the 1980s, Jerry Franklin, Dave Perry, Fred Swanson, and others were
working together to study old-growth forest ecosystems under the rubric of
the Andrews Ecosystem Research Group. The Andrews Group, named after
the Forest Service H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest near Blue River, Oregon
was formed in the late 1960s as "a voluntary association of scientists" — "an
interdisciplinary team representing the earth and life sciences from both field
and theoretical orientations."376 In the late 1980s, it included "a large outer
circle of collaborators, and an inner core of 15 to 20 researchers who have
provided continuity over the 20 years of the group's existence."377 According
to Swanson:
The Andrews group has no formal affiliation with a university
or the Forest Service, but one-third of the members are scientists
and forest managers associated with the [FS] Pacific Northwest
Research Station and Willamette National Forest, and twothirds are scientists connected with Oregon State University and
the University of Washington. ... Most of the funding is
provided by the National Science Foundation and the U.S.
Forest Service.378
376 Swanson, "The People Behind the N ew Forestry," 44.
377 ibid.

378 ibid.
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The team's leader, Jerry Franklin, "Bloedel Professor of Ecosystem
Analysis at the University of Washington, Chief Plant Ecologist for the
[PNW] Research Station, and... a Bullard Fellow at Harvard," was already well
known for his role in the SAF Old-Growth Management team; the New York
Times heralded him as "the nation's foremost expert on ancient forests."379
Until the mid-1980s, Franklin had been a fairly conventional forestry
researcher. In 1966, at Washington State University, he had w ritten his
doctoral dissertation, in Botany, on the "Vegetation and Soils in the
Subalpine Forests of the Southern Washington Cascade Range," and his
conclusion was in line with the work of his mentor, Robert Daubenmire.380
Until the mid-1980s, his research concerned fairly conventional topics related
to forest ecology. Titles of some of his various publications from the years
1973 to 1980 reflected this concern with conventional forestry topics: "Effects
of Various Harvesting Methods on Forest Regeneration"381; "Natural
Vegetation of Oregon and W ashington"382; "Seeding Habitats of Upper-Slope
Tree Species"383; and "Ecological Site Classification Activities in Oregon and
W ashington."384

Later in his career, Franklin began to change his views on forest
management, especially after observing recent "disasters" in public forestry,
particularly the massive blowdown in the Bull Run river drainage in the
Mount Hood National Forest (the watershed for Portland, Oregon), in 1983.385
379 Davis, "The Making of a Revolutionary," 39.
380 Franklin, "Vegetation and Soils."
381 Franklin and Debell, "Effects of Various Harvesting Methods."
382. Franklin and Dryness, "Natural Vegetation of Oregon and Washington"
383 Franklin and Smith, "Seeding Habitats."
384 Franklin, "Ecological Site Classification Activities."
3® Franklin, "Interview."
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In 1984, he co-authored the Society of American Forester's policy statement,
"Scheduling the Harvest of Old-Growth," which expanded the concept of
multiple-use and stated flatly that allocation of old growth was a political
issue, presaging later documents he would help write.386 Publishing in the
first issue of Landscape Ecology, w ith Richard Forman, a leading American
proponent of landscape ecology, and dean of the Harvard Graduate School of
Design, Franklin criticized the geometry of Forest Service timber
management. He observed:
The Bull Run River drainage in the Mount Hood National
Forest in western Oregon provides strong evidence of the
potential for catastrophic disturbance created by the checkerboard
pattern. We analyzed w indthrow patterns on a 37,000-ha area
including the Bull Rim and adjacent tracts. Major windstorms
in this area in December 1973 and 1983 blew down forests of 482
ha and 899 ha, respectively. Nearly 1 /2-billion board feet of
timber fell in the 1983 blowdown. About 48% of the 1973 and
81% of the 1983 blowdowns were adjacent to existing clearcuts
and roads; both are statistically significant relations.387
Employing a conceptual framework based upon landscape ecology,
Franklin and Forman went on to assess the Forest Service's w idespread use of
a checkerboard pattern of clearcut logging. First, they built a model w herein
they could measure boundary-to-area ratios corresponding to various
geometrical patterns for dividing a two-dimensional square into black and
white areas —patterns such as a checkerboard or evenly divided between black
and white. They treated the model as analogous to timber managem ent in
the western cascades, designating the black areas as clearcuts and the white
areas as remaining patches, with various patterns signifying various
"treatments."

They measured the effects of incrementally removing patch

386 Society of American Foresters, Scheduling.
387 Franklin and Forman, "Creating Landscape Patterns," 14-15.
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areas (signifying clearcut logging) upon the availability of remaining patch
areas in terms of "core" (or "interior") or "edge" ("boundary") patch - given a
distance from the edge that defines interior patch.388

This model allowed Forman and Franklin to determine the point at
which removing a patch would eliminate the last (or second to last, so on)
viable patch of a certain dimension (for instance, one theoretically
corresponding to a spotted owl niche). These breaking off points in the model
they likened to ecological thresholds, for instance, levels where major
disturbances become more likely, particularly wind throw damage. Then they
discussed measurements taken from the Mount Hood Forest and found
correlations between the checkerboard geometry of logging and disturbances
such as landslides and the windthrows at Bull Run, though they did not
elucidate the relationship between their model as it concerned interior versus
edge patch and data from the national forest.389

They also found that the idealized checkerboard sequence they represented
in their model did not fit the actual pattern of logging, constrained as it was by
topology and road costs; adjacent squares had been cut, violating the sequence
assumed in the model. While they d id not test any specific hypotheses aside
from possible disturbance effects of quasi-checkerboard cutting, they reviewed
the literature regarding the biotic and structural effects of creating edge
conditions. They concluded that, for the purposes of management, large
patches would be preferable to small, all other conditions being the same.
They further concluded that the Forest Service's use of checkerboard patterns
388
389 ibid.
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of logging worked counter to maintaining large patches, in addition to
maximizing "the high-contrast edge between primeval forest and cutover
areas," and exceeding geometrical "thresholds," beyond which interior
patches could not exist Forman and Franklin suggested that the agency
"reduce the emphasis on dispersing small dearcut patches," to reduce
fragmentation," and "identify and reserve large patches of primeval forest in
the landscape for maintenance of interior species and amenity values."390
According to the team, "Clearcutting generally must be avoided within the
reserved patches because of the substantial vulnerability that results from
placing even small cuts within a reserved tract."391 In addition, they argued,
agencies should manage for corridors between reserved tracts. Aside from
being technically informed statements regarding resource management, these
were political statements, because the establishment of reserves directly
signified constraints upon timber harvesting. The authors continued, "It is
urgent because many current cutting programs are rapidly reducing the size of
available patches."392

Cognizant of the developing conflict in the politics of forest management,
Franklin and his cohorts began to focus on the new objectives that later
evolved into New Forestry. Franklin became convinced that large-scale
ecological and political disasters resulting from past management activities
w ould continue until public agencies instituted new forms of management
and past management errors had been resolved.393 In 1989, he began to take

390
391
392
393

Ibid.
Ibid.
Franklin and Forman, "Creating Landscape Patterns," 14-15.
Franklin, "Interview."
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his message to the general public A ppearing in the film. Rage Over Trees,
released by the National Audobon Society and Turner Broadcasting System in
1989, Franklin lamented that old grow th forest was disappearing faster than
even Forest Service staff knew.394 Referring to (and affirming) the
Wilderness Society estimations of rem aining national forest old growth,
Franklin appealed to the practical issue of allowing for future flexibility in
forest management: "It looks like there's a lot less old growth —real old
growth —Douglas fir forests than m ost of us had supposed. But one logical
strategy might be to try and retain m ost of the old growth in the larger patches.
You probably want to leave these alone so that you retain your options on
those for a longer time period."395 Standing in the Oval Creek drainage, a
Forest Service roadless area in the Willamette National Forest and one of a
few remaining intact, lower elevation drainages, Franklin adm iringly referred
to a "complexity of structure" and outlined the "two principles" that he felt
were "very important to productive capacity": "don't reduce the capacity to
reduce" ("don't timber mine") and "don't extirpate species."396 According to
Franklin, the old growth issue related to both principles, and he soon went on
to articulate this message in other ways.

In November, 1989, the research team, under the authorship of Franklin,
published an article entitled 'T o w ard a N ew Forestry," in the popular
magazine, American Forests.397 In the article Franklin advocated "the "New
394 Franklin in Rage Over Trees.
395 Certainly this language refers to a utilitarian perspective that had evolved beyond the
more narrow "stoic" sense of utility preferred by Pinchot and his heirs up until the major
environmental laws of the 1960s and 1970s. See McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings," p. 198.
396 Franklin in Rage Over Trees.
397 Typically, forestry and ecology researchers, especially Forest Service and "cooperative
research" university researchers publish through the "professional" avenues — the huge FS
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Forestry/' "an alternative" management concept, obviating the management
choice between "tree farms and total preservation."398 Management
objectives w ould be shifted away from use concepts —farms and preservation
—and towards "ecological values," "while allowing for the extraction of
commodities" as a by-product of good management; management objectives
would be phrased to reflect concern for the perpetuation of the "structure and
processes" of forest ecosystems with provisions for board feet. Borrowing a
phrase from President George Bush, Franklin looked upon the approach as "a
kinder, gentler forestry."399

The article discussed old-growth systems in terms of their ecological
functions, "as important reservoirs of biological diversity," and discussed
some of the strategies for maintaining old-growth features in management
activities (particularly timber harvesting).

In an article the following year,

"New and Renewed Stewardship: Toward a Silviculture of Diversity,"
Franklin, w ith Perry and Swanson, was more explicit.400 In this article, the
authors compare old forestry with new forestry, favoring the latter in
language w ith political overtones. The authors wrote:
There are basically two choices regarding how forests should be
managed. One, which has had precedence since it was originated
in Germany in the 19th century, is to homogenize forests and
forested landscapes, reducing natural diversity in order to
concentrate on the economics of wood production. The second,
advocated by a growing num ber of scientists and managers, is to

publishing office or the trade and science journals —Western Journal of Applied Forestry,
Journal of Forestry, Forest Science, Science, Ecology, for instance.
398 Franklin, 'Toward a New Forestry."
399 Ibid., 38.
400 Franklin, Perry, and Swanson, "New and Renewed Stewardship."
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manage forested landscapes in such a way that natural diversity
is preserved.401
The group validated its call to change forest management upon the need
to maintain aesthetics, preserve species (particularly if endangered or
threatened, such as the owl or red cockaded woodpecker), and protect "natural
stabilizing mechanisms," especially "biological diversity."402 The group
characterized "two important lessons" for management, noting:
First, stability in nature does not mean "no change"... but rather
means constraining change w ithin certain bounds which
includes maintaining both the productive capacity of soils and
populations of indigenous species. Second, forestry does not
necessarily degrade ecosystems, and can even be a tool for
keeping them diverse and healthy. Thus, silviculture must do
two things: a. protect species and habitats that may have no
market value; and b. reflect, to at least some degree, natural
patterns.403
Thus the group suggested "some principles" for managers to follow:
Managers should leave "large dead wood" to serve as habitat "for animals
that consume defoliators and barkbeetles" as well as acting as "water
reservoirs, sites of nitrogen fixation, and habitat for organisms that cycle
nutrients"; maintain "diverse plant species" for nutrient cycling and
"retention following disturbances," as well as providing habitat and food for
animals that prey on defoliators"; manage for "diverse landscapes" to reduce
the extent and intensity of disturbances; apply "green retention" of large trees
to allow two or more canopy layers to develop and provide sources of "snags
and soil logs"; use wide spaces to allow "noncommercial plant species to
coexist w ith crop trees"; use longer rotations "to avoid creating too much
early successional habitat for animals such as deer that can become serious
ibid., 200-01.
402 Ibid., 199-200.
403 ibid., 200.
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pests when too abundant"; and keep a 'landscape focus/' "maintaining
migration corridors and avoiding fragmentation."404

The Franklin led group was suggesting changes in the forest practices that
challenged entrenched conventions in forest management, conceptually and
financially, and through a channel that was overtly political.

According to

Franklin, the team wrote the article "because, basically, we thought we w ere at
a critical junction point, and that point of view needed to be laid out before as
many of the potential stake-holders and decision makers as possible."405
Insofar as the situation involved management — an institutional problem — it
was political, and therefore, the team concluded, policy makers should be
audience to the team's conclusions regarding these urgent environmental
matters. The team decided that the conventional mode of communicating
research results was too slow, so they went directly to the more widely-read
literature venues that decision-makers read.

Regarding the "New Forestry"

article, Franklin states:
I wanted to get to a much broader audience than just professional
foresters; of course, that has just been further emphasized since —that
people who really, in the end, are going to determine policy are not
foresters. So, whenever you're trying to influence thinking and policy,
you don't w ant to go to the professional forestry journals; you w ant to
go to outlets that you hope are going to get a distribution to interested
lay personnel —potentially decision makers —that sort of thing.406
New Forestry was soon to become well known to the public —in addition
to publicity afforded it by Franklin's authorship — through his work on the

404 Ibid., 201-207.
405 Franklin, "Interview," 1.
406 Ibid., 1.
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major politically-commissioned science reports in which he w ould
participate.

Concluding Remarks

The two emerging discourses, Conservation Biology and Landscape
Ecology, are in some ways quite different. Some of these differences reflect
differences in other political discourses pertaining to forests. While
Conservation Biology favors "naturalistic" landscapes and reserves and
admonishes hum an artifact, landscape ecology focuses on and even embraces
the hum an-built landscape, and while the latter has largely evolved into a
"spatial language," the form er is concerned more w ith "functional"
relationships between organisms and species.

Yet, the two paradigms also share many similarities, including
overlapping an d shared literature, terminology, methodology, and method,
an interdisciplinary mix of practitioners, a focus on planning and practice,
and an interest in large areas (ranging from a few to hundreds of square
miles).

Also common to these two disciplines was a plethora of terms and

concepts open to debate and interpretation, setting the stage for further
political negotiation when applied to management.407

People w ith political agendas and normative biases articulated the
concepts constituting Conservation Biology and Landscape ecology, "sciences"
that are concerned with the political practice of land management. They both

407 Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
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constitute similar languages of definition and of cause and effect —relying
upon categories and designations that w ould (and did) affect policy decisions
affecting millions of people, not to m ention myriad other species and
ecologies. Thus, in effect, they provide the scientific parts, themselves
political constructions, to be politically appropriated and assembled in various
ways to form national forest policy — particularly through the courts, through
congressionally mandated scientific committees, and in the context of agency
programs. Adaptive Management provided a protocol for this political
assemblage of scientific parts. Central to adaptive management's
methodology (its principles of experimental design) was the idea of crisis —
the idea that the problem at hand, preservation of a species, required
expedient action. Actions would be evaluated in hindsight, and agency policy
would shift accordingly. This emphasis on crisis provided the conceptual
link that would make adaptive managem ent so useful to the practitioners of
conservation biology and landscape ecology.

Franklin's work in new forestry epitomized this synthesis and is a good
example of the construction of science and its political appropriation by
politics. In addition to helping construct the concept, he had a strong hand in
its application in the context of the Interagency Science Committee and the
Scientific Panel, as well as the Forest Service's New Perspectives program,
and, ultimately, Ecosystem M anagement.
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C hapter 6
The Power of Science: The Interagency Science Team and the Scientific Panel
Thomasina: Each week I plot your equations dot for
dot, Xs against Ys in all manner o f algebraical
relation, and every week they draw themselves as
commonplace geometry, as if the world of forms
were nothing but arcs and angles. God's truth,
Septimus, if there is an equation for a curve like a
bell, there must be an equation for one like a
bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a rose? Do we
believe nature is written in numbers?
Septimus: We do.
— Tom Stoppard
Arcadia (a play)

In autum n 1989, the Forest Service was still suffering an injunction
against selling stumpage on northern spotted owl lands —practically all the
old-growth forest in the Pacific N orthw est408 Judge Dwyer of the N inth
Federal Circuit court had imposed the injunction because the Forest Service
had failed to present an owl protection strategy that was based on the m ost
current information on the owl. The agency needed science that the court
would accept in order to continue its timber program.

In October, 1989, the Forest Service, in conjunction with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the BLM, chartered The Interagency Science Committee
(ISC), to produce a "scientifically credible conservation strategy for northern
spotted owl management" —which it published and submitted to Congress
April, 1990.409 In November, Congress passed its Appropriations Act of
408 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 114.
409 Interagency Scientific Committee, Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl, 8.

142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143
1990.410 Among its directives were to redraft the Environmental Impact
Statement it had issued for selling stumpage in owl territory, based upon the
latest in science. Congress also endorsed the agency's formation of the ISC,
which would assemble much of the science to be used in the EIS.

In spring, 1991, the Forest Service continued to be enjoined from timber
operations in owl forests, and Congress was facing pressure to solve the
mutually exclusive dem ands of old-growth advocates and the timber
industry. In April, the House Agriculture Committee and the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee convened a Scientific Panel on
Late-Successional Forest Ecosystems (hereafter, Scientific Panel), in an attempt
to start the process of drafting legislation for managing the old grow th in the
Pacific Northwest.411 The following July, the Panel, dubbed 'T he Gang of
Four" by industry rhetoric, released its report, which it presented to Congress
in October.412

In this chapter, I trace the history of the two projects as well as discussing
the significance of each report insofar as it would influence forest policy and
politics in the next few years —particularly the premier of ecosystem
management in 1992.

410 Section 318 of 1990 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.
411 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 168.
412 U.S. House Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the Committee on
Agriculture and the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, Joint Hearing.
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The ISC and its report (October, 1989-April. 1990)

In October, 1989, U.S. Congress incorporated the ISC charter into the
controversial Hatfield-Adams A ppropriations Act, thereby assuring the
committee some prominence in the political drama governing forest
management in the Pacific N orthwest.413 Congressmen and agencies alike
seemed to take as given the assumption that producing a "scientifically
credible" management plan — a "conservation strategy for northern spotted
owl management and cooperation" was possible and feasible, for no
provisions were m ade for the opposite possibility.414

The committees thus ratified the agencies' pick of internal scientists,
which itself was inevitably restricted to a relatively few possibilities, for
political and technical reasons.415 The Forest Service chose Jack Ward
Thomas to lead the committee because he appeared to be one of their most
"credible scientists."416 According to historian Stephen Yaffee, a "wide array"
of scientists perceived Thomas as a "good scientist," but "good" went beyond
the issue of "credibility," to include a certain "big stature kind of
personality."417 N ot only was he seen as a "straight shooter," but people
perceived in Thomas "a sense of hutzpa," particularly from his refusal to
leave his work in La Grande, Oregon to accept an agency management
position." People formed a mythical image of Thomas, "because he faced the
line officers in the eye and said T m doing what7s right.' That gave him both a
413
414
415
446
417

Section 318 of U. S. Public Law 101-121
Interagency Scientific Committee, Conservation Biology, 47.
Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 123-27,194.
Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 123. George Leonard signed the charter for Dale Robertson.
Yaffee, "Interview," 10.
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sense of somewhat mythic proportions, but also kind of reinforced his sense
of independence."418 Also attractive to people involved in the discourse was
a sense of "folksiness" that people imbued upon Thomas, according to
Charles Philpott, director of the Pacific Northwest Research Station:

The person [chosen as ISC leader] had to be credible not just with the
scientists but with environmentalists and other interest groups. We've
probably got 5 to 10 people in the Forest Service who can do that. Jack
has a knack for explaining complex things in good, simple English.
And he can get folksy when i f s appropriate.419

By 1989, Thomas was known to various people for various reasons. He
was responsible for arranging funding, through the Forest Service
cooperative research structure, some of the early research on the northern
spotted owl, especially graduate student work. Among the work Thomas
assisted was Eric Foreman's graduate research in the late 1970s (at Oregon
State University). Foreman was already bringing attention to his research on
the owl, and he would later become a major contributor to owl policy,
including his participation on the ISC, as I discuss below.420

Thomas was also known to others in context of his service on the Society
of American Foresters (SAF) committee that authored the policy statement,
"Scheduling the Harvest of Old-Growth" (SHOG) in the early 1980s.421 The

418
419
420
421

Ibid.
In Durbin, Tree Huggers, 112.
Yaffee, Wisdom of the Spotted Owl, 27
Society of American Foresters, Scheduling.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146
SAF committee's membership was as significant as its statement. Many SAP
committee members, including Thomas, would later serve on the ISC and
Scientific Panels and other high profile teams and w ould be instrumental in
the events leading to the Forest Service adoption of ecosystem
m anagem ent.422 Jim Lyons, then SAF director of resource policy, organized
the committee. Later, as a congressional staff assistant, Lyons worked to
assemble the Scientific Panel, and in 1993, he became Assistant Agriculture
Secretary in charge of the Forest Service, where he oversaw the Federal
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. Looking back at the SAF
membership, Lyons recalls:
Back even further to w hen I was the policy at SAF —and SAF
should take some credit for this —we put together a task force to
look at scheduling the harvest of old-growth timber. That involved
many of the same players who were involved with the "Gang of
Four" on Capitol Hill. That task force report was really
instrumental in accelerating the evolution of ecosystem
m anagem ent.423
One of those on the task force destined to become one of the "Gang of
Four" was Jerry Franklin, a Forest Service researcher University of
Washington professor soon become well known for his work in "New
Forestry." Before his work on the Scientific Panel, however, Jack Ward
Thomas would choose him for the ISC. Another member of the SAF team
who would later serve on the Scientific Panel was John Gordon, Dean of
Yale's School of Forestry. Gordon was a tree physiologist by academic
training, and had earlier taught and researched in the Pacific Northwest.

422 Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
423 Lyons in Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
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Regarding this line-up and its relationship to the ISC and the later
construction of ecosystem management, Thomas places Lyons and his work
on the SAP committee and the Scientific Panel as central to the development
of ecosystem managem ent Thomas recalled:
[Lyons] influence goes back before ISC to the genesis of the
technical consideration of the "old growth" issue. This was the
SAF [Society of American Foresters] assessment and subsequent
report on scheduling old-growth timber harvest. Lyons was the
SAF staffer who organized and guided that effort. When you
trace the players in the entire old growth issue, there are those
who continue a role through this entire drama. For example,
Jerry Franklin and I were on the SAF committee staffed by Jim
Lyons. Lyons did not have anything to do with the ISC, but was
cognizant of the effort. When Congress tried to make a
legislative fix, he was Chief of Staff working for the Agriculture
Committee, and he know all the players for the previous SAF
effort.424
Franklin, Gordon, Thomas, and Lyons, all who had helped articulate the
task of linking political dem ands w ith the scheduling of old-growth, would
help construct a solution to this problem.

According to Lyons, the importance of the task force followed from its four
recommendations, including regarding old-growth as "valuable unto
itself."425 Lyons recalled:
If you go back and look at the task force report, it had four
recommendations: It said define old-growth, determine how much
is there, recognize that old-growth is an ecosystem, and that it is
valuable unto itself —that was the first time it was ever said and it
was said by the forestry professionals first426

424 Thomas, "Interview," 2.
425 Lyons in Ghannon, "Lyons Speaks Out," 4.
426 Ibid.
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Perhaps more importantly, the policy statement explicitly acknowledged
the political (and potentially whimsical) nature of public forestry —
developing the multiple-use idea and presaging the rhetoric of the popular
forestry soon to be developed as the New Perspectives program and as
Ecosystem Management Policy.427

In the first sentence of the introduction of the SHOG report, the SAF
committee conceded that, technical questions notwithstanding, "[djedsions
affecting the preservation and harvest of old-growth will ultimately be made
through political processes."428 Old-growth policy was a political matter.
Imposing the constraint of non-declining yield was inappropriate for
scheduling timber harvest from public lands, it claimed. Rather, the Forest
Service (and BLM) should determine appropriate harvest and preservation
levels through the forest planning processes (which by 1984 had become
highly politicized). Through the planning process, the agendes could
consider the expanding set of values politically attributed to the national
forests and plan for the highest utility. According to the task force, "the
harvest schedule should be determined on the basis of sodal, economic, and
environm ental values found im portant during the planning process. These
values collectively represent an appropriate measure for maximizing net
public benefits."429 The committee had directly linked sodal utility —
"maximizing net public benefits" — to political values. Presumably, "sodal,
economic, and environmental," values would be ascertained through
political dem ands m ade in the course of the planning process.430
427
428
429
480

Society of American Foresters, Scheduling, 5.
Ibid., 5.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
Determining harvest would involve treating political demands as "a basis" of
decision-making; politics would drive the project of social utility.431 The
process of determining this maximization would require a framework for
transforming political demands into an old-growth harvest schedule, but the
SAF committee did not approach the large problem of constructing such a
framework. That task the ISC w ould grapple with.

The ISC had a large part in constructing the framework necessary to
perform the translation of political demands into resource decisions. Among
those chose was Franklin, who had been on the SAF committee and was
recently known for N ew Forestry. Also on the committee were Charles
Meslow, the Oregon State University professor who had been Eric Foreman's
academic advisor during his early owl work, and Forsman himself. During
the same time period, Meslow served on the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service
owl listing review committee, and he and Foreman both later served on the
Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (1993). For the ISC,
Thomas had assembled a team including consisting entirely of members w ith
biology-related backgrounds, ranging from wildlife management to animal
ecology; none came from other fields, for instance sociology or economics.

Of the ISC members, many were well known among those involved in
the political conflict around old-growth, and many would continue to play
key roles in high profile debates regarding old growth. By virtue of its high-

^31 ibid.
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profile membership, the high profile status of the project itself, and the
mission assigned it, the ISC report would inevitably be a political product, the
technical nature of the planning process aside. Much of the language in the
report verified this eventuality, pointing out that, necessarily, biological data
had only constituted part of the analysis. Other social and politically
constructed matters had exerted their influence, for instance, history and
historical land use and ownership, current law, and "culture" and cultural
constructions of economics and economic "trade-offs." In the ISC report, the
authors stated:
Our conservation strategy was not, nor could it be, formulated
solely from biological data. Various Federal and state laws and
regulations, land ownership patterns, past and present land uses,
landscape features, existing habitat conditions, current and
anticipated allocation of forest land to various uses, regional and
national culture and the reality of trade-offs in all land-use
decisions also influenced our choices.432
The cultural (and political) negotiation of these trade-offs —particularly
between timber and an old-growth dependent species —had inevitably
influenced the team's "choices," presumably those concerning which
questions to investigate. This negotiation of trade-offs constituted the heart
of the political dialogue over the national forests, and in this sense, the
national dialogue had structured the team's decision-making. However, in
applying themselves to the questions involved, the committee claimed, it
had remained objective:
To pretend that a workable conservation strategy for the owl can
be derived and instituted without considering such factors is
unrealistic We did not, however, feel unduly constrained by
these realities. Had we concluded that only total cessation of
432 ISC, 8.
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logging in remaining suitable habitat would save the owl, we
w ould have so recommended. Conversely, we were equally
prepared to state that the owl needed no protection, if that were
indicated.433
Thus, the committee wrote that, though "the best management for the
northern spotted owl obviously is to preserve all stands of m ature and oldgrowth timber w ithin the range of the bird and to grow more such stands as
soon as possible," it was willing to settle for a more politically palatable
solution: "Recognizing the real-world situation, however, we will consider a
less than optimal approach to spotted owl habitat management that will, to
the extent possible, simultaneously provide a high probability of population
viability for the northern spotted owl, well-distributed within its range, and
still allow the cutting of old-growth and mature timber."434 Taking as its
mission to designate the trade-offs between timber and owl viability, the ISC
(whatever the intentions of its members, the chartering agencies, Congress, or
Judge Dwyer), in effect, reified the reduction of public forestry in the Pacific
Northwest to the trade-off between these two "uses" or benefits.

To gather information regarding owl habitat characteristics, extent and
location of current owl habitat, and technologies for managing for habitat, the
ISC consulted w ith an assortment of "experts," including "wildlife biologists
experienced in owl management," silviculturists, landscape ecologists, forest
ecologists, and foresters," as well as "experts in conservation biology and
landscape ecology."435

Using this information, the committee, working

through the "delphi process" (designed to help groups of "experts" reach

433 Ibid., 8.
434 Ibid., 11.
435 Ibid., 12.
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"statements") constructed a "rule set," which they then used to choose which
of the 17 million acres of federal lands they would designate as owl habitat
(and which they would not). They expressed owl habitat in terms of "Habitat
Conservation Areas," which were larger but fewer than the "Spotted Owl
Habitat Areas" (SOHAs) the Forest Service was using at the time. SOHAs,
which the agency designed to provide habitat for one to three owl pairs,
apiece, contained contiguous land areas laying within circles of radii ranging
from 1.5 to 2.1 miles (1,000 to 3000 acres apiece).436 HCAs, by contrast, would
generally hold at least 20 pairs and would convey many benefits for owl
ecology, minimizing the effects of "random fluctuations in birth and death
rates," "habitat fragmentation and edges," and "small scale disturbances" and
encouraging "juvenile dispersal" and "recruitment" from within.437 Each
HCA would be placed within 12 miles of another HCA, encouraging
movement between the blocks, theoretically, increasing rates of genetic flow.
According to the ISO "Large blocks of habitat capable of supporting multiple
pairs of owls, and spaced closely enough to facilitate dispersal between blocks,
are far more likely to ensure a viable population than the current SOHA
system." The HCAs would also be defined by management objectives —
particularly the lack of 'logging (including salvage operations) and other
silvicultural activities (with the exception of stand regeneration)."438

HCAs w ould constitute the "patches" within the "matrix" of non-owl
lands —known by the team as "Forest lands outside of HCAs."439 But, the

436
437
438
439

Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 3.
ibid., 4.
ibid., 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153
team dispensed with "corridors," arguing that owls would not use narrow,
linear corridors for travel, and opted to encourage owl dispersal by managing
for stand conditions within the matrix:
We considered dedication corridors of forests between HCAs to
facilitate dispersal by juvenile owls, but decided corridors were
unnecessary, provided at least 50% of the forest landbase outside
of HCAs is maintained in stands of timber with an average d.b.h.
of 11 inches or greater and at least 40% canopy closure. We also
rely on lands currently allocated to such uses as riparian
corridors, streamside management zones and special
management areas for pileated woodpeckers and pine martens
to provide additional habitat for dispersing spotted owls.440
The ISC had appropriated the hierarchical, descriptive patch-corridormatrix model of landscape ecology and turned it into a prescriptive forest
m anagem ent model.

To create the map, the team devised a rule set, governing the number of
birds per HCA (roughly, 20 or more pairs), distances between them (no more
than 12 miles —or 7 miles for the few smaller HCAs), stand conditions in
"matrix" lands between them (50-11-40 rule), and creating 80 acre old-growth
HCAs "around activity centers of up to seven known pairs of owls per
township in the forest matrix."441 Using the HCA concept, the team
identified 7.1 million acres of spotted owl habitat and over ten million acres
of matrix on federal lands in the ow l region.

The team then conducted viability assessments for ten "physiographic
provinces" (the "Oregon Cascades East," "Northern California Coast Range,"

440 Ibid., 4.
441 Ibid., 28-29.
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and so on) that it demarcated.442 In this way, the owl resources available in
each of the subregions would be accountable from the perspective of the
entire range of the northern spotted owl, giving the team a means by which
to assess the species' genetic viability as a whole. In context of the mapping,
the committee produced the framework by which planners could roughly
translate board feet to spatial area to diminished viability, or increased risk.
Though risk was rated in subjective, qualitative terms (from "very high" to
"very low") and not according to numerical indices, the structure represented
the trade-offs in terms negotiable by some of the less technically minded in
the political realm. Thus, they were able to describe the trade-offs in terms
more explicit than available before, making stark the trade-offs. In choosing a
"less than optimal approach," the team under the aegis of "scientific
credibility," was in the position of legitimating (again, intentions aside)
timber as a primary management objective, aside from assuring owl viability.
Insofar as timber is the only competing use (and virtually always the objective
for the road-building upon which recreationists later drive) and the major
determinant of spotted owl habitat, any reference to loss of viability was, in
essence, a reference to timber harvesting.

The ISC further reified primary status of timber harvesting in its
development of the idea, found in the New Forestry work, that logging and
old-growth management, particularly, management for the viability of the
spotted owl, were compatible. According to the report, "[m]any management
practices, including those associated with certain timber harvest methods,
provide habitat attributes conducive to spotted owl dispersal. Examples

442 Ibid., 62,202.
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include visual corridors, riparian corridors, and streamside-management
zones, all which contain possible stopover spots."443 (Though the structure
of the first sentence in this passage implies that the following examples
w ould pertain to "certain timber harvest methods," it is not clear that
corridors or streamside management zones are particular to any particular
one.) The report argued for the possibility that managers could use
silvicultural practices to promote stand structures that would benefit owl
viability, though the team was careful to note that the technology was not yet
available:
Silvicultural prescriptions m ight be developed that would yield
significant volumes of w ood products while maintaining
suitable habitat for spotted owls, but we find no clear evidence
that such prescriptions currently exist. ... Nonetheless,
examining younger forests where spotted owls reproduce
successfully should yield valuable insights into silvicultural
techniques that could produce both wood products and owls.444
The uncertainty and inexperience associated with such silviculture would
be acknowledged by taking a careful approach of "experimentation,"
involving testing silvicultural treatm ents followed by careful monitoring.
The report's authors claimed:
Silvicultural modifications may include producing multilayered
canopies in stands, and leaving structures such as large trees,
snags, and fallen trees in place. If such treatments prove
successful for producing owl habitat, timber sales of certain types
m ight eventually be scheduled in [Habitat Conservation Areas].
But such sales can legitimately occur only after conclusive data
are obtained showing that associated owl populations are stable
or increasing, and after verifying positive owl responses to
stands that have been so treated.445
443 Ibid., 27.
444 Ibid., 2
445 Ibid., 37.
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This emphasis on experimentation directly alluded to the idea of
"adaptive managem ent/' which explicitly advocated "actively adaptive,
probing, deliberately experimental policies."446 (Forest Service policy makers
were using this concept in other forums, also, for instance in the N ew
Perspectives program, and later, in the production of ecosystem
management.) With these ideas, the ISC was able to make rhetorical
deference to the uncertainties of applied sciences and management. On one
level, the complexity of the population dynamics of the endangered species
the team was concerned w ith preserving resulted in uncertainty. O n another
level, the unpredictability of the politics that affected these species added
uncertainty to m anagem ent As well as adapting to the uncertainty associated
w ith the biological and political, the team had to defer to their consequences,
as they acknowledged in their report: "[mjonitoring, research, and
development activities must then continue in a likewise coordinated fashion
for the conservation strategy to succeed both biologically and politically."447
Politics, they recognized, w ould have the last say.

Politics, as it were, would have the last say, but the ISC participants played
a large part in constructing the language in which the statements would be
made. Also, using the logic of risk analysis, the team constructed the
decision-making framework politicians —bureaucratic, congressional,
executive, or judiciary —w ould use to guide their decisions. The ISC had
constructed a rough structure for designating and comparing trade-offs, which
the Scientific Panel, made up some of the same people, w ould refine.

446 Walters,-Adaptive Management vii.
447 ISC, 43.
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Report of the Scientific Panel (May. 1991-October, 1991)

In 1990, as Congress was in the process of "entertain[ing] intervention,"
Jim Lyons, staff forester for the House Agriculture Committee, was
orchestrating the formation of the Scientific Panel ("Gang of Four") in an
effort "to get things going by providing members of Congress with a menu of
options from which they could build forest protection legislation."448
Apparently, "Lyons persuaded H arold Volkmer, the Missouri Democrat who
chaired the forestry subcommittee of House Agriculture [who was a active
protection advocate], to appoint the four to a new team that would develop
options for protecting owls and other old-growth spedes."449

Like the ISC, the committee induded a high-profile group of players. Jack
W ard Thomas, still Chief Research Wildlife Biologist for the Forest Service
Pacific Northwest Research Station, had barely finished leading the ISC. Jerry
Franklin also had recently partidpated in writing the ISC owl strategy, and
when chosen for the Panel, he was an active force in the Forest Service's
"New Perspectives" program.450 John Gordon, still Dean of the Yale Forestry
school, had chaired the SAF committee. Having worked in the Pacific
Northwest on old-growth forests, (induding work with Franklin) and having
been "Dean of the old school of forestry," he had gained some credibility;
working with Lyons on the SAF committee and having testified before
Congress before regarding old-growth, he had gained political exposure.451
Thus, he was a sensible pick from a political point of view.

Norm Johnson, a

44^ Durbin, Tree Huggers, 168.
449 Ibid., 168.
45^ See Chapter 6.
451 Gordon, "Interview," 4.
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professor at Oregon State University, had helped invent FORPLAN, the
linear programming model that the Forest Service used to construct its forest
plans and had worked with both Gordon, who had been Dean at OSU in the
1960s.452

The Panel's report was an elaboration and refinement of the ideas in the
ISC, put in even more overtly political form. This resulted in a menu of
management options and a projection of their consequences for comparison
of their respective timber and wildlife trade-offs. Using much of the
inventory data organized under the ISC, the team delineated management
areas in "the owl forests" that were supervised by the Forest Service and BLM
into various qualities of "late-successional/old-growth" (LSOG) including
three classes, ranging from "most ecologically significant," to "ecologically
significant," to "the remainder."453 Again, the division reflected the
landscape ecology model, using it as zoning structure as it had done with the
ISC report. "Ecologically significant" lands, upon which logging would be
most severely constrained, corresponded w ith the patches, while "the
remainder" would correspond with matrix lands. But these background
lands were not background from a political point of view, because any rule
applied to them, particularly the team's 50-11-40 rule, would affect timber
harvests.454 In the team's words: "Applying the 50-11-40 rule generally
lowers the harvest rate on the available forest-Iand base."455
452 Johnson, "Is FORPLAN obsolete?"
45^ Scientific Panel on Late-Successional Forests of the Pacific Northwest. "Alternatives for
Management of Late Successional Forests of the Pacific northwest," 2. (Hereafter, Scientific
Panel.)
454 The 50-11-40 rule stipulates that at least 50 percent of a stand be forested with trees
averaging at least 11 inches in diameter at breast height with a canopy closure of at least 40
percent.
455 Ibid., 60.
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The team then drew up a range of alternatives variously emphasizing
timber and wildlife objectives, expanding wildlife objectives to include
retention of enough old-growth forest to assure the viability of old-growth
"associated species/' "viable populations of northern spotted owl," and
"providing adequate habitat on federal land for marbled murrelet nesting, for
other... associated species, and for sensitive fish species and stocks."456 In its
projected consequences, the Panel used risk analysis to consider effects on the
expanded set of wildlife concerns as well as expanding its estimated effects
upon timber production to include economic analysis of job losses.

The Panel constructed its twelve alternatives in reference to the combined
land management plans from the various BLM districts and Forest Service
Forests in the owl forests:
A n alternative starts with the land allocation from a variation
on the Forest Plans that emphasizes wood production
(Alternative 1) or from the land allocation in the Forest Plans
(all of the alternatives). Then any or all of the following are
added: (1) additional reserves (HCAs from the ISC strategy and
the modified ISC strategy or an LS/OG network), (2) a watershed
and fish option (current, w atershed / fish emphasis option), and
(3) a management option for lands outside of reserves.457
As w ith the ISC report, the Panel structured its risk analysis in subjective
terms, this time using a "seven-point scale of ranking ranging from 'very low'
to 'very high.' A very low probability indicated a low chance (considerably
less than 50 percent) of attaining the above objectives, while moderate
approximated a 50/50 chance. A high probability indicated a high likelihood
456 Ibid., 4.
457 ibid., 6
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or reliability (over 90 percent) of meeting the objectives."458 The Panel was
not explicit about its argument for constructing the various levels nor about
the certainty (confidence level) of the system. In its application of the rating
system, the Panel was unable to use an algorithmic or automated process of
evaluating alternatives, owing to inadequate data. Rather, the team used a
communicative process, perusing previous research work and drawing
conclusions as a group:
We conducted the risk analysis w ith the assistance of scientists
who are expert in the species being considered. With their help,
we reviewed the available literature and evidence on the
habitats of the species being rated and then applied this
knowledge to create the risk ratings.459
Next the group authors claimed:
We did the analysis without sophisticated models, but the data
base for most species does not support such analysis at this time.
In addition, we did it in a short time. Still we are confident that,
in general, further analysis would at most shift the results by
one level either way.460
In table form, the report associated the various alternatives with the
viability of five wildlife objectives (to use the term "wildlife" rather loosely),
including protection of a "functional Late-Successional/Old-Growth
network," "viable spotted owl populations," marbled murrelet nesting
habitat, "other LS/ OG species" habitat, and "habitat for sensitive fish
species / stocks."461

458
459
460
461

Ibid.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid.
Ibid., 31.
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The report also associated the alternatives w ith timber yield projections, as
well as projecting "job losses," particularly associated with the timber
industry, enabling Congressional members to compare trade-offs between
timber and wildlife viability. Of the various political-economic effects
possible —for example, the encouragement of other forms of economic
production such as recreation —the team focused on the trade-offs between
wildlife and timber. When presenting the panel's findings at a joint hearing
before the House of Representatives committees that commissioned the
report, Thomas referred to the charts in the report demonstrating the trade
offs.462 Thomas testified: "What I want you to see in those charts is there is a
dramatic cost benefit effect here. Additional levels of protection of assurance
of achieving the objective [providing a viable owl plan] come at significant
cost, in terms of the economy and in terms of jobs."463 In focusing upon this
particular trade-off, the panel effectively strengthened the primacy of these
particular uses that had defined the history of the ancient forest issue.

Concluding Remarks

The reports of the ISC and the Scientific Panel (and the internal teams'
political process that they represented) formed the language and framework
by which the Forest Service and other land management bureaucracies that
became involved in "Ecosystem Management" were to appropriate science
and scientific texts. They also foreshadowed the role the agency would take in
the future, which consisted of providing a framework —including
terminology and methodology -- for politicians, particularly Congress —to
462 Ibid., 34.
463 Thomas, in U.S. House Subcommittees, Joint Hearing on Review of the Report, 23.
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refer to when politically divvying up the Pacific Northwest forests and
administering the politically prescribed uses. Thomas repeatedly emphasized
this role of agency science in his testimony before Congress:
The old-growth research program has listed those species.
Essentially what we're saying is "here, that's for you to decide.
Here's our level of knowledge. H ere's the risk assessments
associated given that level of knowledge. How much do you want
to spend to be how safe?"464
Later in the same testimony, Thomas reiterated his message, informing
Congress of his role vis-a-vis them: "That's the entire object of this report,
that there are levels of uncertainty, there are levels of risk, and they have
very high cost associated with them. But a scientist or a professional biologist
is not the person to make those calls."465 Thomas might not have been the
person to make those calls, but as team leader of both the ISC and Scientific
Panel report, he had a great amount of influence.

In the House joint hearing where the Panel discussed its report with
Congress, Harold Volkmer (D-Missouri), Chairman, who had chartered the
panel, forecast when he rhetorically asked Panel member Norm Johnson:
"Basically, as I read the report, and I remember the statement, we're looking at
ways to now manage the national forests and public lands up there on an
ecosystem approach. Is that correct?"466 Johnson affirmed. According to
panel member John Gordon, the connection between the Scientific Panel and
the later Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team project three
years later (FEMAT, again led by Thomas) is direct: "It set the framework for

464 Ibid., 30.
465 Ibid., 35.
46*> Volkmer in US. House Subcommittees, Joint Hearing on Review of the Report, 24.
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the FEMAT process, which was basically an elaboration of w hat we did there,
and Jack led that, so it was a direct connection."467 In this sense, both reports
represent the political appropriation of several years of discourse concerning
old-growth forest ecology, the spotted owl, the economics of timber cutting,
biodiversity, rural sociology, conservation biology, and landscape biology, to
name but a few. This effort was a synthesis of these discourses -- discourses
that themselves focus upon referents produced and reproduced by society at
large and are reflected in the media of the day.

As important texts defining the allocative trade-offs of these desired
referents, the ISC report and the Scientific Panel report set the terms of
negotiation for the planning process that would later become known as
ecosystem management. The report of the ISC —a radically political
document —signified the mapping out of the costs and benefits of
management in terms of the dem ands that were the most politically
important at the time —owls and timber. The "Scientific Panel" expanded
upon the ideas in the ISC document to include more species —including the
politically important salmon. Though the Forest Service adopted neither the
strategy of the ISC nor the preferred alternative of the panel, these texts
formed the prototypes of the "ecosystem management" framework for
designating and allocating "resources" (translatable into "uses" or "benefits,"
and later, "desired future conditions") and accounting for their trade-offs —
particularly, timber for endangered and threatened species.468 As well, the
reports established and legitimated the process by which the Forest Service
w ould appropriate science (as a process as well as a body of text) in the era of
467 Gordon, "Interview," 6.
468 Ibid., 6; Thomas, "Interview," 1
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Ecosystem Management. Teams would produce scientific statements using a
process wherein scientists with expertise (based upon primary research and
literature) would negotiate qualitative statements regarding the effects of
management upon the viability of species. Both teams produced models
using the logic of "risk analysis," and while particular variable values might
change according to the process of scientific revision, and while variables
(such as endangered species) m ight be added or subtracted, the organizing
principles would remain the same.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 7
Poly Science: The New Perspectives Program
Perhaps, after all, modem capitalism is a great factory for
the production o f angels.
—Sol Yurich
Metatron

By the end of 1989, the Forest Service had become aware that its current
approach to forest planning was not working in the Pacific Northwest,
particularly in the face of the injunction on timber harvesting imposed in
March. Constraints imposed by the legal protection of the northern spotted
owl directly conflicted with timber planning. So did political demands made
by old-growth advocates for protection of wildlife habitat, "biodiversity,"
water quality, and ecological processes, preservation of "intangible values"
(aesthetic, ethical, sacred or "spiritual"), and production of "recreation
opportunities."

But selling stumpage had long been the central priority of

the Forest Service, which was strongly influenced by the timber industry and
its friends in Congress.

The Forest Service found itself in the position of having to reconcile these
demands or have a solution forced by Congress, while the courts were
consistently deciding against the agency in context of the spotted owl. Dale
Robertson, then Chief, remembers that "we were losing court cases. ... [W]e
were kind of getting cornered with the Endangered Species Act and losing our
flexibility to manage the land."469

469 Robertson, "Interview," 4.
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The creation of the "New Perspectives" program was the Forest Service's
response to this impasse — a program that the agency had recently
conceptualized as a way of getting itself out of "the crossfire" of political
conflict over unroaded and old-growth lands.470 The politically based
program was an administrative answer to politics —the agency's response to
an expanding and often conflicting set of political demands. Associate Chief
(at the time) George Leonard later reflected:
I think the thing that finally triggered New Perspectives and
which evolved — in terms of the Forest Service program ~ into
Ecosystem Management, w as the continued level of appeals and
lawsuits that raised those kinds of issues —the endangered
species issues and issues like island bio-geography in the lake
states and whatnot, all of which we found that the traditional
approaches towards the management of the timber resources, in
particular, didn't satisfactorily address.471
All these conflicting demands —or "values" in Forest Service language472 —
signified politically-demanded goods and the Forest Service's mandate was to
somehow reconcile them. New Perspectives was the vehicle by which the
agency attempted this reconciliation by devising a set of forest management
principles (derived, for instance, from adaptive management and new
forestry) and applying them to various prototypical "projects" at the district
level — on "project level planning efforts."473 This chapter traces the history
of the Forest Service's political production of the New Perspectives program,
outlines the principles and framework developed by the Washington Office
staff, and discusses one of the program 's most significant pilot projects —the

470 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 32.
471 Leonard, "Interview," 2.
472 U .S.D A , Forest Service, New Perspectives Program. "Memo"; New Perspectives, New
Times.
47^ U.S.Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest. Final
Environmental Impact Statement, 1-2.
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Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Project, Siskiyou National
Forest, Oregon.

Dreaming up New Perspectives (Tune 1989-December 1989)

In June, 1989, Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson appeared at a joint
hearing before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms and
Energy (of the Committee on Agriculture) and the Subcommittee on
National Parks and Public Lands (Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs).
Robertson said: "Old-growth forests are really important."474 The joint
hearings specifically concerned the "Management of Old-Growth Forests of
the Pacific Northwest," and in this context, Robertson added, "They include a
lot of values such as biological diversity, wildlife, fisheries habitat, esthetics,
water quality as well as industrial raw material values."475 The Chief went
on to implore that, "we have to reach some kind of a reasonable balance in
managing this valuable environmental and economic asset."476 Presumably,
the "we" included all stake-holders, while the Forest Service considered itself
to be the proper arbitrator of "reason."

In October 1989, Robertson again appeared before Congress to discuss the
Forest Service's strategy for coping with the controversy around old-growth
management, particularly in owl country, or in Robertson's words, to discuss
strategies to help the agency "through some difficult times."477 Again,

474
475
476
477

Robertson, 'Testimony/'June 22.1989,478-79.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Robertson, Testimony," October 1989,24.
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Robertson appealed to reason and balance:

"Somehow w e have to work

together to try to manage through this situation and arrive at some kind of a
sensible, reasonable, balance approach to managing these forests."478
Robertson repeatedly uses these terms — "sensible," "reasonable," and
"balance" in this address.479 Robertson argued that the Forest Service,
through its rational planning process, was still the right agency for this task,
telling Congress, "I believe the planning process has worked reasonably
well."480 According to Robertson, much of the turmoil the Forest Service
faced resulted from changing times, but given some "flexibility," the agency
could make the planning process work: 'Tim es change. Needs of people
change. Resource conditions change. New thinking comes along — like old
growth —and we need the flexibility to deal w ith those changes as they
occur."481

Robertson, having referenced "new thinking," subm itted a written report
announcing to the committee that the Forest Service was working on a new
program, "New Perspectives." The program would attem pt to strike this
"reasonable balance" and appease the public by providing for "diverse
values," particularly ecological concerns, in addition to — but not at the
expense of —timber: "'N ew Perspectives in Forestry7 reflects our recognition
of the need to continue to produce traditional forest products and provide for
traditional forest uses while being more responsive to public concerns for all

478
479
480
481

ibid., 24.
ibid., 26.
ibid., 25.
Ibid., 25.
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forest values."482 A month later, George Leonard, Associate Chief, testified
to a House subcommittee regarding the New Perspectives concept:
Basically, the idea is to combine knowledge of forest and
rangeland ecosystems and landscapes w ith appropriate elements
of traditional management practices. The objective is to develop
management systems that will continue to provide for sustained
production of commodities, such as wood and forage, while also
providing a wider range of noncommodity values, such as
wildlife and fish habitat, w ater quality, and recreational
opportunities.483
Robertson recalls that he decided to adopt the term "New Perspectives"
after frantic negotiation among W ashington Office staffers preparing for the
hearings, opting for a compromise term that insinuated a change in the
agency's modus operandi without fully adopting the contentious term, "new
forestry." The Chief had first heard the term only the day before the hearings.
Reflecting upon the events, Robertson commented:
I didn't come up with that term. I remember some of my staff
didn't like "New Forestry." We were facing some Congressional
hearings in Congress that I had to testify about something. I
don't even remember the topic —I guess it was about what we
were doing about New Forestry and that sort of thing. So, my
staff, really working on the testimony, came up with this word
"New Perspectives." I don't know if I would have come up with
it, but I was the one who had to announce it, because I had to go
to the Congressional hearing and talk about a new program, a
new initiative, and it was "New Perspectives" —a new
perspective.484
Robertson recalls that the term was not only new to him, but the concept
was also somewhat vague: "I can remember the staff came in for my
testimony and briefed me and I saw this new term, "New Perspectives,” and I

482 Ibid., 102.
488 Leonard, "Statement," 38-39.
484 Robertson, "Interview," 2.
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asked them, now tell me what that means."485 As Robertson remembers it,
the staff explained the concept as a sort of expanded forestry —"a broader
perspective both geographically as well as the spectrum of values we were
trying to perpetuate through time."486 He added:
Basically w hat it meant was a broader look at forestry. Again, we
weren't in the Ecosystem Management yet, but it was a new
perspective looking at, first, the whole spectrum of values of a
forest that we needed to maintain over time; and then the other
aspect was the looking at the broader area, you know, and they
came up with the landscape area as opposed to a smaller area.487
Robertson was not completely comfortable with the term, especially
insofar as it reflected the controversial "new forestry." But political
expediency required some action, and Robertson went with the advice of his
staff, adopting w hat he recognized as a political term. He noted:
I remember saying in the meeting, "Well, I don't particularly
relate to New Perspectives but I relate to what you're trying to
portray." A nd they asked me the same question, "Do you have a
better term?" and I said "no." I didn't have a better term. So, I
think New Perspectives was kind of ... I was having to go to
Congress to testify, it was where we kind of coined the term, and
you know there's something new in the Forest Service, so it was
kind of a more compatible, political term to describe w hat
Franklin was ca llin g New Forestry. So I just didn't have a better
term and we were facing a deadline of about 24 hours. I said
"well, unless I can come up with a better term we'll just go with
it."488

The top-line officers were unable to articulate the program in any precise
way, but they were generally aware that "something new" was advisable, and
the increasingly familiar "new forestry" would provide some of the
substance. Robertson recalls that, "again it w as... just kind of a label that we
485
486
487
488

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 3.
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pretty much put on Jerry Franklin’s work —it was probably modified as it
came through the management process —to reflect that this is something
new ."489 Associate Chief Leonard later reflected upon New Perspectives as a
sort of vague polyglot of features that signified something new, stating:
The term New Perspectives was kind of an accidental thing, but
it was to get across the idea that we wanted people to look at our
forests with some new perspective, not the traditional tim ber
and big game perspectives and in effect said that "you’re
empowered to go out and deal with some of these new ideas that
a few people are putting out in the professional publications and
whatnot."490
The Washington Office of the Forest Service, facing political w rath from
all fronts, had created a term, N ew Perspectives, that might afford the agency
some "flexibility to manage the land," without knowing exactly w hat the
term meant. It had created a signifier which it was in the position to fill.

The Contents: Filling the signifier of New Perspectives from Dr. Salwasser's
Medicine Bag

The Forest Service directorate had promised to Congress that it w ould
produce a "new perspective," though they did not seem to know w hat such
an object would be. To accomplish this double task of inventing and
administering a new perspective, the agency needed a new departm ent —a
"program." To this end, the W ashington Office began to assemble the staff
and prepare and official charter. According to Hal Salwasser, chosen to lead
the project

489 Ibid., 3.
490 Leonard, 'Interview," 3.
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[A] week or two before the Christmas holiday [1989] they called
me in -- I was the Deputy Director of Wildlife and Fisheries at
the time —they called me in and asked me if I would accept the
job of heading up this N ew Perspectives effort. And somewhere
in that period, between the hearing in September [1989] and
when they formalized the charter for this N ew Perspective thing
[April, 1991], it took on the name "New Perspective for
Managing the National Forest System." And it had, as some of
its principles, that it was going to be a management-research
partnership.491
Salwasser was already familiar with political proceedings at the
Washington Office. Through m uch of his tenure in Washington, he had
been a successful bureaucrat, serving in the interesting role of keeping the
Forest Service abreast of changes in mainstream political opinion. For
instance, in 1986, he served as senior natural-resource analyst for the
"President's Commission on Americans Outdoors," providing "technical
expertise," conducting workshops, and publishing findings and
recommendations regarding recreation vis-a-vis environmental quality,
greenways, and wildlife, fisheries, and water.492

As a senior analyst earlier in the 1980s, Salwasser had played roles
epitomizing the agency's post-NFMA and -NEPA mandate of
interdisciplinary planning and management, seeking reconciliation between
planning and management and newly formed bureaucratic concerns such as
"biodiversity," "viable populations," and "cumulative effects analysis."
During his tenure in Wildlife and Fisheries, Salwasser developed and
promoted programs reflecting his "multiple-resource outlook," based on the
491 Salwasser, "Interview," 3. Salwasser, a long-time Forest Service bureaucrat, reflected his
acculturation into the bureaucratic worldview —deference to officers up the line of command —
by following this quotation by noting that "I ended up reporting to the two deputy chiefs
simulataneously, Sessco and Overbay." Ibid.
492 Salwasser, "Curriculum Vitae," 2.
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proposition that managers can and should produce wildlife in a rational
framework. To the 47th N orth American Wildlife Conference (1982), he
implored that "to fulfill the responsibilities for wildlife and fish habitat on
lands managed for all resources, decision makers need specific and accurate
information on the capabilities of land areas to produce wildlife and fish and
the probable consequences of alternative management prescriptions for
wildlife and fish and their habitats."493

Through his writings, Salwasser developed the concept that the agency
could manage forests to please all —excepting the "me-first forces in our
society," who "are pulling us apart as every special interest w ants its exclusive
slice of the pie."494 These "extremists," he believed, had created "the vision
for how forests should be managed," as well as describing "what constitutes
excellence in performance," and had sabotaged "common ground for the
long-term public good," creating "a nearly impossible task for those who are
asked to craft policies and programs that seek balance among conflicting
values and uses, harmony between people and land —like us."495 The agency
had to be the ultimate arbiter of w hat was reasonable and harmonious.

In a similar vein, Salwasser was concerned with efficiency in the
production of goods and services from the National Forests.496 His
enthusiasm and optimism in this regard was especially apparent in a

493 Nelson and Salwasser, "The Forest Service Wildlife and Fish," 174.
494 Salwasser, "New Perspectives for New Realities," 5. This title implies Salwasser's
awareness that, for the agency, reality was multiple and relative.
49^ Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 34; and Ibid., 5.
496 Ibid.
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statement made at the 1985 Society of American Foresters Annual
Convention, where he likens the managed forest to a factory:
It is a rich and exciting time to be involved in forestry in this
country. The fruits of our labors serve more people's needs than
ever before; enriching their lives greatly through diverse, high
quality products and experiences. The source is the managed
forest. Where else can you find a factory with such wonderful
products as clear grain white pine, elk, pure water, veneer
walnut, wild turkeys, wilderness recreation, colorful
woodpeckers, trout, bass, and salmon? This diversity of products
is found only in managed forests that are tended by innovative
professionals schooled in a broad spectrum of resource
disciplines. The multiple-use forest, planned according to
integrated, interdisciplinary, multi-interest, ecosystem concepts
is coming on line.497
To realize this utilitarian view of the forest required both a concern with
the social w ork of technology transfer and aggressive marketing to the
public.498 According to Salwasser, the success of the factory model of forestry
depended upon two prerequisite projects:
(1) Help resource managers know how to get the most out of
their efforts in integrated forestry —that is Technology Transfer
to make better uses of new methodologies, and (2) m arket the
success stories in integrated forestry -- that is, and aggressive
sales and advertising effort at all levels of society to get the
message out on what multiple use forestry is doing for people.499
Apparently, by mid-decade, a lack of "specific and accurate information on
the capabilities of land areas to produce wildlife and fish and the probable
consequences of alternative management prescriptions for wildlife and fish
and their habitats" was not enough to discourage Salwasser from aggressively
promoting many of the same goals that the New Perspectives program would
later adopt. Uncertainty was inherent, he argued, insofar as "no two species,
497 Salwasser, Holthausen, and Darden, "Using Wildlife and Fish," 170.
498 In a situation like this, the line between "marketing" and "propaganda" is indiscemable.
499 Salwasser, Holthausen, and Darden, "Using Wildlife and Fish," 170.
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populations, or management situations are identical" and, therefore,
"universally valid generalizations about minimum population sizes... are not
possible. Each case must be judged on its merits, and each case will be clouded
with uncertainty. We always lack full knowledge of a spedes' biology, habitat
needs, and population dynamics. We can never be certain that habitats will
respond to treatments exactly as expected."500' Further, nature can be
"random and beyond our control"; disturbances could change large areas of
forest, reduce viability of a spedes, and eliminate management possibilities,
altogether.

Salwasser concluded that since uncertainty was inherent, and since the
Forest Service had a mandate to manage and produce goods and service, the
agency must proceed in the face of uncertainty. But, he argued, forest
managers m ust use the best in sdentific tools —particularly "risk
management," towards the goal of an integrated multiple-use management:
"to make prudent land use dedsions regarding viable wildlife populations we
m ust use existing knowledge and experience to convert uncertainty into
actions designed to meet the goal."501

Salwasser argued that the agency could manage for the entire range of
political demands, given the flexibility; his directorship of the suitably
ambiguous New Perspectives production apparently presented the
opportunity. Once the Forest Service had committed itself to the new
program, Salwasser and others in the Washington Office had to dedde what
the new program would be. According to Salwasser:
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
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After having said [that the Forest Service was going to explore
some new perspectives in forestry] in a hearing in September or
October, we had to put a team of people together to figure out
what it was we just committed to. So there was an
interdisciplinary group in the W ashington Office that had
Nelson Waftus from Silviculture Research and it had Ed Slater
from Range Ecology, and three or four other guys -some of the
more ecologically oriented people in the Washington Office Staff
as an interdisciplinary group to lay out a set of ideas for what this
New Perspective search w ould be.502
After the preliminary conceptualizing, Salwasser began work on
assembling a team to articulate the contents of the new program and set to
work promoting it within the agency as well as to the academic community,
environmental and industry activists, professional groups, and politicians:
I started on the project in January or February of 1990 and I
recruited a very small team of people: Chip Cartright off of the
Jefferson National Forest and Jim Caplin of Planter on the
Bridger Teton and Winnie Kessler who was an ecologist for the
Fish and Wildlife staff out of Logan, Utah. But they didn't start
showing up until May and June. So, between February and May
and June, I spent a lot of time going out and visiting people and
seeing what they were doing and getting their ideas, for what we
should be trying to accomplish w ith this New Perspective
opportunity.503
Soon Salwasser organized a convention, inviting representatives from
professional groups and mainstream political interest groups to formulate
"some guiding principles." Then, he began to encourage field level
dem onstration of some of these em erging N ew Perspectives principles.
Salwasser later recalled:
Then we hosted a workshop in Philadelphia and invited
seventy-some odd people to come in for several days, and half of
the people were not Forest Service people. By design we opened
502 Salwasser, "Interview," 2.
5°3 Ibid., 4.
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it up to try to get a broad spectrum of ideas. We had people from
what you might consider traditional view points: Society of
American Foresters, the Wood Products Industry, and we also
had people from the conservation community — National
Wildlife Federation and that sort. And, we came out of that
workshop with some guiding principles, and that stimulated us
to engage the field folks in putting forward a series of projects
that would exemplify managing for diversity of values in the
land and team w ork between science and management. It
expanded beyond Forest Service research to approve university
type folks and the partnership idea. 504
The New Perspectives program had now constructed a conceptual
framework from which to proceed. This conceptual framework was
organized around a set of substantive management "principles," to be
implemented at the planning and analysis stages of management, which
would proceed according to the procedural principles that the New
Perspectives team had assembled.

The Filling: the Text of New Perspectives

The architects of New Perspectives synthesized the program 's textual
substance from diverse sources, themselves filled with political content by
players (scientists) in a political struggle. The emerging discourses known as
landscape ecology and conservation biology constituted significant textual
sources, as did proposals for their application to silviculture and forest
management, particularly by "the Andrews group."505 New Perspectives also
appropriated ideas from discourses on planning process, particularly the
concept of "Adaptive Management," reflecting the centrality of social
processes in producing conservation biology and landscape ecology. Both of
504 Ibid.
505 So named in Swanson, "The People Behind the New Forestry."
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these discourses, which emphasized questions of methodology and technique
—the "scientific process," in which interpretation and "art" were notably
active — had emerged in a high-stakes political environment.506

Salwasser, in turn, linked statements common to these fields to the
concept of multiple use and the emerging literature emphasizing the term
"sustainable" — "sustainable development, sustainable forestry," and so
forth.507 According to Salwasser, New Perspectives was a form of
"sustainable ecosystem management," and though he was not sure what that
meant, he believed it to be "an elaboration of the concept of multiple benefit,
sustained yield resource management."508 Insofar as "multiple benefit" was
merely a euphemism for multiple use, Ecosystem Management affirmed the
agency's mandate for "multiple use, sustained-yield."509 According to
Salwasser and staff, developing this "sustainable ecosystem management," as
the cause celebre of New Perspectives, involved three general goals.510

The first goal would be to "broaden" the concept of multiple-use. This
broadening took place on two levels. First, and most important, New
Perspectives would "broaden the concept of multiple use to include multiple
value, and extend the concept of sustained yield to sustainability of all the
values and uses of healthy ecosystems."511 Multiple-values w ould include
health and function in the national forests, as well as the availability of

506
507
508
509
510
511

por instance, see SouI£, "What is Conservation Biology?" 1.
Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 35.
ibid., and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
ibid.; Ibid.
Salwasser,"Gaining Perspective," 36.
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diverse management options. Kathy Johnson, ranger of the Gold Beach
district of the Siskiyou National Forest, appeared in the Forest Service
promotional video, New Times: New Perspectives in Forestry, promising
that New Forestry would "allow us to keep our options open," and "save a
healthy, functioning fo rest"512 In literature that the New Perspectives team
circulated to the regional offices (1991), this was an affirmation of the agency's
mandate to multiple use, but w ith an "ecological" perspective. As a result,
the authors of the foundational memo proclaimed:
This direction reaffirms sustainable, multiple-use management.
But it is multiple use w ith a difference. It is strongly based on
ecological concepts to assure that resource management sustains
the health and productivity of the land. And it emphasizes a
better balance among the many values and uses of land.513
Managing for such "balance" would mean protecting "the most sensitive
elements and processes of the land community from degradation, especially
the rare species, wetlands, old-growth forests, and processes that sustain
productivity and provide resiliency to stress"; recovering "the endangered
species and restor[ing] areas and ecological process degraded by past practices";
meeting "people's needs through economically sound, sustainable uses of the
land and its goods and services... without impairing the continued vitality of
the land"; regenerating "healthy, resilient, and productive land... with an eye
towards natural health, diversity, long-term productivity, and the esthetic
and spiritual values that derive from such accomplishments"; and
integrating "management, research, and monitoring to allow management to
become a grand learning opportunity, from which periodic adjustments are
m ade."514
512 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times: New Perspectives in Forestry.
U.S.D.A., Forest Service, "Memo: New Perspectives," 1.
514 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," and "New Perspectives for New Realities."
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A key and unifying concept in the N ew Perspectives rhetoric was
management for "biodiversity" as a natural resource. According to its 1990
Resources Planning Act Program, "the Forest Service views conservation of
biological diversity as a multiple-use issue, not simply a land preservation
schem e."515 The team presented biodiversity —and, more generally, merely
"diversity" -- as "values" that manifested in many forms of analysis, for
instance as "structural," "functional," or "compositional diversity"
(respectively, diversity of spatial and temporal forms, processes, and
spedes).516

Diversity was to be analyzed on various scales, from the stand level to the
regional level, introducing another term given great coinage by the New
Perspectives staff — "managing according to scale." By maintaining and
enhancing biodiversity —using old-growth forests to learn from — the Forest
Service could construct a "managed forest" that would allow for a sustained
supply of goods as well as maintaining "ecological values." In the words of
Franklin, again speaking via the New Perspectives video: "Nature put her
forests together in a very different way than w e've been putting forests
together, and what lessons w e can learn from these old forests w e can then
put to work in creating a different kind of managed forest.517

In addition, Salwasser and his team implied a more subtle modification of
multiple-use —a shift from allocating different zones to timber or non-timber
515 Excerpted from the Forest Service, Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources: A LongTerm Strategic Plan, 1990," in Rockwell, "RPA —The Sleeping Giant," 11.
516 Crow, "Conservation Biology and Landscape Ecology."
517 U S .D A , Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives.
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uses (through the process of designating certain lands to "suitable timber
base") to managing for different uses on the same piece of land —or, in the
words of Bill Atkinson, then manager of Oregon State University's
experimental forest — a shift from managing for "a single, dominant use,
spatially separated," toward managing for "several uses on the same piece of
forest land."518 According to the program's promotional video, New Times:
New Perspectives in Forestry, "Everyone wants their piece of the Forest. And
the impression has been given that only by slicing up the pie can the various
interests and values be served. But the new perspective of the Forest Service
is that pie slicing no longer works, and is unnecessary."519

The film then featured Jerry Franklin — as Forest Service and University
of Washington scientist. Franklin promoted the New Perspective's mixed
use approach using the language of silviculture. In his statement, Franklin
alluded to clear-cutting, but carefully avoided using the term. According to
his view:
There's absolutely no reason why we have to continue to go
through the pie slicing process. What we do have to do,
however, is move away from these dichotomies —as with, for
example, "there's no choice but clean-cut forestry or selection
m anagem ent."520
This switch in the meaning of multiple-use implied that the managem ent
of special reserves was obsolete. In the New Perspectives video, Lynn
Burdett, then ranger on the Blue River district of the Willamette National
518 Atkinson, "Another View of Forestry," 1.
519 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives. Proposed changes to the Forest
Service planning regulations would have eliminated designating "suitable" timberlands —a
process that had been set in place to implement section 6 (k) of NFMA. See McQuillan, "Wolf
in Sheep's Clothing."
520 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times, New Perspectives. The use of "clean-cut" is not a
misspelling.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182
Forest -- the "top timber producer in the U.S." —alluded to this implication.
Interestingly, only minutes (film time) after the film's narrator claimed that
New Perspectives was abandoning the pie-slicing metaphor, Burdett
resurrected it in another form —the pie would remain, but it would be
- reduced to include only what forests were left to negotiate for. In her words:
"The pie is getting much smaller and it's difficult to imagine that it will work
very well to have reserves and highly intensively managed areas under our
old way of doing business and meet the ecological objectives that we might
want to."521 Pie slicing would be out; mixed forestry would be the new
perspective.

The second goal of "sustainable ecosystem management" was to "expand
forestry as applied science from a tree orientation to a forest orientation by
integrating biological, physical, social, and political sciences."522 This goal
reflected Salwasser's earlier experience in synthesizing scientific texts into
administrative language. The agency would do its "integrating" in the
context of cooperative research arrangements between the agency and
universities, between the agency and other agencies (especially those in
Interior) and in forest planning, linking managers and scientists (using a
model analogous to the Scientific Panel). The Forest Service would create
"close partnerships between managers, researchers, and educators."523

This procedural concern — the formation of research partnerships,
especially in the interest of studying old-growth ecosystems for knowledge

521 Ibid.
522 Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 37.
523 Ibid., 37.
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useful to silvicultural management — was to become a main focus of the
agency, and all concerned groups w ould be included. According to Salwasser:
Applying these lessons in order to maintain ecological values
and produce a sustained supply of goods has been a major focus
of research conducted in a partnership involving the national
forests and the research branch of the Forest Service. Other
partners are universities, the forest products industry,
environmental groups, and those who represent other personal
and public interests.524
This would be a democratic, inclusive science project, but it w ould include
experimentation on a grand scale, including "megascience projects for natural
resources that capture the imagination of the best and brightest intellects —
like the Apollo project did for space."525 But, while grand, the science would
still be a people's science —w ith an emphasis on utility and action, rather
than the product of a detached, elite scientific community. According to the
program's video:
New Perspectives research is not some esoteric, test tube
experiment. It is science in action. And when the experiments
are completed, the results are implemented on the ground as
management prescriptions.526
Using the present tense — "the results are implemented" —the film implied
that New Perspectives was already established and involved in the "action" of
applying its science to the better management of national forests. This
assertion was not necessarily true.

The final goal of "sustainable ecosystem management" was purely
political. Salwasser proposed to reduce legal and political opposition to its

524 Ibid., 37.
525 Ibid., 37.
526 U .S.D A Forest Service,Nero Times, New Perspectives
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policies, or in his words, New Perspectives must negate "the ability of spedalinterest groups to play political trum p and legal 'gotcha.'"527 This would
involve several strategies, ranging from an intensive propaganda effort to
recrafting laws and regulations to curb lawsuits and administrative
appeals.528 Among Salwasser's suggestions were mass "education" regarding
forestry issues, shaping "goods and services" to "satisfy the customer," and
developing a mass advertising program. Thus, the agency would "find out
how people get their inform ation and form their opinions and aggressively
enter the game. People m ust know what it takes to produce the things they
desire and at what cost and consequence."529 Given the correct information,
agencies and people could come together to discuss w hat was best for the
forest and the public. In addition, changes in "laws, regulations, and
incentives" would discourage disruption of the planning and management
process by "extremists" and other "unreasonable" people. Since Salwasser
made this statement one year after the 1989 appeals regulation changes,
presumably the agency envisioned additional changes to preclude action by
the irrational elements.530

With "guiding principles" now formulated, the N ew Perspectives team
encouraged field officers to undertake a number of projects -- mostly
demonstration and research projects, or "pilot programs."

By April 1991,

shortly before the Scientific Panel presented its report to Congress, the team
sent out the official charter as well as a "Progress Report" to Regional

527
528
529
530

Salwasser, "Gaining Perspective," 37.
Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 37.
See Chapter Two, "Smokey's Identity Crisis."
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Foresters and Research Station Directors. In a mailer distributed to the
regional offices and research stations, the Washington office pronounced that,
"[m]ost of what will come to characterize New Perspectives is yet to unfold;
most field demonstrations and research projects are still being shaped.
However, a lot has happened so far."531 "A lot" included "silviculture
research," "New Perspectives sessions at leadership team meetings,"
"biodiversity workshops" and conferences, educational projects, inclusions in
regional guides, and "demonstration" projects in ten regions. By this time,
the staff had established its principles and framework and had begun
implementing them.532

Shasta Costa

To implement his newly devised principles for New Perspectives,
Salwasser and his crew used the idea of "project level" planning, wherein the
program would work w ith Forest Supervisors and District Rangers to devise
plans for a controversial roadless area.533 Forest Service personnel would
consult with the public and the timber industry through hearings and
meetings, and the resulting plans w ould reflect the principles of New
Perspectives. The "Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource
Project" (Siskiyou National Forest), one of the agency's first attempts at
instituting New Perspectives, was a telling example of project level planning.
It was a highly controversial and visible project, introducing timber
management and roading into the Shasta Creek drainage roadless area, which
531 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, "Memo: New Perspectives in April," 1.
532 Ibid., 1.
533 Ibid., 1.
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was situated between the Wild Rogue and Kalmiopsis wilderness areas
(though not contiguous to them), and provided significant salmon and trout
habitat. According to an anonymous staff writer at the Inner Voice: "The
creek, a tributary of the Rogue River, is one of the last unsilted spawning
streams in the region, critical for several species of salmon and trout."534

In Spring 1990, after intensively studying, classifying, and m apping the
watershed, the agency released its Draft Environmental Statement for the
Shasta Costa project. The Siskiyou had chosen as its "preferred action"
alternative B, which "incorporate[d] the full array of New Perspectives
concepts, such as m in im iz in g fragmentation, maintaining biological diversity
and habitat connection, and establishing structural integrity of riparian
ecosystem.535 The alternative proposed a 25 percent reduction in timber
harvest from earlier proposals and involved 2-1/2 miles of road off the Burnt
Ridge and Bear Camp roads, which encircled the drainage. According to the
plan, the agency would harvest timber using selection cutting w ith small,
group clearcuts, and remove it using helicopters, existing roads on the
perimeter, and the additional two miles of newly built road.536 But, the
agency "kept its options open" by limiting the plan to a three year planning
horizon, stating that "any shortfall in timber volume cut from the area may
be made up after the 3 year planning period expires."537 Nevertheless the
agency declared that the Shasta Costa planning area was a unique choice for
implementation of the program and that its implementation provided a good
334 Inner Voice, "Forest Service Hedges its Bets," 11.
535 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
S-8.
536 Ibid., S-8.
537 inner Voice, "Forest Service Hedges its Bets," 11.
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example of what the program w as all about. In the agency/s words, the areas
was a "unique area for the exploration of New Perspectives. The Shasta Costa
planning effort offers one of the m ost exhaustive glimpses of New
Perspectives and Forest Plan im plem entation found to date."538

Meanwhile, the team in the W ashington Office was dedicating significant
resources to promoting the image of the Shasta Costa project as a shining
New Perspectives success. In early 1990, for instance, the team publicized a
glossy, color pamphlet on the Shasta project entitled, "New Perspectives on
the Siskiyou National Forest, the Shasta Costa Integrated Resource Project
Landscape Level Approach to Timber Sale Planning." In March, the agency
promoted the project in its promotional video, New Times:

New

Perspectives in Forestry. The video featured Kathy Johnson, district ranger
on the Gold Beach district w ithin which the drainage is situated, Siskiyou
Forest Supervisor, Ron McCormick, and even Forest Service Chief Dale
Robertson. The video placed each of these officers "in the field," discussing
the drainage and the possibilities of New Perspectives. Making several
spoken and visual references to the science and technology involved, the
team had also attempted to portray the project as a democratic process. For
instance, the video situated McCormick, standing in the field, propositioning
the "environmental community" to "roll around together" w ith the Forest
Service. Facing the camera, almost sheepishly, McCormick told the camera:
We want you to join us here, on the ground, and let's roll
around together, in the environm ent, and try to learn together
what's happening here an d how we can work with it in our
management of the N ational Forests.539
538 Ibid., 11.
539 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
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Nevertheless, the Oregon N atural Resources Council announced its
intention to fight the plan in court, and the timber industry criticized it on
the grounds of the planned harvest reduction. Subsequently, the Forest
Service stalled for time, maintaining a period of silence, and the agency
shifted personnel, particularly Johnson and McCormick, removing much of
the official support for the New Perspectives option. According to journalist
Kathie Durbin, "Forest Supervisor Ron McCormick retired, and Kathy
Johnson, a rising star in the Forest Service, was promoted to a job in the
agency's Washington, D .C office [and in] 1991, Mike Lunn replaced
McCormick on the Siskiyou."540 Li March 1991, the agency released its final
EIS, replacing the New Perspectives option for its proposed action. The new
alternative, which the agency declared "best reflects the Capital Investments
and Ten Year Action Plan" called for increased road construction —6.2 miles
—and higher timber harvest levels —17.5 million board feet.541 New
Perspective's role, which was mainly linked to planning by providing a
conceptual basis for "considering the implications of several timber sales,
road and trail construction, fish habitat, and w ater quality improvement
projects from a stand, watershed, and landscape perspective" had been
sidelined.542 The Shasta Costa N ew Perspectives innovation faded into
oblivion, but, undaunted, Salwasser and his team continued to promote the
program and claimed successes.

540 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 130.
541 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
S-8.
542 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, "New Perspectives in the Siskiyou National Forest," 1.
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Marketing the Idea

The agency continued to promote New Perspectives in conventions,
journals, and other media, and the program soon began to attract the
attention of foresters outside the Forest Service. The agency's video used
dramatic images in an attempt to situate the program as the solution to
political conflict and redefine multiple-use in its image.

In an intense introduction — under three minutes long —the film laid out
its entire position. Beginning w ith a dramatic drum rhythm repeated over
and over, increasing in volume as ominous newspaper headlines flashed
into view. First came headlines pertaining to environmentalists: "A blow to
Northwest timber interests —spotted owl study calls for saving vast tracts of
trees," then "Conservationists fight Pacific Coast logging."543

Then followed poignant allusions to the resulting difficulties and
consequences for the working people of Oregon: "Forest Chief assesses owl's
plight," and "390 jobs at Klamath Falls Mill."544 Then the headlines "trade
groups back log export," "drive to save old forests begins," "Senate should
pass old growth bill," and finally "Shortage of logs hurting." At the close of
this segment, a voice-over ominously told the audience, "More an d more
people w ant parts of the national forests reserved for their particular needs
and interests," before fading into Jerry Franklin's promotion of a new
perspectives approach to "sharing the pie." By the end of the video, with the
543 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
544 This sequence cleverly linked these effects to the environmental movement, despite the
existence of several plausible alternative explanations common in the discourse at the time —
for instance lay-offs resulting from increased "worker production" (increased automation).
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folksy music of banjos in the background, Franklin assured the audience that
the various interests were "always gonna have to share the pie... give up
portions of it. There's never gonna be enough pie to go around." Forest users
would "have to share," in what Franklin promised to be "a win-win
situation."545

Three months later, in July, the Forest Service publicized its 1990 Resource
Planning Act Program ("The Forest Service Program for Forest and
Rangeland Resources: A Long-Term Strategic Plan"), promoting the New
Perspectives program as a commitment to new political values. According to
the report, the New Perspectives program "commits the Forest Service to a
broadened sensitivity to ecological and social values in providing a sustained
yield of uses from the national forests and grasslands."546 By September,
when the agency published its color, glossy brochure, "Shasta Costa from a
New Perspective," the agency was apparently confident enough to promote
the belief that New Perspectives was a tested and working system. In a section
titled "Why New Perspectives Works," the agency told readers:
There are several advantages to managing lands with New
Perspectives. First, New Perspectives conserves important
elements of biological diversity on every acre, not just on the
acres that are protected in wilderness. Second, by keeping the
area for resource use large enough, we can use a lighter touch
over a wider area to balance biological needs with social ones.547
The agency continued to spread the word, and even in the environmental,
academic, and professional communities, it found tentative support. In the
545 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, New Times,New Perspectives.
546 USDA Forest Service, Forest Service Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources: A LongTerm Strategic Plan, 1990," 5-7, in Rockwell, "RPA —The Sleeping Giant,"ll.
547 USDA, Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Shasta Costa From a New Perspective,
15.
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Inner Voice, the reader could find endorsements of New Perspectives. For
example, in a series on New Forestry, Ken Foss, "a Forest Service veteran of
13 years" and timber sale planner on the Wenatchee National Forest
(Washington), touted New Forestry as a new "state of mind" and "a way out"
of "this mess."548 New Forestry, he exclaimed, involved "the global
perspective."549

Alan McQuillan, University of M ontana professor of forest planning and
management — formerly a for Champion International Corporation resource
analyst and Forest Service economist — proclaimed New Perspectives to be
"Forestry for a Post-Modern Age."550 The new approach would open up new
possibilities for meeting the various political demands — for instance
dem ands for "ethical considerations."551 McQuillan wrote:
Post-modern forestry is not abandoning reason but has already
progressed beyond mechanistic science to embrace ethical
considerations. ... New Perspectives opens up an exciting range
of possibilities, an opportunity to flesh out an entire spectrum of
styles of forest management, providing for an eclectic mix of
desires. This is the promise of post-modernism.552
McQuillaii attended several professional association meetings in w hich
the New Perspectives program was a m ain focus of discussion. McQuillan, to
whom the terms "new perspectives" and "new forestry" were "becoming
interchangeable," wrote that "New Forestry, like perestroika, has attained a
level of popular support within the profession's public sector from which

5^8
5*9
550
551
552

Foss, "New Forestry —a State of Mind," 4.
Foss, "The Global Perspective," 10.
McQuillan, "New Perspectives."
Ibid., 14.
Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

192
there can be no retreat."553 For example. New Perspectives was prominent at
an industry-sponsored Western Forestry Conservation Association (WFCA)
Annual Meeting in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho (December 1990), at the Montana
Society of American Foresters' Annual Meeting (March 1991), at the Western
Forest Economists' Annual Meeting in Wemme, Oregon (May 1991), where
the New Times, New Perspectives video was shown, and at the Wilderness
Society's "Defining Sustainable Forestry" workshop (January, 1992).554
Subsequent meetings also focused upon New Perspectives, including WFCA's
"Seeking Common Ground" conference in Portland, O regon during February
1992 and again at the annual Montana SAF meeting in Kalispell during
March.555

Meanwhile, Salwasser was continuing his own campaign to promote the
program, which he claims was gaining support.

In December, 1991, the

Forest Service had "repeated, in Roanoke, Virginia, what we had done in
Philadelphia." He added:
In, Philadelphia w e'd invited a bunch of people in to help us
shape what we ought to do; in Roanoke, two years later, we
brought some of the same people back, b u t not entirely the same
group, b u t the same type of venue, where we had half nonForest Service people and we did a show and tell and basically
said "here is w hat we have put together in the field. Here are
the kinds of things people have done, here’s what it looks like."
... And in the workshop setting after the show-and-tell, the
message came back strongly to us: "adopt Ecosystem
Management as the Forest Service operating philosophy, and
focus around a set of principles.556
553 McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings," 192. McQuillan actually presented the paper in early
1992, but it did not appear in print until 1993.
554 Ibid., 212, fn.6.
555 Ibid., 212, fn.6.
556 Salwasser, "Interview," 8.
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In early 1992 the New Perspectives staff was willing to advocate for
expanding the scope of its activities. According to Salwasser, "as we got well
into this and it became increasingly d ear that this set of ideas and prindples
was practical, was working alright, and there was enough field evidence that
we could embrace the set of prindples as an operating philosophy."557

At the same time, the Washington Office was promoting the New
Perspectives on an international basis. A1 West, Assodate Chief for Private
and State Forestry, "was involved as the lead forest person w ith a Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) group, United Nations FAO Regional
Commission on Forestry. FAO's got these regional commissions all over the
world, and w e're in the North America Commission with Mexico and
Canada." West arranged for the United States presentation at the North
American Commission meeting to focus upon the Forest Service New
Perspectives program. Hal Salwasser also "enlisted the help of a person in
research, nam ed Tom Snellgrove, who is involved with forest products and
harvesting systems and Doug MacCleary, who is an Assistant Director of
Timber Management, and who has spent a part of his career as a political
appointee as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Agricultural Office,
overseeing the Forest Service." According to Salwasser, the "paper was given
in February of '92 in Cancun at the regional commission meeting and Dale
was there," where it was "well received" by the Mexican and Canadian
delegations.558

557 Ibid., 5.
558 Ibid., 6.
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By March 1992, the New Perspectives team was ready to move beyond
pilot projects and encourage the directorate to adopt the program on a fullscale level. It would make a proposal to agency professionals at a Forest
Service workshop in Salt Lake City. Because of the highly charged political
atmosphere, Salwasser decided to proceed cautiously, assembling a team to
draft the politically testy proposal and getting approval through the
Washington office directorate before presenting it to the meeting. Salwasser
later recalled using an address given by Jim Overbay, the Deputy Chief for
National Forest System, at a "soils and water type" workshop in Salt Lake
City, March of 1992 as a forum for introducing new perspectives as a policy.
Overbay noted:
And we used the opportunity of his key note address to this
workshop —it was a soil and water type workshop —to lay out as
a trial balloon, so to speak, the idea that it was time to adopt
these principles as Forest Service policies and not just a pilot
program. A team of people worked on writing his speech. Many
of the people who worked on writing his speech were the same
people who developed the charter for the New Perspectives
program about a year and a half earlier.559
Because Salwasser and Overbay perceived the event —introducing New
Perspectives as a major policy initiative to a group of agency professionals —
to be politically sensitive, they routed the speech through the Washington
Office staff for approval, an unconventional process. According to Salwasser,
"we knew that this speech was a policy sensitive kind of speech."560 He added
that the speech was important insofar as it tested internal receptivity to the
New Perspectives framework which ultimately metamorphosed into
"Ecosystem M anagem ent" Of the event, Salwasser reminisces: "Internally

559 Ibid., 5.
560 Ibid.
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that was a major deal. That was the speech that got the Forest Service ready to
accept w hat Dale d id a couple of months later."561 Salwasser and his team
had prepared the w ay for the agency to adopt New Perspectives, or
(ultimately), at least a similar program under a new name, based on
principles synthesized during the program's short two years of existence.

The N ew Perspectives promotion touched upon many politically
significant signifiers — "Science," particularly the language of "landscape
ecology" and "conservation biology," "Adaptive Management," health and
diversity, and an end to "legal gotcha" to name a few. The controversial issue
of clearcut logging w as conspicuously absent, which was no accident.
According to Salwasser, the directorship was "trying to maintain a distance
between the New Perspectives, which was managing land for diversity with
science/management teamwork —with partnerships and all that stuff —and
clear cutting which is technical practice. But it didn't work. The switch away
from clear cutting kept getting cast as a part of what N ew Perspectives was all
about."562

Clearcutting was not merely a "technical practice," it was part of a larger
production system vigorously promoted (as a political agenda) by the timber
industry and opposed by environmental activists. Thus, any policy on
clearcutting was a political product, much like the political products
associated w ith the N ew Perspectives program, reformed resource policy, for
instance. The boundaries between the two policy areas rem ained unclear. As
the controversy around the Forest Service evolved, the issues involved in
561 Ibid., 16.
562 Ibid., 10.
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New Perspectives and those around clear cut logging became more tightly
associated, despite Robertson's efforts to the contrary. In August, 1991,
"Senator Pryor, alarmed about clear cutting in the South having an effect on
forest diversity, asked to go out in the field with the Chief, on a summer day
in August, Dale Robertson and Senator Pryor went for a walk in the woods."
According to Salwasser, Dale Robertson went "for a walk in the woods in
Arkansas" and came out w ith "an agreement to change the clear cutting
policy of the agency."563

Increasingly, Robertson was having to cope with demands for change
w ithin the agency. Congressional members were directly summ oning him to
force the Forest Service to discontinue practices known as conventional for 50
years. By political circumstance, clear cut logging was a New Perspectives
issue, and in the near future, it would be an ecosystem management issue.

Criticism and Dissent

The N ew Perspectives program itself emerged through a process of political
negotiation, maneuvering, and propagandizing, mainly by members of the
Washington office —who resided in a hostile political milieu — but also
involving officers in the field and regional offices. As could be expected, it
drew criticism and opposition from the timber industry as well.

A n early criticism from the "old school" of forestry came from William
Atkinson, head of the forest engineering program at the Oregon State

563 Ibid., 9.
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University and the manager of its School of Forestry's experimental forest
Atkinson presented a paper titled "Another View of New Forestry" at the
May, 1990 Annual Meeting of the Society of American Forests in Eugene,
Oregon. The paper, which was as much a bitter commentary on the effects of
environmentalism on national forest management as it was a critique of
New Forestry and its application (i.e., New Perspectives), lambasted the
program for its political nature as well as what Atkinson perceived as its lack
of technical and scientific credibility. Atkinson began his speech with a
sarcastic tone, arguing that the system was not new, but rather, "it has been
around for years —we have just called it a 'Real Estate C ut'."564

Portraying the program as being technically absurd and untenable,
Atkinson directly alluded to it as a product of academics out of touch with the
realities of forestry. He dismissed its application as a product of political
expediency, and further noted:
You don't see anyone asking forest engineers, forest economists
or practical operating people what they think about New
Forestry. I have been wondering "why this lack of debate?" and
have come to the conclusion that nobody took these people
seriously. New Forestry was dreamed up by academics working
as a closed group on the HJ Andrews Forest. Most of us felt that
nobody in their right mind would actually practice this stuff.
But it turns out today that not only are people applying New
Forestry across the landscape but proponents of N ew Forestry
have been successful in catching the ears of some very
influential people. People such as the Chief of the Forest
Service, supervisors of National Forests and regional foresters.
The academics had a program when the Forest Service badly
needed a program. So now we are all charging off to practice
New Forestry.565

5*^ Atkinson, "Another View of New Forestry," 1.
565 Ibid.
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Atkinson claimed that this political "charging off and practicing something
new in forestry" was an example of a "lemming effect/' where "we all move
in the same direction at once without a whole lot of thought and caught up in
the spirit."566

Atkinson developed "five points" to his argument, the first being that
"New Forestry is obsolete."567 Here, Atkinson criticized the agency's
redefinition of multiple use to mean "managing for several uses on the same
piece of forest land."568

According to this argument, Congress had already

rejected this view in the 1960s and 1970s. At best, new forestry was an ill
attempt at residing between these two approaches to multiple use. His second
point was that new forestry obscured "the Real Issue," which was "a loss of
land base for commercial forestry," resulting from the political appropriation
of the landscape, especially by "resource specialists." According to Atkinson, a
"major problem that we have in forestry today is the locking up of our
timberlands, which results in the loss of commercial forest land base.
Contributing to this loss of land base are the various resource specialists
(fisheries and wildlife biologists, hydrologists, etc.) who are carving out their
own set of land withdrawals."569

Next, alluding to a looming timber famine in Oregon, Atkinson
sarcastically lamented that "the wood supply situation is too serious for
Hobby Silviculture."570 According to Atkinson, "we are in deep sheepdip
566
567
568
569
570

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid.
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regarding wood supply in Oregon."571 In an emotional summary appealing
to the specter of social collapse, the author claimed: 'T h is is a shocking
situation! We are looking at nothing less than social calam ity/'572 Then
Atkinson claimed that the application of new forestry was a technical
"disaster," owing to increased harvesting costs, "the loss of revenue and
decreased yields," windfall damage, "damage to residual trees from logging
and site preparation," and hazards to worker health from snags and
blowdowns, in addition to environmental concerns such as soil
compaction.573 Atkinson's recommendation, articulated in his final point,
was to "modify plantation forestry" —including the continuation of
clearcutting: "I think we ought to use clear cuts except in areas that are
visually sensitive."574

One of Atkinson's most poignant arguments concerned the fast tracking of
new forestry in defiance of conventional scientific process. According to
Atkinson, conventional, science-based research management, moved in an
orderly process from constructing a "research hypothesis," to
experimentation, to statistical tests, to conclusions, to interpretation, to field
trials, to "evaluation and change," and finally to "operational
im plem entation."575 Atkinson wrote that new forestry practitioners have
replaced m uch of this process with the production of substanceless political
rhetoric — "an end run around the right w ay to establish new practices." He
added:
571
572
573
574
575
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They start w ith a research hypothesis, experiment, draw a
conclusion and jump right into operational implementation on
a large scale. And in between is a great deal of hype with
scientists running around the halls of Congress, banging on
doors in order to get their system in place. Completely lacking is
the operational testing that is needed.576
Atkinson restated his critique in a winter 1992 article titled, "Silvicultural
Correctness: the politicalization of Forest Science," in 'Western Wildlands
(published by the University of Montana's School of Forestry). He concluded
that forest managers could and would have to choose between selfishness,
emotion and politics on one hand, and science and objective management on
the other —the new versus the old. Atkinson clearly sided with the latter:
We have a choice. We can determine future forest practices
based on personal values, emotion and selfish political
expediency. O r we can apply the best available biological and
operational knowledge to meet honestly debated public goals. It
is time to stand up and fight for proper resource management.577
Atkinson's criticism of the substitution of politics for scientific process
involved in new forestry and its application cut directly to one of New
Perspective's claims to legitimacy —its purported scientific basis. O ther critics,
particularly environmentalists, also pointed to the political nature of the
program. After attending one of Salwasser's New Perspectives workshops,
AFSEE leader Jeff Debonis and other agency employees questioned whether or
not the program was not another "smoke and mirrors public relations games
typical of past Forest Service responses to the public's calls for reform."578

576 Ibid., 8.
577 Atkinson, "Silvicultural Correctness," 12.
57^ In Hirt, Conspiracy, 285; Debonis, "New Perspectives," 8.
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DeBonis found the program's language to be unacceptably vague and
lacking in support from the Washington office. He wrote:
There seem to be no specifics from the Washington Office about
what the Forest Service will do to become a more "environ
mentally sensitive" organization. The N ew Perspectives
initiative appears to be a volunteer effort on behalf of individual
forests and districts to do w hat they can to buck the status quo.
Other than Hal and his NP staff, there doesn't appear to be a real
push from the WO to really change the status quo from the
top.579
In Sierra magazine, Peter Zuckerman wrote, "Working in the gray area
between preservation and all-out logging, N ew Forestry was devised to satisfy
demands both for healthy forests and for an adequate wood supply. That is
precisely its seductive appeal and its gravest threat."580 In regard to the New
Perspectives program in Ouachita National Forest, Arkansas, the Sierra Club's
southern plains representative proclaimed, "It's just the same old clearcutting
with a little gloss. ... New Perspectives? We call it new PR."581 Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, in
Congressional hearings in April 1991, criticized the agency, exclaiming that
"You cannot have 'N ew Perspectives' and at the same time have a 66 percent
increase in the Green Mountain's timber sale program. That is contradictory
and it has to stop."582 Despite Salwasser's promotion and New Perspectives'
apparent "popular support within the profession's public sector," skeptics
remained, w ithin industry as well as within the environmental groups.583
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Concluding Remarks

Criticism notwithstanding, Salwasser continued to market New
Perspectives, which, soon enough, would evolve into Ecosystem
Management. Robertson's and Salwasser's Cancun New Perspectives speech
went well, as had others, and advocates of its methods continued to be
emboldened. New Perspectives staff —especially Salwasser -- continued to
press Robertson to expand the scope of the program as well as adopting the
"terminology of Ecosystem Management," which was soon to supplant New
Perspectives. According to Salwasser, "I don’t recall that we were offering
[New Perspectives] at the time as an alternative —as an Ecosystem
Management. But clearly the Ecosystem concept was in our minds and maybe
even in the writings if you pull up some of the old documents from that
time. Even the charter, you may find Ecosystem in there."584 The New
Perspectives program was in place, its principles and terminology almost
worked out, and all that awaited the transition to "Ecosystem Management"
was a policy decision by Chief Robertson and his superiors.

584 Salwasser, "Interview," 3.
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Chapter 8
ForestWorld, a Policy Spectacle

To live and let live is the public's motto,
And it's the public that I want to please.
The tent is up, the stage is set,
People are ready for a real treat.
They're sitting here already, open-eyed,
Placid, and waiting to be wonder-struck.
I've learned to give the public what it wants,
But never before have I been so embarrassed:
O f course, they're not accustomed to the best —
But just the same, they've read an awful lot!
What can we do to have things fresh and new,
Significant and entertaining too?
— Goethe
Manager speaking to the
Poet, Prelude to Faust

Several people involved w ith the creation of ecosystem management —
for instance, Jerry Franklin, George Leonard, Hal Salwasser, and Jack Ward
Thomas — have suggested that the N ew Perspectives program served as a
bureaucratic pilot project to ecosystem management.585 But, high profile as it
was, its inception did not signal a major policy shift, but more of a policy
experiment — a sort of political adaptive management. The actual policy shift
required the kind of political pressure that soon came to bear upon the Forest
Service and its Chief, Dale Robertson. This chapter will trace that shift in the
context of politics internal to the agency, as well as the politics of national and
international politics from the standpoint of the presidency.

585 por instance, Franklin, "Interview," Leonard, "Interview," Salwasser, "Interview,"
Thomas, "Interview."
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Robertson Bites the Bullet

In March, 1992, Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson "was still not ready to
accept Ecosystem M anagement terminology," nor was he "comfortable with
acknowledging Ecosystem Management as an operating philosophy."586 On
the other hand, through the promotional efforts of H al Salwasser and other
New Perspectives staffers, the "Ecosystem Management" moniker was
gaining support in the Forest Service. Even Salwasser proclaimed, "people
were talking about it more openly. ... There were rumblings from field units
here and there. A nd obviously in the scientific held the concept had been
around for at least a decade, because there were even books written about
it. "587

Salwasser and the New Perspectives team soon convinced themselves that
the time was right to adopt ecosystem management as official Forest Service
Policy. In Roanoke, Virginia, where the Forest Service had organized a New
Perspectives "workshop," Salwasser recalls, "after the show-and-tell, the
message came back strongly to us: adopt Ecosystem Management as the
Forest Service operating philosophy, and focus around a set of principles.588"
Salwasser continued to lobby Robertson, and by the time of the FAO Regional
Commission Meeting, the Chief had somewhat softened his position, perhaps
influenced by favorable response horn the Canadian and Mexican delegation
586 Salwasser, "Interview," 8.
587 Salwasser, "Interview," 8. See for instance, Van Dyne's edited book, The Ecosystem
Concept in Natural Resource Management, published in 1969, as an early linkage of the
signifiers, "ecosystem" and "management"
588 Salwasser,, "Interview," 8.
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regarding the "New Perspectives" paper. According to Salwasser, the paper,
which outlined the Forest Service New Perspectives program, "was really
well received by the Canadians and the Mexicans, who complimented the
Chief profusely over what the United States was doing w ith this ecosystem
approach."589 The "ecosystem approach" was gaining enough political
popularity and legitimacy for Salwasser to approach Robertson with the
proposition of adopting ecosystem management as Forest Service Policy.
Salwasser describes a brief meeting w ith Robertson on a resort beach in
Mexico in which Robertson finally seemed somewhat amenable to shifting
agency policy towards ecosystem management. Salwasser stated:
The afternoon after I gave this talk, I was walking along the
beach there —Cancun is a phenomenal resort area —and Dale
and his wife were lounging in some recliner chairs out along
this beach. And I walked up to him and said "Dale, I would like
to talk to you about something. The substance about what we
talked about yesterday was really well received, and I used the
term 'Ecosystem Management' frequently in explaining what we
were doing. I think i t s time that the Forest Service adopt the
Ecosystem Management terminology for what it is we're moving
towards, and that we shape it, rather than let somebody else
define w hat it is and then us having to live with that definition
and not being able to make it m esh with our other legal
mandates, we should embrace the terminology and at least play a
part in shaping what it comes to mean." ... And my recollection
was that he said, "Well, we'll think about it." It was the first
time that he didn't say "No, we won’t do Ecosystem
Management, and we aren't going to use those words."590
Salwasser had begun to sway Robertson by appealing to political
pragmatism. In arguing that the Forest Service "should embrace the
terminology and at least play a part in shaping what [ecosystem management]
comes to mean," he had im plied that confronting the signifier of ecosystem

589 Ibid., 6.
590 Ibid., 7.
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management was inevitable; ecosystem management would "come to mean"
something, and the agency would be better off if it were to define that
something. Robertson now had good practical reason for adopting the policy,
and all he needed was permission from the presidential administration, itself
feeling the nudge of national environmental politics.

Smoky and the President

Robertson would now have to reckon w ith administrative politics if he
were to move the Forest Service managem ent tow ard Ecosystem
Management. He was aware that, before the Forest Service could ever address
"a major policy issue like moving into Ecosystem Management," he w ould
have "to get clearance through [his] political bosses — the Assistant Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture, and in this case, the White
H ouse."591 To Robertson, getting "clearance" involved a negotiation,
depending upon the Forest Service's knowledge of w hat policy should be, as
well as its ability to persuade his administrative superiors: "a big part of the
Chiefs job is to figure out what the federal polity oughta be for the Forest
Service and bring around his political bosses to support that."592 W hichever
routes influence took, Robertson ultimately had to answer to "his political
bosses," who in turn were subordinate to the president —politics as usual.

This chain of command was not new. The Forest Service is part of the
executive branch, and it has been "after all, a federal bureaucracy, and

591591 Robertson, "Interview," 10.
592 Ibid., 10.
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accordingly, it was affected by the flow of power in the government."593 One
source of this "power" is control over spending; all agencies have been
subject to the powerful mechanism of executive budget review since the 1921
Budget Act, "which changed the U.S. government from a series of quasi
independent departments to a governm ent under the control of the President
and his chief financial officer, the Director on the Budget which presented a
unified governmental position on financial and policy matters to
Congress."594

Since then, presidential adm inistrations have been able to exercise general
powers over the federal bureaucracies through such mechanisms as
reviewing, enhancing, or cutting budgets, eliminating programs w ithin an
agency, instituting (or ignoring regulations) and so forth. In the case of
presidential administrations and the Forest Service, "[djespite increases in
funding and personnel, the budget has been used to emphasize specific
resource values and to de-emphasize others."595 Thus, a "review of changes
between 1981 and 1983 shows the use of the budget system for policy
purposes," the former reflecting President Carter's policy, the latter reflecting
Ronald Reagan's policy, which increased budgeted timber activities, while
decreasing recreation and wildlife management budgets.596

Further, laws written to govern the activities of federal bureaucracies
almost always delegate authority to the Secretary of the D epartm ent in which
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the agency is situated. For the Forest Service, this means Congress has
delegated administration through the Secretary of Agriculture (who governs
through an Assistant Deputy Secretary). For instance, in the Multiple
Use/Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Congress states that "the Secretary of
Agriculture is authorized and directed to develop and adm inister the
renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use and
sustained yield," while in the NFMA, Congress delegates authority to "the
Secretary of Agriculture, under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe."597 In 1982 the Reagan administration used its powers of
prescription in revising the Carter administration's 1979 NFMA rules,
"because Reagan administration officials felt that the 1979 regulations did not
insure that forest planners adequately considered economic impacts."598

In this context, the Department of Agriculture has long since occupied an
im portant space in the U.S. Forest Service's Washington Office, as well as
dictating to the agency through adm inistrative orders.599 Speaking of the
Reagan administration's oversight of the Forest Service, policy professor
Steven Yaffee writes:
Congressional inquiries are always viewed as important items
for agency response, but their impact on decisionmaking can be
blunted. Inquiries from Executive-level political bosses are
much more serious, and Reagan administration appointees were
mobilized to pressure the FS on its owl direction. For example,
John Crowell, Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture in charge of the Forest service , and former
Louisiana-Pacific executive in Oregon, wrote a memo to FS Chief

597 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, and National Forest Management Act of 1976.
59® Yaffee, Wisdom, 68.
599 Mumma, "Interview,” 6.
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Max Peterson in July 1981 that can only be interpreted as political
pressure."600
The memo claimed that early spotted owl set-asides, suggested by regional
staffers, involved unacceptably high timber trade-offs and that "the guidelines
need to be very carefully reviewed. Reduction in the num ber of pairs of
spotted owls to be protected on each forest should be considered, and the
number assigned to each forest be located in areas adjacent to similar areas in
adjoining forests."601 Thus, the administration pursued a policy of
"encouraging the resource management agencies to retrench toward their
core technologies —commodity production for the USFS and BLM, and game
animal managem ent for the FWS."602

The Reagan administration, in exercising its influence upon the Forest
Service further instituted this practice of political control, played upon by the
following administration of president George Bush. Bush, having worked
the language of environmentalism into his campaign platform, would
eventually depend heavily upon this influence, not only in regard with the
Forest Service, but with other bureaucracies as well.

The Environmental President

In 1988, presidential candidate, George Bush, had told the press that he
would be America's premier "Environmental President." Bush pledged,
for instance, that there would be "no net loss of wetlands," that he would
600 Yaffee, Wisdom, 65.
601 Crowley, John. Assistant Secretary of State. 1981. Memo to FS Chief Max Peterson. July.
In Yaffee, Wisdom, 65.
602 Yaffee, Wisdom, 158.
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work on a global w anning treaty, and that he would help to tighten clean
air provisions.603

Upon being elected, he set to work assuring Americans

that the anti-environmentalist "counterrevolution" w as over. The Bush
administration drafted legislation to strengthen the Clean Air Act and
hosted an international meeting to begin drafting a global w arm ing treaty.
In addition, Bush appointed William K. Reilly —who had recently
directed the World Wildlife Fund —as administrator of the EPA, and he
promised to give the agency cabinet status. He publicly supported a
moratorium on offshore oil drilling, and he included in his budget the
money for a major reforestation program.604

But, soon, President Bush's policy record began to appear less
environmentally friendly, as he began publicly lamenting the costs of
environmental regulations.605 Soon the Bush adm inistration's policy of
actively opposing environmental regulation inspired harsh criticism. The
conflict took place on many levels —in the courts, in Congress, in the press, in
the federal bureaucracies — with the administration focusing on
administrative regulations as well as legislative and litigative strategies.

A major Bush strategy w as to order constraints upon an agency's
regulation proposal process, largely by overseeing and reviewing proposed
regulations and by instituting (through executive order) rules for accepting or
rejecting the administrative statute. For instance, Bush retained two
significant executive orders from the Reagan presidency lim iting new
603 Shabecoff, p. 251-56.
604 Ibid.
605 Shabecoff, p. 252.
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administrative laws proposals. One order required an agency to use "a formal
cost benefit analysis... prior to formal proposal of major regulations, defined
as having an annual impact on the economy of at least $100 million." The
order required agency to determine w hether or not "the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society/' and to
choose w hether or not to adopt them based upon the outcome of that
calculus. The second order required agencies to "to develop an annual
regulatory agenda for submission to OMB and to indicate how their programs
were consistent with the president's ow n agenda." Critics condemned the
orders because, first, the construction of cost/benefit analyses was a political
process, and second, they gave the OMB a wide breadth of review, another
political process.606

In addition to retaining the Reagan-era executive orders, the Bush
adm inistration used other working groups to oversee the introduction of
new regulations or grant exceptions to old ones, with the explicit mission of
encouraging "economic growth." Most notorious was the "Council on
Competitiveness," headed by Vice-President Dan Quayle. In June, 1990, Bush
chartered the Council to search for and eradicate regulations or grant
exceptions w hen deemed reasonable from a business point of view. Through
the "council," the adm inistration was able to diminish the effect of
am endments to the Clean Air Act that Bush supported and signed. The
council also provided the context for the "wetlands dispute," w herein it
attem pted to broaden the EPA's definition of wetlands to open up to

606 Shabecoff, p. 219.
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commercial use "between 30 and 90 percent of currently protected
wetlands."607

In response, "tens of thousands" of environmentalists sent comments,
opposing the policy, and scientific organizations entered the conflict. The
National Academy of Sciences issued a report that recommended an end to
loss of wetlands and a program for wetland restoration.608 Nevertheless, EPA
director Reilly succumbed to political pressure and changed the definition.
Eventually, the council's aggressive stance against environmental protection
resulted in its members being summoned to extensive congressional hearings
in 1991, which did not daunt the administration; in January 1992, Bush
ordered a 90-day "regulatory moratorium," which he "continued in April for
four additional months as the November election approached."609

Bush continued to pursue policy that ran counter to the environmental
image he had attempted to construct. In 1991, Bush attem pted to work
through Congress to promote his "National Energy Strategy," which included
provisions to develop oil extraction in the Artie National Wildlife Refuge.
He rejected proposed conservation measures on the advice of his economic
advisors. "The nation's press portrayed the Bush plan as shortsighted and
timid," and environmentalists successfully lobbied for defeat of the bill.610
During the same year, Bush led the United States into w ar against Iraq,
bombing dozens of oil production plants as well as public infrastructure,
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creating enormous toxic pollution in regional air and waters and further
m arring Bush's environmental legacy.

Bush and Trees

Towards the end of his presidency, Bush's position was clear regarding
how much public old-growth forest would be open to logging: "It's time to
put people ahead of owls."611 By this time, Bush presented the issue in terms
of "jobs versus the environment," defining the problem as politics —or,
"environmental extremists."612 Pursuing this policy stance, the
administration refused to accept the findings of the court mandated
Interagency Scientific Committee (and later, the Congressionally summoned
"Scientific Panel") or the Fish and Wildlife Service produced
"Recommendations for Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl." Instead, it
opted to construct its own plan for BLM lands and national forests, which it
introduced at a news conference in July 1990 as the "Five-point Plan to
Preserve Owl (sic) and Protect Jobs." The News conference coincided with
another —held directly before —announcing "the President's decision to
curtail offshore oil drilling off California, Oregon, Washington, Florida, and
New England's Georges Bank."613

According to one historical interpretation, the administration was
responding to electoral politics: "Noone believed that the two decisions were
unrelated. Rather, they appeared to give one to the environmentalists and
Ibid., 169.
612 Ibid., 169.
613 Yaffee, Wisdom, 128.
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one to the developers."614 Gubernatorial and Congressional elections were
approaching, some of which would be sensitive to decisions regarding owl
management or off-shore drilling. For instance, in Oregon, sensitive to the
owl issue, Mark Hatfield was running for reelection, and in California and
Florida, Pete Wilson and Robert Martinez, respectively, were running for
governor's seats.615

The Bush administration appeared to be pursuing a "train-wreck strategy"
concerning the owl issue, hoping to create a situation where either logging
would virtually cease, and an agency head would convene the Endangered
Species Committee (or "God Squad"), or ultimately Congress w ould be forced
to revise the Endangered Species Act, which was u p for reauthorization in
1992 (reelection year).616 A special reporter to The New York Times wrote a
story regarding the White House rejection of the ISC owl plan alluded to this
political strategy of sabotaging the ESA by dramatically raising its costs:
The reason, White House aides say, is that the Administration is
intent on using the timber struggle to loosen the Endangered
Species Act, which it says restricts economic developm ent and
intrudes on the lives of citizens. Saying that he w anted to bypass
the law, Interior Secretary M anuel Lujan Jr. cast the struggle in
the Northwest as one that p u t a few little owls in the path of
thousands of jobs.617
The problem did not go away. In January 1992, the New York Times
reporting that, "politics reign at spotted owl hearing," wrote about a turn of

614 Yaffee's methodology of triangulating between newspaper reports and conjecture begs the
question that much of history begs: what constitutes legitimate evidence?
615 Ibid., 129.
616 Ibid., 136-40.
617 Schneider, "Bush and Congress Facing a Showdown on Forests," New York Times., May 12,
1992, A14.
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events wherein the EPA w ithdrew evidence, apparently due to political
pressure:
[T]he hearings here by the panel, the Endangered Species
Committee, concerning the northern spotted owl were only a
few minutes old w hen it became dominated by internal conflicts
of the Bush A dm inistration over environm ental policies.
Today, in a surprise move, the EPA, which has harshly criticized
Government policies that favor logging in the Pacific Northwest,
abruptly w ithdrew from the hearings... taking w ith it some of
the most crucial evidence on behalf of saving the owl.618
During the same month, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service announced
that its final designated spotted owl habitat would am ount to 6.9 million acres
~ down from its earlier proposal of 11.6 million acres. Interior Secretary
Lujan, already involved w ith the ESA committee, responded by announcing
that he was "delaying release of a comprehensive recovery plan for the owl
and convening a new task force to develop recovery alternatives."619 In
February, Lujan had announced formation of the team, proclaiming that he
intended for it "to develop ways both to save the owl and to lim it job losses in
the Northwest tim ber industry," although implementation w ould involve
legislative changes to exem pt certain tim ber operations from environmental
laws.620

According to the Washington Post, "[t]hose alternatives

presumably w ould entail fewer job losses," while "jettisoning the goal of
rebuilding the owl population in favor of merely stabilizing it."621

618 "Politics Reign at Spotted Owl Hearing," New York Times, Jan. 9,1992, A,14.
619 "Interior Secretary at Center of Storm Over Handling of Owl Controversy," Washington
Post, March 22,1992, A8.
620 "Luhan to Name Third Panel on Northern Spotted Owl," Washington Post, Feb. 19,1992,
A2.
621 "Interior Secretary at Center of Storm Over Handling of Owl Controversy," Washington
Post, March 22,1992, A8.
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In May 1992, the "Cabinet-level" ESA committee, which Secretary Lujan
had convened and was a member of, "voted 5 to 2 to waive the requirements
of the endangered species law and allow logging on 13 federally owned tracts
of timberland."622 Lujan finally announced an alternative owl plan calling
for protection of 5.4 million acres —compared to the FWS's 6.9 million acres —
as well as calling upon Congress to make changes in the Endangered Species
Act, which was up for reauthorization. Without Congressional action within
60 days, and barring court interference, the plan w ould become law and take
effect. A Newsweek article called the policy "a vote against preservation" and
"a sad parable of hypocrisy and hyperbole," characterizing it a political
compromise of "complying w ith the ESA even as [the administration] moved
to weaken it."623 Calling the "God Squad" decision "pure politics,"
environmentalists sued the Bush administration on procedural grounds
including the neglect of more benign alternatives.624

Unpopularity Polls

Apparently the strategy did not reflect well upon Bush's popularity in this
election year; the Bush administration's public image as the "environmental
president" no longer appeared so "environmental." The New York Times
published results of a May 1992 poll it had co-conducted with CBS News,
remarking upon "Mr. Bush's low ratings on environmental issues, with 31
percent [of respondents] saying they approved of the President's
622 "White House on Conflicting Paths as it Agrees to Protection for Owl," New York Times,
May 15,1992, A l.
623 Hager, "A Vote Against Preservation," 83.
624 "Lawsuit asserts Interior D ept Acted Illegally on Spotted Owl," Washington Post, June 11,
1992, A10.
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environmental policies and 55 percent saying they disapproved."625 Accurate
or not, the survey portrayed Bush's public image as inadequate. According to
the widely read New York newspaper:
A sizable majority of those surveyed said they felt that Mr. Bush
talked more about protecting the environment than he had
accomplished. Seventy percent said the President had been
insincere in his expression of support for environmental issues,
as against 19 percent who said they believed he had made
progress.
This represents an erosion of Mr. Bush's already low standing on
the environment from early in 1990, when 24 percent of those
surveyed said they felt progress had been made, while 62 percent
said he had just talked about the issue but had done little or
nothing about i t 626
During the same month in 1992, "a Gallup poll indicated that the
public disapproved of his handling of the environment by a two to one
margin."627 In the midst of his re-election campaign, Bush was viewed as
having failed to meet promises made in his prior campaign. According to
one historical interpretation, the Bush administration was unable to
depart from the strong political legacy left over from the Reagan
presidency, resulting in "deep internal divisions over the direction of
environmental policy" and his inability to keep campaign promises.628
By the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, where Bush's footdragging on
issues of biological diversity and global warming drew strong criticism —
internationally as well as nationally — the "environmental community"
considered the presidency a "great disappointment."629
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By June, 1992, President Bush was well into his re-election campaign and
less than five months away from the November elections. Hoping to attract
votes from w hite educated business types, the Bush re-election committee
had to take account of environmentalist urbane political values that were
popular even with many Republicans. But, by this time, Bush's policy record
was widely interpreted as anti-environmentalist. The adm inistration needed
to take speedy action to signify a concern for "the environm ent" without
compromising his opposition to the regulation of industry and economic
growth. Bush needed to present himself as an environm ental anti
environmentalist, which he did not succeed in doing, at least from the
perspective of environmentalists as well as some of the major newspapers.
The Forest Service, however, offered him a timely opportunity for attempting
this feat.

The President Goes to Rio

In 1992, the United Nations produced the Conference on Environmental
Development (UNCED) — or, "the earth summit"630 — in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, to "discuss" "sustainable development," a "global forest convention,"
"technology cooperation," "protection of marine environm ent," "man-made
pollution," "biological diversity" and "whatnot."

Later, in his address to the

conference, Bush would optimistically claim that "today, an unprecedented
era of peace, freedom, and stability makes concerted action on the
environment possible as never before."631
630 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S. News and World Report, June22,1992,20.
631 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
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But from the beginning, conflict, not harmony, characterized the
conference and preparatory meetings called "PrepCom." According to U.S.
News & World Report, "George Bush never wanted to go to Rio. He feared
that his conservative approach to environmental issues would only spark
hostility from Germany, Japan, and other nations."632 As early as February, a
Bush appointee, Curtis Bohlen, "Assistant Secretary for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs," told the House Foreign
Affairs Committee that the president w ould not compromise regarding
"economic growth" and "economic objectives." As Bush later stated at the
conference, "we realize that growth is the engine of change and the friend of
the environm ent."633 Early on, Bohlen established the administration's
opposition to a proposed biodiversity treaty, telling Congress, "some countries
are seeking to use the convention to regulate biotechnology, a position the
United States cannot accept."634

In the same month, George Woodwell, director of the Woods Hole
Research Center and Kilaparte Ramakrishna, the center's senior associate for
environm ental law, wrote in the New York Times that "discussions have not
gone well. The world's poorer nations recognize that they are likely to be
made the scapegoats of global warming." Concerning discussions on a forest
convention, the researchers wrote, "[fjorest management is turning into one
more issue over which industrialized and developing countries are fighting,"

632 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S. News and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
633 gush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
634 Bohlen, "US Prepares for UN Conference," 97.
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primarily because the more "developed" countries w ere arguing a double
standard.635 W oodwell and Ramakrishna wrote:
True, [tropical] forests are diverse and fascinating but they are
also almost entirely in underdeveloped countries. And it is on
those forests that developed nations are working hardest to
impose their wills. But the north seems unable to live by the
rules it wants to impose on the south: government-subsidized
greed is allowing wide swaths of Canada and the northwestern
U.S. to be clear-cut, and lumber companies are now
maneuvering to make profits from the Siberian taiga.
As a result, a "convention on forests" has become unacceptable
to many nations preparing for the Brazil conference. Now the
best that seems possible is a "non-legally binding authoritative
statement of principles for a global consensus on the
management, conservation and development of all types of
forests." That promises little. 636
Soon, the adm inistration made clear its policy of blocking proposed
environmental treaties on "economic" grounds. In May, Bush threatened to
boycott the upcoming conference "to win concessions from most of the
world's nations on a global warming treaty, eliminating language that would
have required the United States to cap its emissions of carbon dioxide by year
2000 at 1990 levels."637 Bush refused to support fossil fuel use reductions,
opting for a "'no regrets' policy where actions would be taken against the
possibility of global w arm ing only where they could be justified on some
other grounds."638 The other nations compromised, replacing mandatory
caps with voluntary "action plans" that governments would formulate to
work w ith industry.

635 Woodwell and Ramakrishna, "Special: Forests, Scapegoats, and Global Warming," New
York Times, February 11,1992, A25.
636 Ibid., A25..
637 "Bush, Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan toSave Earth's Forests," New York Times,
June, 11, p. A,10.
638 Kraft, Environmental Polio/, 20.
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Similarly, by the time of the conference, Bush had made it known that he
would not sign a "biodiversity treaty." Standing heroically in the way of
progress, he stated obtusely:
We come to Rio prepared to continue America's unparalleled
efforts to preserve species and habitat. Let me be clear. O ur
efforts to protect biodiversity itself will exceed the requirements
of the treaty. But that proposed agreement threatens to retard
biotechnology and undermine the protection of ideas. Unlike
the climate agreement, its financing scheme will not work. It is
never easy to stand alone on principle, but sometimes leadership
requires that you do. N ow is such a time.639
At issue was regulation of environmentally hazardous industries as well
as "funding and mechanisms" of the specific "binding conventions" and the
more general, non-binding resolutions. The U.S. News & World Report,
after the conference, reported:
[Bush's] goal, he said, was to "protect taxpayers" and resist global
pressure for mass U.S. spending on ecological concerns. The
United States, he declared, will spend $1.2 trillion on
environmental protection over the next decade. America is
"way out front," he argued, "and we are going to stay out front,
but we are not going to act like we have an open checkbook."
Bush was stepping into a "lions den" in Rio, a senior adviser
said, but would stand up to extremists. "In the long run, that
sells at home."640
Bush's intransigence formed the object for a barrage of media criticism,
including a New York Times editorial, accusing the president of putting
politics before environmental concerns. The Times claimed:
The "Environmental President" now seems mainly interested in
becoming the "Re-elected President." Twice in one week, on the
issues of air pollution and forests, the Bush Adm inistration has

639 Bush, p. 462.
640 "Bush Goes to Brazil," IT.S. Nezos and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
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handed down rulings that sacrifice long-term environmental
concerns to short-term commercial and political interests.641
A nother New York Times article wrote that the "United States has been
seen by much of the rest of the w orld as an obstructionist on the key issues of
global warming and biological diversity. The Bush Administration
successfully sought the adoption of commitments to reduce emissions of
heat-trapping gasses that is weaker than most other industrialized countries
wanted."642 According to another New York Times article, the
administration's stance on the treaties garnered itself international criticism.
"The United States received heavy international criticism over that decision
and for its refusal to sign the new biodiversity convention to preserve animal
and plant life, an agreement which w on the European Community's support
today."643

As might be expected, Bush received criticism from the foreign press as
well as the domestic press. "As delegates to the summit meeting began to
gather in Rio de Janeiro today, the Brazilian press painted the Bush
Administration as an environmental villain."

By the second week of the

conference, the administration was "under attack by poor nations and out of
step with Europe," as well as being at odds with Japan.644

Bush responded by proposing to contribute money for a new program,
proclaiming that the U.S. had "come to Rio w ith an extensive program of
technology cooperation. We stand ready, government and private sector, to
641
642
643
644
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help spread green technology and launch a new generation of clean
growth."645 The author wrote:
Seeking to counter foreign and domestic criticism of his
environmental record, President Bush presented a new program
today to conserve the w orld's dwindling forests, a crucial issue at
this month's Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Standing at a
NASA research center before a huge blue photograph of the
earth taken from space, Mr. Bush said the White House would
increase its aid to other nations' forestry programs by $150
million, to $270 million, starting in the fiscal year that begins in
October.646
By the end of the conference, every one of the 165 heads of state involved
in the conference, except for Bush, had signed the treaty. Bush told the
conference, "Let's face it, there has been some criticism of the United States.
But I must tell you, we come to Rio proud of what we have accomplished and
committed to extending the record on American leadership on the
environment," citing "the w orld's tightest air-quality standards on cars and
factories, the most advanced laws for protecting lands and waters, the most
open processes for public participation."647 In addition, Bush alluded to
"concessions on a long-range plan to limit global warming."648 He also
promised to "double global forest assistance," by doubling "US forest bilateral
assistance next year" as a move toward working "together, respecting national
sovereignty on new strategies for forests for the future."649 In terms of
internal environmental policy, Bush congratulated the United States for its
environmental legislation, added some ambiguous allusions to new policy
regarding clearcut logging, telling the conference that the U.S. "will reform at
645 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461.
646 "Bush, Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan toSave Earth's Forests," New York Times,
June, 11, A l.
647 "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 462.
648 "Bush Goes to Brazil," U.S, News and World Report, June 22,1992,20.
649 Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development,"461.
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home, phasing out clear-cutting as a standard practice on US national forests
and working to plant 1 billion trees a year."650

But, at home, people had become increasingly critical of Bush regarding
his environmental record. According to a The New York Times and CBS
N e ws poll, U.S. citizens were skeptical about "whether President Bush will
accomplish much at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro this week." This
skepticism "appeared to be linked to Mr. Bush's low ratings on
environmental issues, with 31 percent saying they approved of the P resident
policies and 55 percent saying they disapproved."651

Robertson Comes Through

A week before Bush's appearance at Rio, a U.S. delegation, headed by
Environmental Protection Agency Director, Bill Reilly, was already in Brazil
fielding sharp criticism from other delegations as well as from
environmentalists shut out of the conference.652 Forest Service Chief,
Robertson, in contact with Reilly, recalls that "the meeting down there... was
kind of rough on the United States."653 The U.S. delegation faced
international scorn regarding its policy on the major treaties in addition to its
domestic policy, some of which —including clear cutting and endangered
species —concerned the Forest Service directly. Only a week before, on May
28, U.S. District Judge William Dwyer had ruled that the agency's proposed
spotted owl plan was inadequate and violated environmental law and
650
651
652
653
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ordered the agency to rewrite the plan.654 The following day the judge
enjoined logging millions of acres of Forest Service land in the Pacific
Northwest until the plan was finished.655 According to Robertson:
Bill was getting beat up pretty bad in Rio from other countries
about the clear cutting, well, you know, that the United States
was not as environmentally sensitive as we should be and that
we talked a better game than we were. He was getting beat up
over clear cutting and endangered species, pollution, clean air
and ... global warming and reduction of gases that pollute and
contribute to global warming. That was the big issue down
there.656
Reilly and Robertson had established a relationship before Reilly's tenure
as EPA director, during which they maintained contact. According to
Robertson, Reilly "was very concerned about clear cutting, and he and I spent
some time discussing that." Robertson recalls that, in the past, "Reilly and I
had talked about the clear cutting issue and I think maybe Reilly [already in
trouble in Rio] suggested to Clayton [Yeutter, the Secretary of Agriculture]
'why don’t you talk to the Chief of the Forest Service, see if we can’t get some
policy on the clear cutting?'"657 Apparently, Reilly, from Rio, called upon the
help of Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson, through Clayton Yeutter. Before
Bush's appearance at the Rio convention, Secretary Yeutter made a telephone
call to Robertson. (Normally, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, in this
case, John Beuter, who as acting Assistant Secretary in charge of the Forest
Service, would have conducted business w ith the Forest Service Chief.)
According to Robertson, Yeutter asked him to "come up with some kind of a
654 "Court Imposes New Logging Ban," Nero York Times, May 30,1998: A-12.
555 Ibid.
555 Robertson, "Interview," 11.
557 Ibid., 11. Yeutter was Secretary of Agriculture and superior to John Beutter, Deputy
Assistant over the Forest Service, who was temporarily serving as "acting" Assistant
Secretary. Ed Madigan became Secretary of Agriculture in October, 1992. Durbin, Tree Huggers,
120- 21.
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policy on clear cutting for the President for w hen he goes dow n in about a
week to Rio." Though pressed to take a major policy position "rather
quickly," Robertson felt he was in the position to collaborate, because, in
Robertson's words, "fortunately, the Forest Service had been milling this
around for quite a long time."658 In Robertson's words:
I said, "Yes, Clayton, I can give you a policy statement on clear
cutting that basically says the Forest Service stopped using clear
cutting as a standard silvicultural practice in the Forest Service
and that it will only be used on an exceptional basis, b ut it won’t
be due to economics." So, he says "Great, put that together; lef s
see if we can't get this w orked out in the next two or three days
and the President can announce it at Rio and say we no longer
will be doing clear cutting as a standard silvicultural practice on
federal land in the United States."659
Robertson recalls using this request for presidential assistance as an
opportunity to broach the idea of "Ecosystem Management" as an organizing
principle for national forests. To Yeutter, he announced, "I’d like to
announce Ecosystem Management as a policy of the Forest Service at the
same time and make it clear cutting and Ecosystem Management, and I think
that will go over well too."660 Yeutter was unfamiliar with the term, so
Robertson explained to him, over the telephone, his conception of Ecosystem
Management. Robertson recalled:
He says "what is that again?" And, I said "Ecosystem
Management." H e didn’t even know what that was. And he
says "tell me more," and I kind of explained it: "it’s a more
environmentally sensitive w ay to manage forest lands, deal w ith
endangered species, in a m uch broader perspective.’’661

658
659
660
661

Robertson, "Interview," 12.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 13.
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Robertson had alluded to an "environmentally sensitive w ay to manage
forest lands" at a time when Bush's popularity regarding environmental
policy was low. Secretary Yeutter apparently decided that the term was
politically advantageous. According to Robertson:
He says "well all that sounds good; the President would like to
say that." So he gave me a deadline; he said "by tomorrow
morning, you have a draft over here on Ecosystem Management
and clear cutting."662
The political discourse clearly had linked Forest Service clearcutting —or
the relief from clearcutting —with Ecosystem Management. Robertson was
now responsible for articulating this new policy direction in less than 24
hours. Having worked out some of the concepts w ith Hal Salwasser had
helped him to prepare, and he set out to work:
So I remember, I went home, and gosh, I thought about "here's
the letter I gotta send to the White House tomorrow morning at
8:00, fax it over and the President's going to look at it, Clayton's
going to coordinate it with the President [and] Bill Reilly." So I
thought about how to put this letter together, I actually wrote
this letter, in fact I got up at 3:00 A.M. in the morning after
thinking about it all night; I drafted this June 4,1992 letter
starting at 3:00 A.M. in the morning. And I drafted it and called
my secretary and said "You better be at the office at 7:00 in the
morning because we gotta have this fax to Clayton Yeutter by
8:00.” So she came in and she typed it up. I d id a little more
editing, and of course I was part of all the discussions in the
Forest Service up to that point. But it got dow n too: I had the
power of the pen and I didn’t have time to check with any body
else. So I drafted this and then I sent it over to Clayton. He read
it, and I don’t know if he checked w ith the President or not at
that point, and he says "yeah, this sounds good."663
Robertson, exercising his "power of the pen," crafted this politically timed
m em orandum and presented it to the administration. Robertson had

662 Ibid., 13.
663 Ibid., 14.
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constructed this policy shift through unconventionally direct lines of
communication, which briefly caused some dispute w ithin the
a d m in istra tio n , but ultimately, Robertson and Yeutter's policy initiative

prevailed. While Yeutter was not available at the Department of Agriculture
(because he was at the White House) to read the final draft, according to
Robertson, the Department of Agriculture staff accepted the policy statement:
He says "keep it under wraps, but I think this is the way we want
to go." And by that time I hadn't even coordinated w ith my
assistant secretary, so as soon as I got that OK from Clayton, I had
to backtrack and sit down w ith John Beuter, who was my acting
Assistant Secretary at that time, and go over it with him. John
was very supportive. And i f s such a major policy decision, we
thought we better go down and talk to the Secretary about it.
Well, we couldn't get the Secretary, but we got the Chief of Staff;
they didn't like the sound of it too well. Anyway, we finally got
their ap p ro v al... They finally said, "Well, we don't particularly
care for this thing you're doing, but if that's what the President
wants, what Clayton Yeutter wants, Bill Reilly wants for Rio, its
okay with us." Again everybody did a little editing on it. So we
finalized it.664
With the document w ritten the administration had to decide how to
announce the change to the public Ultimately, the president decided to have
Robertson release the message domestically before he announced at the
conference in Rio. According to Robertson:
In the mean time I kept talking with Clayton Yeutter [who was,
at the time, over at the White House]; they were having a
terrible time deciding if the President was going to announce
this at Rio as part of his speech, or was he going to announce it
here in the United States. They mulled that over for about a day.
Finally Clayton called me back and he said, "Well the President
has made a decision. He says that we decided you're the
professional forester of the United States, Chief of the Forest
Service, that you ought to announce this domestically, just
ahead of the President making his speech, and he will announce
664 Ibid, 14.
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it in Rio in his speech at the Earth conference." So that’s what
we did.665
Summarizing this fast moving series of events, Robertson recalls that he
"wrote the letter... on June 4th, got it signed, communicated it, announced it
in the United States." Mistakenly, Robertson recalls that Bush mentioned
ecosystem management, stating that "if you'll read his speech in Rio, he
included it as one of the things the United States is doing to deal with the
clear cutting issue and endangered species and the concerns about old growth
forest and all of that."666 Ultimately, Bush did not reference ecosystem
management in his speech to the U.N. conference.667 He did vaguely
mention "reform at home" and "phasing out clear-cutting as a standard
practice on US national forests."668

True to his word, Robertson circulated the memorandum to "Regional
Foresters and Station Directors," dated June 4,1992, announcing the agency's
"marriage" to Ecosystem Management: 'T oday, I am announcing that the
Forest Service is committed to using an ecological approach in the future
management of the national forests."669 The following day, linking the
announcement on ecosystem management w ith a policy shift on clear
cutting, the New York Times reported that "U.S. Forest Service field officers
are being ordered today to start running the 126 national forests on an
'ecosystem management' basis that could reduce by 70 percent the
controversial practice of clear-cutting tim ber and result in more

665
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Ibid., 15.
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Bush, "International Cooperation on Environment and Development," 461-2.
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environmentally sensitive stewardship of the nation's 191 million acres of
federally owned forests."670 The paper also implied the relationship between
the dual announcement by Robertson and Bush's uncomfortable position visa-vis the ongoing Rio conference: "Robertson's directive... comes as the
United States has been sharply criticized for a lack of leadership in the
adoption of two key environmental treaties at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro."671 The memorandum was clearly a political construction, and its
contents were proportionately political.

The Memo

The memo, which announced "a new management philosophy"
constructed "to deal with the clear cutting issue and endangered species and
the concerns about old grow th forest and all of that," made no mention of
old-growth or ancient forests, and only briefly mentioned endangered species
— not in the main text of the memo, but in "attachments." Regarding clear
cutting, the agency would not really commit to discontinuing it, but rather,
w ould "accelerate the reduction of clearcutting as a standard commercial
tim ber harvest practice on the National Forests."672 Regarding "public
involvement," Robertson proclaimed, "Like never before, the Forest Service
m ust renew its commitment to public involvement and actively seek out and
incorporate people's views in our decisions about the management of the
National Forests and Grasslands."673 Meanwhile, the agency was attempting
670 '"Forest Service Chief Orders 'Ecological Approach' to Managing U.S. Woodlands," N ew
York Times, June 4,1992: A -ll.
671 Ibid.
672 Robertson, "Memo to Regional Foresters and Station Directors," 2.
673 Ibid.
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to stifle participation in the form of administrative appeals. Robertson
envisioned "a new higher level of dialogue or partnership w ith the
American people" as "even more important now in view of the proposed
changes in the administrative appeal process."674

Perhaps the most telling feature of the memo is its ambiguity, to which
Robertson referred as "room and flexibility for the professionals on the
ground in working w ith the public to work out the many details" of
Ecosystem Management.675 Ecosystem Management as it applied to
"endangered species and the concerns about old growth forest and all of that"
would be worked out by "the professionals," who would use "ecological
principles" to work out the on-the-ground details. In Robertson7s words,
managers -- the professionals —would use "the best science and close the gap
between the level of scientific knowledge and its application in our day-to-day
m anagem ent."676

Reading the memo, an observer might get the idea that Ecosystem
Management was a product of scientific deliberation. After all, as Robertson
claimed in the first sentence, the agency had "made good progress over the
past 3 years in experimenting with more environmentally sensitive ways to
manage the National Forests."677 The agency had "learned a lot from our
field demonstration projects, research effort, university symposia, and
workshops," mainly that, as for as Robertson was concerned, "ecosystem
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management works."678 Forest resource decisions were now to follow from
the scientific processes imbedded in forest planning, it seemed, and, by
implication, politics were now to be put aside. In the memo, Robertson made
no reference to the politics governing the situation — the politics of
Congressional appropriation, executive administration, judicial decision
making, the politics of science making, nor the politics of citizen direct
activism and media punditing.

In any case, by the June 25, when Robertson circulated a follow-up memo
to regional foresters and station directors, the directorate had succumbed to
national politics and fused the new clear-cutting policy with ecosystem
m anagem ent.679 According to Robertson, the directorate was "very pleased
w ith the positive reaction to our new policy on ecosystem management,
which includes increasing public involvement and reducing the use of
clearcutting as a standard timber harvest practice."680 Clearly, Robertson and
the directorate considered public participation in forest planning a significant
issue.

The follow-up memo went on to outline the process by which the regions,
forests, and ultimately, ranger districts, would work ecosystem management
into planning and management. According to the memo, planners should
not discontinue or undo ongoing projects. Rather, they should consider new
projects using the principles and guidelines included in the June 4 memo.

678 Ibid.
679 The memo was in Robertson's name by signed by James Overbay, Associate Chief.
Robertson, "Ecosystem Management, Public Involvement, and Clearcutting."
ibid., I.
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Ultimately, according to the memo, amendments in the NFMA regulations
and planning guides would reflect these principles.681

Concluding Remarks

Politics was determining the course of Forest Service management of its
forests, and its claims to scientific rationality. Though the "professionals" and
"experts" would now use the scientific language and protocol of Ecosystem
Management, this itself was a political maneuver.

Perhaps in seeming to

neglect the politics of national forest management, Robertson appeared to
have ignored the main point of ecosystem management — which was to
mediate, not eliminate, the political negotiation of forest output. Or, perhaps,
he did not.

681 Ibid.
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Chapter 9
Plugging Up the Hole: Filling the Signifier of Ecosystem Management

Meet the new boss.
— The Who
Who's Next (record album)

In partaking of the political dramaturgy around the shotgun "marriage"
w ith ecosystem management, Robertson had situated the Forest Service in
the position of filling the largely-vacant signifier of ecosystem management.
The agency w ould set out to produce ecosystem management and meet the
negotiable dem ands of the law and the whims (and implicit whims) of
Congress — while reconciling with the agenda of the president.

At the time

of the memo, the question of who would be president remained unanswered,
a question of importance. The answer to this question w ould have great
bearing upon Forest Service policy, which would bear the nam e "ecosystem
management." Thus, the shaping of ecosystem management — using parts
constructed by the Interagency Science Committee, the Scientific Panel, and
the New Perspectives program —remained politically negotiable.

In November, 1992, Bill Clinton defeated George Bush in the presidential
election. U pon taking office, in 1993, Clinton inherited the injunction on
timber harvesting on BLM and Forest Service in owl territory (imposed by
Judge Dwyer, in May 1992) and faced political crisis in the forest politics of the
Pacific N orthwest.682 He also inherited the July 16 (1993) deadline imposed by
Judge Dwyer for completing a plan for "Management for the Northern
682 Seattle Audubon Society o. Mosely, et. al., 798 F.Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992)..
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Spotted Owl in the National Forests/' including a complete environmental
impact statement with viability assessments of northern spotted owls and 32
other "old-growth associated species," projecting the effects of the preferred
alternative.688

Immediately the presidential administration confronted this political
problem of reestablishing the Forest Service's ability to manage the national
forests in the Pacific Northwest. The adm inistration divided Judge Dywer's
demands into two tasks — completing the viability assessment and
constructing a forest plan. Forest Service Chief Robertson assembled a team,
the Scientific Assessment Team (SAT), again led by Dr. Jack W ard Thomas, to
conducting the assessments. Meanwhile, the Clinton adm inistration began
preparing a "timber summit" —a well-publicized public hearing held by
Clinton and others picked by the administration — meant to produce a set
goals for the upcoming planning project.684

The administration w ould take a direct and high profile approach to
accomplish its goals of convincing the court to lift the injunction on the
Forest Service's timber program in the Pacific N orthw est and resurrecting the
Forest Service's credibility. This chapter will discuss the work of the SAT, the
construction of the "Northwest Timber Summit," and the w ork of the
Federal Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. It will conclude by
pointing out the significance of the FEMAT effort in light of the Forest
Service's ecosystem management.

688 U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, Viability Assessments and
Management Considerations , 8.
684 Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT."
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Wildlife Accounting: The Scientific Assessment Team

Judge Dwyer's decision required the agency to answer three questions:685
Did the Endangered Species Committee's May 15 decision to allow the logging
of the 13 BLM timber sales change the viability assessment the Forest Service
prepared for its 1992 Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management
for the Northern Spotted Owl in the National Forests? Did new information
found since the 1992 EIS require revision of the selected alternative or change
the viability of the owl? Would implementation of the plan lead to
"extirpation" in agency planning areas of any of 32 listed species "associated
with old growth"? Chief Dale Robertson had assembled "a technical
"Scientific Assessment Team" (SAT) to provide the assessments/' assigning
Jack Ward Thomas as team leader.686

Thomas and others in the Forest Service w ere aware that hundreds and
perhaps thousands of species were associated w ith old-growth forests and that
the agency would be better off assessing them immediately. Thomas
remembers pleading his case to Jim Overbay, Deputy Chief for the National
Forest System, "who assigned the team," and Overbay cooperated.687 Thomas
recalled:
I ... said, "Look, why don't we quit evading the real issue and
answer the appropriate question. The question is: "There aren't
39 species associated with old growth, there are maybe 900 or
1,400 of them. Let's look at the whole spectrum of species."

685 Ibid., 8.
686 Thomas and Marcot, Of Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10; SAT, 9-10.
687 Thomas, "Interview," 3.
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Overbay said "OK, let's go." So I wrote the instructions that he
would then give to us to follow.688
Thomas then wrote the letter of instruction to himself and the Team, as he
had for the ISC committee, incorporating the mandate for this expanded
assessment within the "Guidelines for the Scientific Analysis Team for the
N orthern Spotted Owl."689

On March 19, 1993, the new Clinton administration presented the SAT
report to Judge William Dwyer. According to Thomas, the most
distinguishing feature of the report was that the team had expanded the
mission to include a nearly complete "catalogue" of species "closely associated
with old growth," species ranging from fungi to fish.690 Though the report
did not get much press attention, it was an im portant document because, in
Thomas' view, assessing this expanded list required a process that was
tantamount to an ecosystem assessment. Thomas recalls:
Now the Administration was not ready to talk ecosystems just yet.
But when you consider 900 to 1,400 species and their interactions and
interdependence, you are talking about ecosystems. The SAT report
never made the headlines like ISC and FEMAT, but the SAT report
was a truly crucial turning point. That's when we looked at all
associated species. At that point everything bogged down in political
controversy.691
In all, the report included assessments of 667 species "listed as closely
associated" —a dramatic increase over the original number of species Judge
Dwyer had ordered the agency to assess. According to the Team, this
688 ibid.
689 Thomas, "Interview," 1,3; Overbay, James, Instructions for the Scientific Analysis Team, in
U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, Viability Assessments and Management
Considerations , Appendix 2B.
690 Thomas and Marcot, Of Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10.
691 Thomas, "Interview," 3.
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expansion was partially due to changing the definition of "associated w ith old
grow th"692:
The environmental Impact Statement [on Management for the
N orthern Spotted Owl in the National Forests] identified 32
species of terrestrial vertebrate wildlife (amphibians, reptiles,
birds, and mammals) that are closely associated with latesuccessional or old-growth forests or components of old-growth
forest. ... Our analysis refined the basis for evaluating the degree
of association of these species with late-successional and oldgrowth forests, and expanded the evaluation to include fungi,
lichens, plants, invertebrates, and fish, in addition to all
terrestrial vertebrates.693
The m andate of the Team was to provide a qualitative assessment and a
framework for assessing the viability of old-growth species in context of
various managem ent scenarios.

This assessment would not be quantitative

and would rely on the judgment of Team members:
In estimating habitat associations and risks of extirpation, the
Scientific Analysis Team was not expected to conduct a formal
viability assessment for each forest species associated with oldgrowth forests. Rather, we were directed to use common sense
and expert judgment and to explicitly display and discuss the
process used for establishing viability ratings.694
In the report, the Team argued that such "full disclosure and knowledge"
of the effects on all old growth species resulting from implementation of the
Spotted owl plan would be important for the plan's "selection and
im plem entation."695

In addition, a broad assessment would better m eet the

agency's m andate to manage for biodiversity. Importantly for the future of
Forest Service management, the structure of the report would provide a
framework from which to produce ecosystem management: "Such a
692
693
694
695

Thomas and Marcot, O f Spotted Owls, Old Growth and New Policies, 10.
U.S.D.A., Forest Service, Scientific Analysis Team, 259.
Ibid., 258.
Ibid., 259.
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comprehensive approach lays the groundw ork for a more complete approach
to ecosystem management."696 Nine months after Chief Dale Robertson had
committed the Forest Service to an expedient "marriage" w ith "ecosystem
management," the agency was beginning to articulate what the term would
m ean.

The "Forest Conference" and FEMAT

Meanwhile, the Clinton adm inistration was developing its political
solution to the crisis in the Pacific Northwest. After replacing the retiring
Chief Robertson with the new Chief Jack Ward Thomas, the adm inistration
began producing a "Northwest Forest Conference" slated for the following
April 2, in Portland, Oregon, at which Clinton and Vice-president A1 Gore
would sit face-to-face and discuss concerns regarding the west side forests.
Yaffee points to the Clinton adm inistration's media presentation of the event,
writing that "the forest conference was remarkable in several ways. It
showcased the President and Vice-President of the United States, along with
three cabinet secretaries, sitting around a conference table for a full day,
talking domestic policy with those who ostensibly would be most directly
affected by any course of action, while the rest of the nation had the
opportunity to watch the proceedings on national television."697 Yaffee also
refers to the political and symbolic nature of the conference, to which the
Forest Service and Congress —"some of the more major historic players in
the dispute" — noticeably were not invited. He writes, "the symbolism was
unmistakable: Here was a conference focused largely on the future of
696 ibid. Also see Thomas, "Interview," 1; Durbin, Tree Hungers, 197.
697 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 141-42.
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national forest management in the Pacific Northwest, and the chief of the FS
and the elected representatives of the regions population were not at the
table."698

The Clinton and Gore campaign had relied upon the promise of avoiding
the "false choices" between environmental and economic issues —
particularly in regard to the political conflict associated with the Pacific
Northwest "forest ecosystems."699 At the conference, Clinton revisited the
political issue of "balance" - a key signifier during this struggle —implying
that he and the people of the Pacific Northwest could devise a policy that
would preserve significant wildlife and allow for logging at the same time.
But, balancing continued to mean the consideration of both sides of the
"loggers versus owls" issue. Clinton addressed the issue of such balance in a
question to conferencees:
How can we achieve a balanced and comprehensive policy that
recognizes the importance of the forest and timber to the
economy and jobs in this region, and how can we preserve our
precious old-growth forest, which are part of our national
heritage and that, once destroyed, can never be replaced?700
In the language of this rhetoric, the "owls versus jobs" dichotomy
persisted, yet Clinton, in the same tone as the New Perspectives rhetoric,
claimed that the end to the political turmoil w ould require substituting the
choice between these uses with some sort of reconciliation. The President
claimed:
The most important thing we can do is to admit... that there are
no simple or easy answers. This is not about choosing between
698 Ibid., 141-42.
899 Morganthau, "A Lighter Shade of Green," 24.
700 Clinton, in Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT," 6.
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jobs and the environment, but about recognizing the
importance of both.701
A reconciliation w ould deliver a perpetual supply of commodities
without sacrificing "forest health," a term that was beginning to find coinage
in the political struggle around the national forests. In his advocacy for forest
health, Clinton even went so far as to evoke its religious value (with implicit
references to Christian deism): "We need to protect the long-term health of
our forests, our wildlife, and our waterways. They are a gift from God, and we
hold them in trust for future generations."702 A policy would have to, in
Clinton's words, "produce a predictable and sustainable level of tim ber sales
and nontimber resources that will not degrade or destroy the
environm ent."703

Furthermore, establishing this balance would require a change in the
terms of struggle — the interdepartmental (and intradepartmental) struggle
within the federal government, explicitly, and the struggle between
government and public implicitly.

The shift would be tantam ount to an

institutional change in natural resource politics —from an adversarial
approach to a consensual approach: "We will do our best... to make the
federal government work together and work for you. We may make
mistakes, but we will try to end the gridlock within the federal government
and we will insist on collaboration, not confrontation."704
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Before the Forest Conference, the adm inistration had begun setting up the
"Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team" (FEMAT) — recruiting
members, renting space, and buying equipment — which Thomas was to
lead.705 The team would include representatives from six agencies, among
them the Forest Service, to construct a set of alternatives for m anaging the
Northwest forests. Among them were Jerry Franklin, Eric Forsman, and
Charles Meslow, all well known for their roles in the forest policy dialogue.
The president ordered the team to synthesize the political dem ands voiced at
the forest conference, dem ands which amounted to reiterations of the same
values underlying the conflict over forest planning all along. The new plan
w ould address the demands of the timber industry and its cohort of loggers
and "timber communities," while speaking to the issue of species
preservation and "forest health." Further, the project would m uster scientific
credibility, establish a direct line of decision-making, and conform to federal
adm inistrative and environmental law.706

The Clinton administration imposed five constraints — or "criteria" — to
guide the process. The first criterion limited alternatives to those that could
be analyzed within sixty days, effectively limiting the options to plans already
developed, for instance, those developed by the Scientific Panel. The second,
third, and fourth criteria, which included risk analysis language, had to do
w ith ensuring that the team's solutions would "provide a m edium to very
high probability of ensuring species viability" in the face of timber
harvesting.707 The second criterion stipulated that "the majority of the
705 Thomas, "Interview," 7.
7°6 ForestEcosystemManagement Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, ii-iv, II-4.
707 Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26.
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options should have a relatively high probability of successfully meeting the
objectives for each of the five biological criteria" developed by the team.
These sub-criteria stipulated the maintenance of viable populations of the
northern spotted owl, marbled murrelets, "at-risk fish species and stocks,"
"other species associated w ith old-growth forests," and finally, "maintaining
an interacting late-successional/old-growth forest ecosystem."708 The third
and fourth criteria stipulated that, respectively, "at least one of the options
must have a medium probability rating" (for the biological criteria) and one
must have a "very high rating."709 Clearly, the construction of a viability
assessment would be central to the report, and given the short time period
allowed the team, it would rely upon further developing the assessments
from the SAT report.710 The fifth criterion also determ ined that the team
would construct a statement of tradeoffs, requiring that "options selected
should include at least one developed from an approach focusing on species
and at least one developed from an approach focusing on old-growth forest
stands."711

When the team went about assembling the report, much of its work
comprised of constructing options from 29 previously w ritten plans (ranging
from the 1984 regional guide to the National Forest Products Association's
"multi-resource strategy," to the modifications of the ISC strategy).712
According to Thomas, the team merely refined the earlier ISC, Scientific
Panel, and SAT reports to develop FEMAT: "So it started off as an owl plan,
708
709
710
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712
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but basically, when you look at FEMAT, if s just ISC with bells and whistles
hung on it."713

To construct the options, the team used a zoning procedure, first dividing
all federal lands in the three state owl region (a total of 24,261,000 acres) into
two categories —"congressionally w ithdraw n" for wilderness, national parks,
and wild and scenic rivers (6,983,100 acres) and acres to be allocated (17,278,000
acres).714 For the present, "the pie" w ould consist of these 17-million acres.
For each option, the team would divide the contestable acreage differently
according to a classification scheme using four zones, each corresponding
with a general management goal (or set of goals).

"Administratively

withdrawn areas" would be m anaged for recreation, "visual protection,"
"certain other administrative objectives/' or lands unsuitable for timber.
"Late-successional reserves" —w ould be "protected from most management
activities... though some level of silviculture might be permitted to enhance
the development of old-growth characteristics." On "managed late
successional areas" (only featured in options 1 and 3) agencies w ould allow
commercial logging, but with the objective of creating "late-successional"
characteristics which would allow more logging than the late successional
reserves. All options allocated some lands to "Riparian reserves," which
were, in general, protected from logging. (All these categories of "reserves,"
as well as the team's would correspond with the "patches" from the
landscape ecology model.) "Matrix" would constitute "all federal lands

Thomas, "Interview," 1.
714 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table III-

5.
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outside the above six categories."715 FEMAT'S use of the term "matrix" to
designate lands "outside the above" reflected landscape ecology's coupling of
"matrix" w ith the term (and idea of) "background." But, given the
contestability of these land uses, from a political point of view, they were not
necessarily "background."

For each of the various options, the team altered the proportion of the
total land allocated to the zones, as well as altering specific management rules
governing each zone. For instance, in option 1, the group designated the
highest amount of land to late successional reserves —11,495,500 acres (twothirds of the contested acreage) —and the lowest amount to matrix —2,830,600
acres (roughly 15%). By contrast, option 7 designated the lowest amount to
late successional reserves —5,912,600 acres (one-third the contested acreage) —
and the most to matrix —8,459,800 acres (a little under half the contested
acreage). Acreage assigned to late successional reserves in the various options
ranged 5,582,000 acres —roughly one-third the total contestable acreage, and
acreage assigned to matrix ranged 5,629,000 —also about one-third the total
contestable acreage.716

The team assessed the results of the options in terms of a limited set of
concerns: expected population viabilities for the various species protected
under the Endangered Species Act, and timber; aside from the Clinton
administrations criteria concerning species viability, the team judged that
715 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 145. Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest
Ecosystem Management, EQ-3-13.
716 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table III5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

246
"the economic and social implications of the options should be
considered."717 Of the "implications," only economics was assessed in
quantitative, comparative terms, and this assessment prim arily concerned
tim b er harvest —in terms of board feet and jobs. (The team did not offer

comparisons for expected range and mining uses under the different options.)
The report also mentioned "Non-commodity production," w hich am ounted
to various categories within a "Recreation Opportunity Spectrum setting,"
w ith little comparative value. The report was concerned prim arily w ith
tim ber harvesting.718

In addition to evaluating "the likelihood of maintaining sufficient
habitat, well distributed on federal lands, to provide for the continued
existence of viable populations of northern spotted owls and m arbled
murrelets," the team "perform ed similar assessments for more th an 1,000
plant and animal species closely associated with old-growth forests."719 To
choose which species to assess, the team used criteria that Thomas had
devised for associating w ith "late-successional forest conditions."720 The
assessment project depended upon the personal judgments of "m ore than 70
experts" serving on "14 separate assessment panels." The team set up a
process (called "judgment probabilities") that allowed specialists to translate
the certainty or uncertainty of their knowledge pertaining to individual
species into numerical values. In addition, the team set up a process for
appropriating knowledge (based upon interpretations of literature and
717 Ibid., m-3.
718 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, Table VI1-36.
^ Mesiow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 24.
720 Ibid, 24.
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research) pertaining to a species into an evaluation of the effects of each
option upon that species. According to Charles Meslow, Richard Holthausen,
and David Cleaves, who were part of the FEMAT:
Each panel was asked to estimate the likelihood of four possible
outcomes [on species viability] for habitat conditions on federal
lands. The panel process was designed to elicit expert opinion
and professional judgment. We used advice from the panel,
other information, and our own expertise to make the final
assessment.721
The team constructed the "outcomes" along a continuum from habitat "of
sufficient quality, distribution, and abundance to allow the species population
to stabilize, well distributed across federal lands" to habitat conditions that
w ould "result in species extirpation from federal land."722 Eighty percent
likelihood of achieving the strictest outcome (most likely for viability)
constituted the operational definition of viability.723

Since the criteria instructed by the Clinton administration required a
diversity of effects, from requiring a majority of options to meet the biological
criteria with high ratings to requiring one option to have a medium level, the
team was able to establish discernible contrasts between options; in this way
the team was able to make clear the trade-offs inherent —through an agency
perspective —between the timber and wildlife associated w ith ancient forests.
The construction also expressed choices between options in terms that would
allow Forest Service and adm inistration officials to be aware of the legal
effects of agency management, at least in terms of the Endangered Species Act.

721 Ibid.,24.
722 Ibid., 26.
723 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, 11-28;
Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26.
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When May, 1993, the FEMAT working groups presented their work to the
full team, culminating the previous weeks' work, they discovered that two of
the eight options developed to date were unacceptable according to the
biological criteria (7, and 8).724 O f the remaining six, option 5 offered the
highest annual harvest off the "owl forests," at 915 million board feet (118,000
jobs), and option 6, the second highest, offered 774 million board feet (117,500
jobs).725 One billion board feet, politically, was the industry's minimal
acceptable offering, and the team had failed to deliver this a m o u n t726
According to Thomas, many of the FEMAT team members were surprised at
the results: "Some, including me, were stunned by the low numbers" —
particularly those concerning the timber yield.727

George Frampton, Assistant Secretary of Interior for the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Park System (and former president of the
Wilderness Society), sensed that the timber supply numbers w ould not be
politically acceptable, commenting "If that was to be the tim ber cut in the final
alternatives, it w ouldn't be acceptable." Regarding the team's scientists,
Frampton commented that the scientists, too, sensed that the tim ber harvest
quantities were politically unacceptable: "They knew what the margins
were."728 Thomas recollects that the team had failed to find an alternative
with the correct balance promised by the administration. He noted:

724 Meslow, Holthausen, and Cleaves, "Assessment," 26-27.
725 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management, VI-5, 28.
725 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 203.
727 Thomas, "Interview," 5.
728 George Frampton, in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 203.
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We tried to create an array of options all the way from very
strong environmental protection to high levels of tim ber
production- And then, when we wanted some interm ediate
ones that cut close to the line, we could not come up w ith any
that did not go "off the edge" on the two sides (protection and
production," yet maybe it would not stand up to legal muster.
The option with absolute protection of the environm ent
probably would not be politically and economically acceptable.
We needed a full array of options. But when we got through, we
simply did not have any that were feasible that included
production of more than 600 to 800 million board feet.729
The team members perceived that none of their alternatives would be
politically acceptable, but some of them believed that they could find a
solution if given a little more time. Jerry Franklin convinced the team to
attempt to produce another option that would be politically acceptable.
Thomas recalls:
Jerry Franklin... rather passionately declared that we had not yet
done the job. We were all tired and completely exhausted.
Franklin made a plea "lef s try one more option." He took the
lead in the development of Option 9. The team was pooped, but
he got up and said, "Come on guys, one more time." Thus Jerry
Franklin "fathered" Option 9.730
Ultimately, Franklin, whose background in silviculture established his
perspective as a forester, led the effort to craft another option.

By June, they had developed "Option Nine," and in July, the team
published its report, which "yielded the groundwork for the administration
to chart a course through the political negotiation and maneuvering that was
sure to come."731 Of all the options that would satisfy the legal conditions,
particularly in context of the ninth circuit court, Option 9 w ould produce the
729 Thomas, "Interview," 4. Thomas heavily edited this transcript, softening much of the
lanuage from the actual interview.
730 Ibid., 4.
731 Yaffee, Spotted Owl, 145.
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most timber —1.2 billion board feet —and jobs at —119,800 jobs. Thomas
sensed that Clinton would choose this alternative.722

With the option, the team delegated 7,053,600 acres to late-successional
reserves and 4,853,300 acres to matrix. The team made this new option
possible by redefining the zoning categories that it had established,
particularly the idea of reserves.733 For instance, "Late-Successional
Reserves" would not be limited to old-growth, but w ould, in addition,
include areas with stands less than 80 years old to be "m anaged" (through
silviculture) for old-growth characteristics.734 Furthermore, forestry
management, including salvage logging and commercial and precommercial
thinning, would be allowed. In FEMAT's words, referring to the west side,
'Thinnings (precommercial and commercial) may occur in any stand up to 80
years of age regardless of the origin of the stand," though it w ould be subject
to "review by an interagency oversight team to ensure that they are beneficial
to the creation of late-successional forest conditions."735

The reserves were neither pristine nor inviolate, thus challenging a
preservationist interpretation of biological reserves. According to Jerry
Franklin, progenitor of new forestry, old-growth might not be necessary for
meeting wildlife and ecological objectives, if manipulation of younger stands
heeded certain structural objectives:

T don't think old-grow th is that much

more important or better than later stages of a mature forest in providing

722
722
734
725

Durbin, Tree Huggers, 205.
StCIair, "Cutting it Down the Middle."
FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-21
FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-21
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services to the environment. ... [I]f we are good w ith our forest management,
we can perpetuate some of the characteristics of old growth without actually
perpetuating the old-growth forest."736 (This was the promise of new
forestry.)

In the "matrix" areas, between reserves, the Team included over 4 million
acres that would be open to some form of logging. According to the report,
Option 9 zoned over 30 percent of the remaining 8.5 million acres of "latesuccessional and old-growth forest" (c. 2.8 million acres) into the matrix.737
In addition, it designated over 30 percent of the remaining 4.5 million acres of
"old-growth only" lands (c. 1.3 million acres) to matrix lands. The team also
abandoned the Scientific Committee's use of the "50-11-40 rule" for matrix
lands, which was designed to accommodate wildlife movement, effectively
loosening constraints upon logging.738 In lieu of this 50-11-40 coverage, the
team used riparian zones to meet wildlife viability objectives.739 Much of the
promised timber w ould come from the matrix old-growth.

For Option Nine, the team invented "adaptive management areas." In
these ten management areas, which ranged from 84,000 to 400,000 acres, "well
distributed in the physiographic provinces," agencies would conduct
silvicultural experiments and allow commercial logging.740 These areas each
7^6 Franklin in StClair, "Cutting it Down the Middle," 13.
^ 7 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Tearn, "Objectives, Process, and Options,"
(diagram, p. 15). (Hereafter, FEMAT, "Objectives.")
738 In the words of FEMAT, "The 50-11-40 rule ... calls for at least 50 percent of the federal
forested land within each quarter township to be forested with trees averaging at least 11
inches in diameter at breast height and with a canopy dosure of at least 40 percent" FEMAT,
"Objectives," 15.
FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, Ch. 3; FEMAT, "Objectives," 15.
740 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

252
contained diverse age and class structures and composition, including a
significant amount of old growth —additional land upon which the agencies
could practice New Forestry.741 The adaptive management areas seemed to
offer a context for applying administrative promises to manage for "balance,"
and the team placed them in politically controversial areas — areas with oldgrowth near timber dependent communities. According to the report, "Most
are associated with subregions impacted socially and economically by reduced
timber harvest from the federal lands. The areas provide a diversity of
biological challenges, intermixed land ownerships, natural resource
objectives, and social contexts."742

Soon after Clinton unveiled the plan in July, activists began to study the
maps. Many groups responded in protest to some of the allocations, some
that would allow clearcut logging in prized roadless areas and others that they
felt would jeopardize other ecological values. For example, they objected to
designations that would allow logging in the "steepsided watershed of Still
Creek east of Portland, in Mount Hood National Forest, forested with natural
stands of Douglas-fir, cedar, and hemlock 80 to 100 years old."743 "In the
Siskiyous, Option 9 placed more than 30,000 acres of burned over, heavily
roaded BLM plantations in a reserve while leaving several pristine roadless
areas open to logging." Deputy Interior Secretary George Frampton
commented that "We all knew going in that an ecologically credible plan
would not produce more than 1 billion board feet," but nevertheless, he

741 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, III-24r25; S t Clair, "Cutting it Down the Middle";
According to Yaffee, this was "the magic of adaptive management," Spotted Owl, 146.
742 FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, HI-24.
743 Ibid, 205.
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assented to the plan.744 The Wilderness Society proclaimed that Option 9
was merely a political substitution for the FEMAT process —a political
construction that failed to fulfill the mission of solving ecological problems:
"Unfortunately, administration officials — who were mostly interested in
producing a politically correct "balanced solution" -- did not heed the
FEMAT's advice."745

In any case, Clinton would move ahead with the plan, but first he had to
grapple with the court imposed timber injunction. The following November,
the administration formed a deal with plaintiffs in the Portland Audubon
Society v. Lujan case that had resulted in an injunction from logging on
spotted owl land. Tom Collier, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's chief of staff,
had requested the plaintiffs to release of 200 million board feet of timber (on
BLM lands) from the injunction continued by Judge Dwyer of the Ninth
Circuit Court in early 1992.746 The release apparently would demonstrate
good faith on the part of the environmental groups as well as allowing
Babbitt to meet his commitment to sell 2 billion board feet of tim ber in the
first year of the Clinton administration.747

Collier also used intimidation, w arning the plaintiffs that w ithout a
"good-faith effort," on their part, Interior Secretary Babbit w ould urge the
administration to immunize his plan from legal challenge through
legislation.748 Environmentalists and strategists influencing the plaintiffs,
744 Frampton in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 205.
745 Anderson, "Prescription," 39.
746 "Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992)."
747 Durbin, Tree Huggers, 209.
748 Ibid., 209.
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including Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund lawyer, Kevin Kirchner, took
seriously the threat of the rider. Other lawyers followed the same track, and
"at one point [according to Larry Tuttle, executive director of the Oregon
Natural Resources Council, plaintiffs] SCLDF attorneys Vic Sher and Todd
True threatened to fire ONRC as a client if Tuttle refused to go along with the
deal." Malanie Rowland, a Wilderness Society attorney, advocated the deal,
believing a friendly relationship w ith the Clinton adm inistration was critical:
"We had to have their support. If we didn't, I d id n 't see any ways we could
hold on to our victories."749 In addition, Montana Senator Conrad Bums (R)
and others were attem pting to split the 9th Circuit, which had long had the
reputation of being environmentally friendly. The plaintiffs went for the
deal, and in April 1994, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior issued
records of decision, (slightly modifying the plan) and issued guidelines for
conducting necessary assessments and studies of management effects.750

Meanwhile, the timber industry objected to the plan for reductions in
timber levels. Attacking its claim to "balance" and calling it a "problem, not a
solution," John Hampton, chief executive officer of the Willamina Lumber
Company of Portland, Oregon, lambasted FEMAT for usurping presidential
power to assert its environmentalist biases into policy751:
Following the forest summit, President Clinton called for a plan
that recognized the "hum an and economic dimensions of these
problems"; that was "scientifically sound, ecologically credible,
and legally responsible"; and that produced "a predictable and
sustainable level of timber sales." Instead, the FEMAT produced
a major policymaking effort to "revolutionize land management
749 Rowland in Durbin, Tree Huggers, 211.
750 Marcot and Thomas, O f Spotted Owls, 11.
751 Hampton, "A Problem, Not a Solution," 25.
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in the Pacific N orthw est/' This outcome was not anticipated
when the president asked the "best scientists" to find ways to
protect the forest environm ent while minimizing the hum an
impact. The new policy developed by the FEMAT is not a
balanced solution to the forest debate.752
Other industry representatives criticized the process as a product of
"scientific opinion, not process," pointing to its political nature and arguing
that the process was too exclusive. James Newberry, a manager for Potlach
Corporation, wrote in the Journal o f Forestry:
The FEMAT report, in large part, is the opinion of a group of
scientists and not the result of a rigorous application of the
scientific method. Therefore, a group composition is critical to
an objective evaluation and implementable plan. I believe the
FEMAT team lacked the broad perspective that w ould have been
achieved by selecting scientists representing a variety of
organizations and specialties as well as on-the-ground managers.
Silvicultural expertise does not appear to be as well represented
as wildlife and fisheries.753
Another critic voiced a more extreme version of the complaint that the
FEMAT process had been too closed, alluding to its secrecy and evasion and
accusing the team of reinstituting the environment versus timber dichotomy:
The FEMAT approach to this charge displayed all of the
characteristics of technocratic self-protection: controlled access,
invisible agenda, obscure language, unaccountable
proceduralization [sic], and most importantly, fallback to the
understood comforts of environm ent versus industry.754
Soon the timber industry translated this critique into a court case
against the Forest Service, using the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
"intended to ensure that Federal agencies treat equally all non-Federal and
nongovernment interests, and not establish advisory committees consisting
752 Ibid., 25.
752 Newberry, "Scientific Opinion, N ot Process," 44.
754 Romm, "Professional Springtime," 47.
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of preferential membership."755 By 1997, the case had not been resolved;
though the government lost the case in Washington, D.C, the judge has
refused to order an injunction halting implementation of the plan.756

Concluding Remarks

Constructing the FEMAT process required a serious political effort and,
ultimately, muscle from the Clinton administration. But, the politicians did
w hat they needed to do, and the FEMAT process went on. Presumably, the
benefits would include a reinstatement of some Forest Service (and hence,
administrative) authority in land management in the owl forests.

Through the FEMAT process, the Forest Service (and other
participants) used the logical frameworks developed by the ISC, Scientific
Panel, and SAT to institute a planning structure for what it w ould call
ecosystem management. Through the planning process, the Forest Service
was be able to designate and distribute resources on the national forests. With
this framework in place, the individual national forests would be able to
construct or revise their own plans and presumably remain w ithin the law.
Presumably, they would be able to incorporate this process of ecosystem
management into the regular Forest Service planning cycle.

755 Marcot and Thomas, Of Spotted Owls, 12
756 Ibid., 12
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Chapter 10
Conclusion

The lordly right o f giving names extends so far that one
should allow oneself to conceive the origin o f language
itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers:
they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and
event roith a sound and, as it were, take possession o f it.
— Frederich Nietzsche
Geneaology o f Morals

What this history demonstrates is that, insofar as Ecosystem Management
pertains to policy, political choices have produced forest policy and its related
science (in the inclusive sense —the historical process and the scientific texts).
Scientists have been involved, but their role has been to construct a technical
process — including the rules, terminology, and information — through which
politicians will struggle for and negotiate over the actual distribution of
resources.757 In the words of FEMAT:
We believe the assessments of the current situation, the
previous assessment of the situation, and the options presented
herein are adequate to support an informed decision as to a
course of action. Our work as scientists, economists, analysts,
and technicians is complete. Whatever decisions that may
emerge from this work are now, most appropriately, in the
hands of elected leaders.758
Thus, the FEMAT team was responsible for defining the parameters of a
political discourse, not for choosing which course the agencies w ould follow.

757 Shannon and Johnson, "Lessons from FEMAT." Loosely speaking FEMAT, Ecosystem
Management was a "user's guide" to ecosystem management
75® FEMAT, Ecosystem Management, 1-3.
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The FEMAT did not make the distinction —directly or indirectly —
between which of its options would be Ecosystem Management and which
would not, because all options were Ecosystem Management options. The
planning process —judging and constructing the viability assessments of
several species across large landscapes, designating certain areas to 'large-scale
management experiments," others to "reserves," and such activities outlined
by FEMAT and the earlier reports are the characteristics that distinguished it
from other managem ent styles.

The process and the language used in articulating and actualizing any of
the options constitute Ecosystem Management, not any particular set of
consequences, or prescriptions. The best the agency can do is make available
to politicians the language and designations of resources for their
negotiations —aside from its ability to lobby, which varies. In producing
ecosystem management, the Forest Service was constructing a planning
framework —a decision-making process with a management language
(including terminology, imagery, cartography). Through ecosystem
management, the Forest Service w ould continue to be executor of the whims
of presidential and congressional politics, but it would again define the terms
of the negotiation. Ecosystem management performs a m ediating role; it
provides a framework for classifying, mapping, and inventorying space,
conceptually linking desire to prescription to activities over that space, and
assessing trade-offs between activities, particularly, logging and preservation.
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An im portant question that remains concerns w hat distinguishes this
process and language, this paradigm, as different from the preceding NFMA
model. (Recall that Ecosystem Management is itself governed by the NFMA.)
Jack Ward Thomas has argued that use of tiered spatial "scales" for assessing
consequences marks the difference.759 Perhaps more im portant is its use of
the process of risk assessment for a wider variety of old-growth "associated"
species viability."760

Another im portant question that remains concerns "W hat marks this
paradigm as being the same as the preceding model?" To me, the most
obvious answ er also links Ecosystem Management w ith MUSY: promises of
a little for everyone. Multiple use promised that, through intensive
management, the national forests could provide game, recreation, and
timber. Ecosystem Management still promises a little bit for everyone —
although now w ith a w ider variety —an expanded range of values, in situ as
well as output-oriented, for instance, ancient trees, habitat for rare species, lod
of spiritual and aesthetic value, structural complexity, biological, diversity,
and so on.

In the years since the agency's "marriage" to Ecosystem Management, the
discourse has moved in the direction of "forest health." Jack Ward Thomas,
as Chief of the Forest Service in 1995, told the 60th N orth American Wildlife
and N atural Resources Conference (NAW), in M inneapolis, Minnesota, that
"By sustaining healthy ecosystems, present and future generations may reap

759 Thomas, "Forest Health," 4.
760 Yaffee attributes great significance to this technology, first used in the Interagency
Scientific Committee report. Spotted Owl, 83.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260
the benefits that healthy, diverse and productive ecosystems provide." Forest
"health" is key here, but its definition is somewhat vague and even circular.
In the NAW paper, Thomas defines a "healthy forest" as one "that is a fully
functioning community of plants and animals and their physical
environment." This would seem straightforward, but "fully functioning"
turns out to be defined relative to objectives: "In this concept, fire, insects,
and disease —at appropriate levels - are components of healthy forests." But,
the idea of "appropriate" follows from the political designation of "objectives
of management and by the economics of management actions."761

Health, the latest pursuit of Ecosystem Management, has to do with the
productive capacities of the material conditions —the "extant biotic and
abiotic influences" ~ available for pursuit of objectives, themselves products
of political desire. In the words of Jack Ward Thomas, speaking as Forest
Service Chief in 1995, "I propose that a desired state of forest health exists
where extant biotic and abiotic influences do not threaten resource
management objectives now or in the future —including ecosystem
function."762 Even Bryan Norton, who longs for science-based management,
admits that ecosystem health is "a highly normative concept."763 In language
"appropriate" to the context, Thomas closes the signification circle, writing
"the desired state of forest health exists where extant biotic and abiotic
influences do not threaten resource management objectives now or in the

761 Thomas, "Forest Health," 3.
762 Ibid., 3.
763 Norton, Toward a Unity , 193,239.
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fu tu r e." ? 6 4

Presumably, even the timber industry would agree to this

definition.

764 Thomas, "Forest Health," 2.
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